The Growth of a Green Industry : Wind Turbines and Innovation in China by Korsnes, Marius Støylen
The Growth of a Green Industry 
Wind Turbines and Innovation in China 
Marius Korsnes 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Philosophy in  
Culture, Environment and Sustainability 
Centre for Development and the Environment 
University of Oslo 
Blindern, Norway 
May 2012 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
Table of Contents 
List of figures, tables and maps V 
Acknowledgements VI 
Abbreviations and glossary VII 
1. Introduction 1 
1.1 A transforming electricity sector 3 
1.2 Understanding the growth of an industry 6 
1.3 Research questions 9 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 10 
2. The Chinese energy sector and the wind industry 11 
2.1 Energy in China 11 
2.2 Modern wind turbines and China 14 
2.2.1 A short introduction to modern wind turbines 14 
2.2.2 Wind turbines in China 16 
2.3 Why a wind turbine industry? 19 
3. Theoretical framework 22 
3.1 Why an innovation system approach? 22 
3.2 The technological innovation system scheme 24 
3.2.1 The meaning of “functions” 26 
3.2.2 Step 1: Defining the TIS and mapping the components 29 
3.2.3 Step 2: Assessing functions and functionality 31 
3.2.4 Step 3: Inducement and blocking mechanisms 35 
3.3 Technology transfer and catch-up 35 
4. Methodology 38 
4.1 Case study research 40 
4.2 Methods of data collection 42 
4.3 Barriers and ethical dilemmas 49 
5. The Chinese wind turbine TIS and structural components 52 
5.1 Defining the TIS 52 
5.2 Actors 55 
IV 
5.2.1 The enterprises 56 
5.2.2 Organisations and associations 59 
5.2.3 Universities and research institutes 59 
5.3 Networks 60 
5.3.1 International networks 62 
5.4 Institutions 66 
5.4.1 The laws and regulations in the wind industry 66 
5.4.2 Culture and norms 72 
6. The functions and functionality of China’s wind industry 76 
6.1 Resource mobilisation 76 
6.1.1 Financial resources 77 
6.1.2 Human resources 81 
6.2 Knowledge development and diffusion 83 
6.2.1 Science-based learning 84 
6.2.2 Experience-based learning 86 
6.3 Influence on the direction of search 90 
6.4 Market formation 94 
6.5 Creating legitimacy 97 
6.6 Entrepreneurial activity 101 
6.7 Development of external economies 103 
6.8 Overall goal and dynamics of the industry 106 
7. External mechanisms influencing the wind turbine TIS 111 
7.1 Blocking 111 
7.2 Inducement 116 
8. Conclusions 119 
Bibliography 128 
Appendices 144 
Appendix 1: List of the formal interviews 144 
Appendix 2: Interview guide (sample) 146 
Appendix 3: The Information and Consent Form 148 
V 
List of figures, tables and maps 
Figures 
Figure 1: The top 15 wind turbine manufacturers, and global market  
shares, 2010 
 
1 
Figure 2: Installed wind capacity of the top five countries, 2000-2011 2 
Figure 3: The relative sizes of commercial wind turbines since the       
1980s 
15 
Figure 4: The principal components of a wind turbine 15 
Figure 5: How a TIS relates to national and sectoral innovation sys-
tems 
 
24 
Figure 6: Steps for analysing a TIS 27 
Figure 7: How functions aid the analysis of the wind turbine supplier 
industry 
 
32 
Figure 8: Value chain for Chinese wind turbine manufacturers 
 
53 
Figure 9: Key actors in China’s wind energy innovation system 56 
Figure 10: Wind power technology transfer networks for Chinese    
firms 
63 
Figure 11: Correspondence between policies and market growth 97 
Table 
Table 1: Comparison between investments and government subsidies   
for renewable energy and fossil fuels in 2010, million US$ 
4 
Map 
Map 1: Distance between wind farms and power demand centres in  
China 
113 
VI 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, my thank goes to the informants to this research project. 
Without your input this study would have been very close to useless. 
All the helpful souls that I met and that helped me out in Beijing deserve recogni-
tion. This goes in particular for An Min and Gao Si at the Swedish Environmental 
Research Institute (IVL) Beijing, Gørild Heggelund (UNDP), Xiaomei Tan 
(WRI), helpful people at Innovation Norway and the Norwegian Embassy, Chris-
tian Ellermann (Ecofys), Jost Wübbeke, Jorrit Gossens, Ruohong Cao, my inter-
preter Hope, and all my classmates and friends in 五道口 and Beijing. The same 
appreciation is directed at all those who answered my e-mails and my many ques-
tions regarding China and the renewable energy industry at the outset of this 
study. 
Special gratitude goes to my two supervisors. Hal Wilhite at the Centre for De-
velopment and the Environment (SUM): your support, useful feedback, great 
knowledge and positive attitude have been irreplaceable and a source of great 
inspiration. Jens Hanson at the Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture 
(TIK): your input has been most decisive to the outcome of the logic and argu-
ment in this thesis. Without your help I would have been left in a theoretical 
limbo. 
I have been highly privileged to enjoy writing my thesis in the best research mi-
lieu thinkable: the Centre for Development and the Environment. To everyone 
there, and especially to my classmates and great reading room buddies: thank 
you. I also express my appreciation for receiving the MILEN scholarship which 
has lead to many interesting new encounters and experiences.  
Lastly, I wish to thank my family and friends who have remained positive, sup-
portive and inquisitive during this process. You made the stormy days feel like a 
breeze. 
Marius Korsnes, 
Oslo, May 2012 
VII 
Abbreviations and glossary 
BNEF  Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CREIA Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association 
CRESP Chinese Renewable Energy Scale-Up Program 
CWPO  China Wind Power Outlook 
CWEA Chinese Wind Energy Association 
DNV   Det Norske Veritas 
ERI  Energy Research Institute 
FIT  Feed-in tariff 
GW  Gigawatt = 1000 MW 
GWEC Global Wind Energy Council 
IEA   International Energy Agency 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
kW  Kilowatt 
kWh  Kilowatt hour: the rate of energy per unit time 
LCOE  Levelised cost of electricity: the price at which electricity must be 
generated from a specific source to equal market prices.  
M&A   Merger and Acquisition: A corporate strategy which involves buy-
ing, selling, dividing and combining of different companies. 
MW  Megawatt = 1000 kW 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
NEA   National Energy Administration 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
R&D  Research and development 
ReLaw  the Renewable Energy Law 
SOE  State Owned Enterprise 
TIS  Technological Innovation System 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
U.S.  The United States of America 
WEO  World Energy Outlook 
WWF  World Wildlife Fund 
XEMC Xiangtan Electric Manufacturing Co., Ltd
1 
1. Introduction 
Ten years ago the Chinese wind turbine industry was virtually non-existent; it 
was unknown to most people both in and outside of the People’s Republic of 
China, and insignificant in comparison with the cutting-edge countries such as 
Denmark, the U.S. and Germany. Today the Chinese wind industry is producing 
more wind turbines than any 
other country, Chinese compa-
nies dominate the list of the 
world’s largest wind turbine 
manufacturers (Figure 1), and 
China is the country which in-
vests the most resources in re-
newable energy globally (CGTI 
2011, REN21 2011). What en-
abled such unprecedented, 
rapid industry development?  
As a result of staggering developments over the last 30 years in China, the coun-
try is now facing multiple and mutually influencing crises ranging from environ-
mental and climatic (Economy 2010), to social, political and economic 
(Fewsmith 2010, Saich 2011). China’s scale makes any Chinese problem a global 
problem, and fortunately, it seems the Chinese government is starting to take 
these concerns seriously. Thus far, however, the quest for economic growth has 
received higher priority than any other consideration by the Chinese leadership 
(Naughton 2010), especially environmental considerations. Yet, not all economic 
activity is necessarily harmful for the environment, and the wind turbine manu-
facturing industry is one example. Understanding how the industry has emerged, 
and how it is performing is the main undertaking of this study. Furthermore, un-
derstanding the growth and performance of the industry can help us understand 
Figure 1: The top 15 wind turbine manu-
facturers, and global market shares, 2010 
Source: Jiang et al. (2011: 40) 
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better the more important question of what role a “green” industry—e.g. the wind 
turbine industry—can play in China’s future electricity mix.  
China’s total wind resource potential is estimated at a capacity of 2,580 GW, of 
which around 200 GW is offshore (Jiang et al. 2011: 36).
1
 Measured in annual 
electricity generation, this resource potential equals 17 per cent more than 
China’s total annual electricity production today (end of 2011) (IPCC 2011: 17, 
businessweek.com 2012). As we observe from Figure 2 below, the installed wind 
electricity capacity in the People’s Republic has developed at a break-neck speed 
which exceeds that of any other country. Such a rapid development, starting 
around 2004, can truly be called a great leap forward. The five countries mapped 
in the figure account for almost three quarters of the total installed wind capacity, 
that is, about 176.4 GW, out of a total 238.5 GW globally (GWEC 2012). 
Figure 2: Installed wind capacity of the top five countries, 2000-2011 
 
Sources: gwec.net (2012) is used for all numbers except for Germany, and for 2010 and 2011, 
where the latest report from GWEC (2012) was used. For Germany, the latest figures were re-
trieved from the BMU (2012). 
Given this rapid growth of installed wind power in China, one can assume that 
China is doing everything right. Taking into consideration that Chinese manufac-
turers captured a domestic market share of 87 per cent in 2010, as opposed to 
only 25 per cent in 2004 (CWPO 2010: 37), it becomes evident that the domestic 
                                              
1
 This is according to the latest official assessment. Another frequently referred to figure is a resource 
potential of least 250 GW onshore and 750 GW offshore (Martinot 2010). 
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manufacturing industry has increased tremendously. Obviously, such a rapid ex-
pansion has carried with it several problems, including grid connection, turbine 
quality, and other issues. The scope of this thesis is not necessarily to highlight 
these problems, but rather to understand how they surface as a consequence of 
the rapid growth—how these issues emerge within a systemic context. In a sense, 
therefore, answering how the industry has flourished also involves looking at 
what the dynamics of the industry are today. 
Progressive government policies and renewable energy development goals are the 
basis of the rapid development of wind energy in China. For example, the last 
five year plan issued by the government had a target of providing 11.4 per cent 
non-fossil primary energy by 2015 (Jiang et al. 2011). By 2020 non-fossil fuels 
are planned to account for a 15 per cent share of final energy (Martinot 2010: 
290).
2
 Out of this 15 per cent share, it is estimated that wind power will contrib-
ute to around 10 per cent of the total, if the goal of 150GW installed wind power 
in 2020 is reached (Jiang et al. 2011: 46). Yet, it is simplistic to assume that gov-
ernment goals and policies alone explain how the industry has grown. Through-
out this thesis, a point has been made to include factors which on the one hand 
illuminate how the government is inducing industry growth, and on the other, 
how many instances are outside government influence.  
1.1 A transforming electricity sector 
China’s electric power sector is dominated by two sources of fuel, coal and hydro 
power. Even though wind electricity generation has grown quickly, it is still far 
below the total amount of coal power production in China. In fact, coal alone fu-
elled about 81 per cent of China’s annual electricity generation in 2008 
(Cunningham 2010: 236), whilst wind electricity generation represented as little 
                                              
2
 In comparison, the EU target for 2020 is for renewables to account for 20 per cent of the final energy 
(Martinot 2010: 290). For the Chinese target, note that non-fossil here includes nuclear power (ibid.), and 
that final energy means a larger absolute quantity of electricity than primary energy (Martinot et al. 2007). 
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as 0.75 per cent of the total in 2009 (Yang et al. 2012: 145), and 1.2 per cent in 
2010 (CWEA 2011: 36).
3
 The rest of the electricity is largely supplied by hydro 
power (ibid.). In terms of CO2 emissions, the use of coal is the source of as much 
as 70 per cent of total emissions in China (Lewis 2010a: 259). Thus, coal electric-
ity is polluting the country, making China the world’s largest emitter of CO2 (al-
though by far not, if calculated per capita) (Economy 2010).  
Table 1: Comparison between investments and government subsidies for 
renewable energy and fossil fuels in 2010, million US$ 
 
Sources: WEO (2011), BNEF (2011) and Morales (2011). Renewable energy here does not 
count large-scale (more than 50 MW) hydro power. The basis for the estimate on renewable 
energy subsidies in China is explained further in Section 6.1.1. To avoid confusion in conven-
tions, I will refer to one billion as 1,000 million throughout the thesis. 
As we see from Table 1, though more money is currently being invested in the 
renewable energy industry, the fossil fuel sector is still receiving far more subsi-
dies, both globally and within China. As long as the fossil fuel industry is heavily 
supported by the Chinese government, one can assume that the renewable energy 
industries taken together will still face difficulties in the future. Finding concrete 
data on the amounts China today invests in fossil fuels has proved thorny. We can 
nevertheless safely assume that Chinese investments in fossil fuels are larger than 
in renewable energy (Eisen 2011).
4
 On a global basis the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) has calculated that if fossil fuel subsidies were to be removed, the 
subsequent emission reductions would correspond to “half the emissions reduc-
tions needed to limit global warming to 2°C” (Clark 2012). Thus, such a seem-
                                              
3
 According to preliminary statistics, this percentage has increased to roughly 1.5 per cent by the end of 
2011, that is, almost 70 TWh of wind electricity generation annually (chinadaily.com.cn 2012)  out of a 
total production of 4600TWh in 2011(businessweek.com 2012). 
4
 As one report puts it: “China’s investment in renewable energy and other green technologies is miniscule 
compared to the resources devoted to its continued building of coal-fired power plants and efforts to se-
cure dirty oil shale supplies in Canada and elsewhere” (Quoted in Eisen 2011: 38). 
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ingly simple measure engenders effective and beneficial climate results. Why is it 
so hard to carry out? 
Transition, technological regimes and lock-in 
A point of departure for this study is that emerging technologies very seldom are 
competitive. Since old technologies have had much more time to establish them-
selves, mutual benefits have developed between the established technology and 
its surrounding institutions—such as in infrastructure, financing and political 
support (Smith 2011). This is what scholars refer to as a technology “lock-in”, or 
“path dependency”, and is the reason why state support is crucial in the nursing 
phase of a new technology’s development (Kemp 1994, Jacobsson 2011). An ex-
ample from the U.S. is illustrative, where nuclear and fossil energy technologies 
have received larger subsidies historically than renewable energy technologies: 
“(...) the federal commitment to [oil and gas] was five times greater than the fed-
eral commitment to renewables during the first 15 years of each subsidies’ life, 
and it was more than 10 times greater for nuclear” (Pfund & Healey 2011: 6). 
Moreover, renewal of energy technologies happens especially slowly because 
capital expenses are large and investments are long term, ranging from 30 to 40 
years for an average coal power station (Jørgensen & Münster 2010: 15). Hence, 
these established technology systems undergo only incremental change—whilst a 
rapid change is what we need given the grave consequences caused by climate 
change. How can such a transition happen? 
The fact that, for the first time in 2010, renewable energy investments globally 
were larger than fossil fuel investments (Morales 2011) is a clear indication of 
the prospects for this industry. Nevertheless, the electricity sector contains some 
of the most relentlessly “locked-in” technologies, and the sector has had no real 
precedent for change (Unruh 2000). Given the high CO2 emissions in the electric-
ity sector in China, one can speak of a “carbon lock-in” of the sector (Unruh & 
Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006). Carbon lock-in can best be understood as “embedded 
in a powerful conditioning social context”, arising from a “combination of sys-
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tematic forces” (Unruh 2000: 817, 818). Therefore, to recognise what leads to 
lock-in of technologies, it is necessary to study their historical development and 
the system surrounding the technologies—often referred to as a technological 
regime (Smith 2011). In general, a technological regime encompasses all factors 
that influence, support and constrain the development of a technology—including 
production and thought processes, routines, knowledge and learning (Dosi & 
Nelson 1994).  
One process of altering a regime is often referred to as disruptive innovation, 
which disturbs or replaces a technological function of an existing industry (Smith 
2011). Disruptive innovations lead to changes in established infrastructures or 
institutions, so that regime characteristics are altered. Although perhaps not im-
mediately evident, the consequences of such a change are that emerging tech-
nologies eventually will replace the established technologies. For instance, elec-
tricity generated from wind turbines demands very different management and 
electricity transmission capacities than from thermal electricity, coercing changes 
in routines and practises of energy incumbents. In the longer term, therefore, 
wind power induces a disruptive change, and contributes—together with other 
renewable energy technologies—to the replacement of energy incumbents. There-
fore, as we seek to understand how the wind industry has grown and what the 
industry dynamics are today, a more important insight emerges, namely how 
China is doing in transforming from a coal-fuelled “grey” to a renewable “green” 
electricity regime. 
1.2 Understanding the growth of an industry 
A technological regime may consist of many innovation systems (Smith 2011). In 
order to understand the growth of the Chinese wind turbine industry, this study 
looks at the growth of technologies and formation of industries through a systems 
lens—a lens honed by innovation system theorists. This framework takes as a 
starting point that technology develops in a web of interactions between actors, 
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networks, and institutions. Innovation is seen as resulting from a broad spectrum 
of factors, and not only, as is commonly perceived, through market forces or re-
search and development. When a new technology emerges, it does so within the 
frames of an established regime. In fact, in all known transitions from one tech-
nological regime to another, the new technology has emerged and developed 
within the existing regime (Kemp 1994). In order for the new technology to 
grow, it is therefore dependent on making a new “path”—it needs to build a sur-
rounding system which supports the technology when facing the incumbent tech-
nologies (Jacobsson 2011). The technological innovation system (TIS) frame-
work, a subsection of the innovation system theory, looks at how emerging tech-
nologies evolve within such a context. The approach is particularly relevant for 
understanding the Chinese wind turbine industry, because it takes technology as a 
point of departure for analysis (Bergek 2002, Bergek et al. 2008, Hekkert & 
Negro 2009). The wind turbine is the technology in question here, and the TIS 
framework allows us to simultaneously study what the industry consists of and 
what the industry dynamics look like over time. Ideally, to understand which fac-
tors have been essential to the growth of an industry, we would wait 10 to 20 
years in order to see how the industry develops. However, if we want to under-
stand today what the industry dynamics are, we need to make an early assess-
ment, which “identifies processes that are precursors to manifest market and in-
dustry growth” (Sandén et al. 2008: 2). The TIS framework captures such proc-
esses (ibid.). By studying how an emerging technology evolves within a “fossil” 
technology regime, we can simultaneously understand better how the electricity 
sector can become “unlocked”. 
Technology transfer 
It is clear that China’s engagement in renewable energy has already had a glob-
ally beneficial effect, not only with respect to clean electricity production per se, 
but also in terms of price reduction, which has increased the willingness to invest 
in renewable energy. Chinese wind and solar manufacturers have induced a sig-
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nificant price-reduction globally, particularly due to increased competition and 
economies of scale (RETCR 2011: 12, 24, bnef.com 2012). This means that the 
Chinese contribution makes it easier and cheaper to harvest the higher-hanging 
fruits that renewable energy sources are. It means that the subsidy ladder can be 
shortened substantially, and possibly be removed more quickly so that wind elec-
tricity can compete with fossil electricity generation. Understanding how the Chi-
nese wind industry has emerged is important if only because of the impact it has 
on renewable energy globally.  
The same way the Chinese wind industry has had a global impact, the industry is 
also highly influenced by technology and knowledge from other countries. Tech-
nology transfer can take many shapes, some of which include foreign direct in-
vestment, technology licensing, or joint ventures (Binz et al. 2012). As will be 
elaborated further in Chapter 2, the Chinese wind turbine industry is based pre-
dominately on licensing technology from abroad. The innovation system analysis 
regards innovation as a complex phenomenon, implying that technology cannot 
simply be transferred as a “gift” from one country to another. Therefore, an im-
portant insight into innovation processes lies in understanding what role technol-
ogy transfer may take. As highlighted by two innovation theorists, Gu and 
Lundvall (2006: 27), “borrowing technology and domestic development of tech-
nology are both important; they actually are complementary in most real innova-
tion processes”. Technology transfer can be understood as a natural diffusion 
process in a global context which is crucial when building up any industry. These 
territorial conditions as a determinant for successful innovation become highly 
explicit in emerging countries such as China because, as export-oriented econo-
mies, they are involved in an interdependent nexus of actors, networks, and insti-
tutions from all over the world (Binz et al. 2012). Research and development ac-
tivities are also increasingly taking place within China, whether from foreign or 
domestic initiatives (Steinfeld 2010: 148). Such activities are not isolated from 
their surroundings: instead, they must be viewed as part and parcel of a Chinese 
and an international system. Given this international interconnectedness, it be-
9 
comes clear that a transition can best be studied by simultaneously looking at 
global and local innovation processes (Coenen et al. 2012). One reason the TIS 
framework is useful is that understanding the growth of a specific industry is the 
prime issue of concern—irrespective of the “origin” of a technology. Part of the 
scope will therefore be to understand how the wind turbine industry draws upon 
international flows in knowledge, technologies and investment.  
1.3 Research questions 
To oversimplify somewhat, we can say that we have a global problem; climate 
change, we have a Chinese problem; coal fuelled electricity supply and CO2 
emissions, and we have an alternative solution; an emerging electricity technol-
ogy which does not emit CO2—wind power. Starting from the assumption that 
technology and society have developed interdependently, understanding how new 
TISs emerge and what their industry dynamics are helps to understand how tech-
nological regimes can change—in this case, understanding how the Chinese elec-
tricity sector can transform from a “grey” to a “green” power supply.  
The overarching research questions for this thesis are: 
- How has the Chinese wind industry grown, and what are the dynamics of 
the industry today? 
Consequently, two more sets of questions emerge as particularly interesting to 
pursue in detail, namely: 
- What is the role of the Chinese government in the development of the in-
dustry, and what does this role mean for the wind turbine TIS dynamics? 
- How has the global wind industry affected the Chinese wind TIS devel-
opment? 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 will give a short introduction to China’s energy sector, and the histori-
cal development of the wind turbine in and outside of China. The chapter will 
also briefly touch upon the question of why China pursues to develop a wind tur-
bine industry. Chapter 3 will further outline the theoretical framework chosen for 
this study, followed by methods in Chapter 4, which justifies the choice of a case 
study approach and how it was deployed to answer my research questions. Chap-
ters 5 and 6 delve into the specifics of the Chinese wind industry. Chapter 5 first 
makes clear the delimitation for the wind industry, and then maps the actors, net-
works, and institutions accordingly. In Chapter 6 the functional aspects are exam-
ined point by point, and an assessment is made on the performance of the industry 
in light of key processes in the industry. In Section 6.8, the dynamics between 
these processes are highlighted, after determining a relevant overall industry goal. 
Chapter 7 then looks at what potential blocking and inducement mechanisms 
might have influenced the development. These external mechanisms illuminate 
what impact the established electricity regime has on the Chinese wind turbine 
TIS. Finally, in Chapter 8, some final conclusions for this thesis are made.  
11 
2. The Chinese energy sector and the wind 
industry 
From the beginning of China’s reform period, starting in 1978, until today it has 
been possible to distinguish key concerns amongst decision makers in China as to 
which direction the energy sector should move in. Meidan et al. (2009) note two 
important concerns to be energy efficiency and conservation. Also, renewable 
energy has been for some time now, and will likely continue to be, at the fore-
front of China’s energy policies (Huang et al. 2011). In the following, I will give 
a brief introduction to China’s energy sector, before the history of wind turbines 
in China is further outlined. Lastly, we shall briefly look at the question why 
China seeks to build up a wind industry. 
2.1 Energy in China 
The energy sector is sometimes referred to as the last “fortress” of the planned 
economy in China (e.g. M. Wang 2007: 248), meaning that the sector is highly 
centralised and not very flexible or open to change. This picture is increasingly 
challenged, as a conception prevails that marshalling resources to meet China’s 
considerable energy needs is based on more than central planning (Cunningham 
2010). Although central leadership is important for energy decisions, it is only 
one of several influential factors. As a matter of fact, energy decisions are highly 
politicised in China because they involve many different actors with diverging 
interests and objectives. This has lead to a state of affairs where there is  
a ‘leadership vacuum’ in China over energy policy and many decisions are 
driven by projects promoted by localities or industries rather than being 
guided by a coherent national energy policy (Kong 2009: 791). 
Therefore, a change in energy policy amongst the top-level leadership does not 
necessarily equal smooth implementation throughout the system. This is because 
decisions face strong institutional constraints, ranging from “the vague and con-
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tradictory nature of the relevant laws and regulations; the nature of economic in-
centives for local government officials to prioritize economic growth at the ex-
pense of energy efficiency and the environment”, to the expectations and beliefs 
amongst the Chinese people (Meidan et al. 2009: 615). As we shall see in this 
paper, a burgeoning wind industry has to deal with these institutional constraints.  
Perhaps one cause for the troubles in implementing energy decisions is the rela-
tively small staff of the central government energy management. According to 
Cunningham (2010: 253), only 112 people are employed in the National Energy 
Administration, which is divided into nine departments. In comparison, the U.S. 
Department of Energy employs almost 15,000 individuals working with energy 
policy (ibid: 254). Such a striking difference in employee numbers is remarkable, 
especially given the size of China’s energy sector. In fact, in 2009 China sur-
passed the U.S. as the world’s largest primary energy producer. At the same time, 
China provided over 94 per cent of this energy domestically (ibid: 223). It is 
therefore understandable that energy decisions are allocated downwards in the 
system.  
Also, even though energy management can be perceived as more decentralised in 
China, most analysts agree that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) still have a large 
impact on energy decision making (Downs 2008, Meidan et al. 2009). We shall 
come back to their impact in the wind industry later on, but for now it is impor-
tant to clarify that “state-owned” does not necessarily equate to “state-controlled” 
(Cunningham 2007: 2). Instead, these powerful enterprises are relatively autono-
mous actors, and sometimes advance corporate ahead of national interests 
(Downs 2008: 42). Cunningham (2007: 1) stresses that, following the state-
owned enterprise reform by the central government, the SOEs became “newly 
empowered corporate actors whose operations are largely obscured from official 
view, and who selectively tap state resources as they see fit”. This seriously chal-
lenges any perceptions that China—with an authoritarian government—“knows 
13 
what it wants” and easily “gets what it wants” (Kong 2009: 810). This recogni-
tion shall be kept in mind when analysing the Chinese wind industry. 
Hence, viewing the energy sector as centrally governed and inert is misleading. 
Rather, the sector is highly innovative, and absorbs and develops technologies 
quickly. Indeed, Steinfeld (2010: 164) claims that “whether they are multinational 
or indigenous firms doing the work, it is in the China market that numerous new-
to-the-world energy technologies are being developed and deployed for the first 
time.” Nuclear and thermal electric power generation technologies are cases in 
point (ibid.), and in a few years wind turbine technologies might well be added to 
that list. On the one hand, this shows that energy technology can be innovative in 
China, something which gives hope for the wind industry. On the other hand, this 
may imply that a transition from a grey to a green electricity sector might take a 
long time, given that the energy incumbents are so innovative. Even though the 
incumbents develop energy technologies, they are still firmly placed within the 
established carbon lock-in, because they are based on fossil-fuels (except nuclear 
power).  
The electric power sector 
Table 1 above groups fossil fuels together, but it should be pointed out there is a 
distinction between the subsidies given in China to oil and gas, and those given to 
coal. Historically, coal has been subsidised, and thermal electricity utilities have 
benefitted from this. Even though all coal prices were officially deregulated in 
1994, thermal coal prices were still subsidised in the early 2000s because of 
backsliding in implementation, and it was not until 2006 that the last province 
abolished state-subsidised thermal coal pricing for power plants (Cunningham 
2010: 240). This means that most of the subsidies mentioned above are in fact 
given to the oil and gas industry, which is not as heavily engaged in the electric 
power sector. Therefore, the role the coal-fuelled power industry has in respect to 
the wind turbine industry is particularly elusive, not only because it is the major 
electric power “competitor” to wind power, but also because the largest wind 
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farm investors are large, central-government-owned coal-power utilities. As we 
shall see, these large electricity generation companies without doubt have a large 
impact on the wind industry. Yet they only own around 40 per cent of total elec-
tricity generation, whilst local governments own more than half of China’s power 
generation capacity (ibid.: 243). It is therefore not adequate to measure support to 
energy incumbents in terms of direct subsidies alone. To comprehend the growth 
of the Chinese wind industry we need a holistic approach which highlights all 
potentially influential aspects. 
2.2 Modern wind turbines and China 
2.2.1 A short introduction to modern wind turbines 
Modern wind turbines have slowly developed since the 1950s and 60s, becoming 
larger in size and more efficient in electricity production (Figure 3). The turbines 
that are mainstream today spread slowly from countries which led in implement-
ing wind-supportive policies, such as the U.S., Germany and Denmark, but are 
now found in more than 75 countries worldwide (Manwell et al. 2009: 2, 
gwec.net 2012). A modern wind turbine distinguishes itself from traditional tur-
bines, or windmills, by converting the wind into electricity. The most common 
wind turbine capacities installed today are around 1.5 MW, although this varies 
from region to region: for instance, the preferred turbine sizes are 2.5 MW in the 
U.K., and 1.4 MW in China (REN21 2011: 40). The largest commercial turbine 
launched thus far is a 7 MW offshore turbine from Vestas (ibid.), although design 
capacities can range as high as 10 MW (10,000 kW in Figure 3) or more.   
15 
 
Source: IPCC (2011) 
As displayed in Figure 4, the principal components of a wind turbine are the rotor 
(the blades), the drive train (the gearbox, if any), 
the generator, the main frame (e.g. the nacelle 
cover), the yaw system (e.g. a yaw bearing), and 
the tower (Manwell et al. 2009: 276). I will 
come back to these different components peri-
odically in the analysis of the Chinese wind tur-
bine industry, because components manufactur-
ers are important actors in the wind industry. 
Much research on innovation and wind turbines 
has already been conducted, and this facilitates 
the analysis for China greatly. For instance, the 
developments in the Danish, Dutch, Swedish, 
U.S., and German wind industries, all pioneers 
at some point in wind turbine development, have been studied in detail (e.g. 
Garud & Karnøe 2003, Bergek & Jacobsson 2003, Kamp et al. 2004, Hendry & 
Harborne 2011). We now turn to a short description of China’s modern history of 
wind turbines. 
Figure 3: The relative sizes of commercial wind turbines since the 1980s 
Figure 4: The principal 
components of a wind 
turbine 
Source: Manwell et al. (2009: 4) 
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2.2.2 Wind turbines in China 
The modern wind turbine history of China can be divided into two phases: one 
which lasted until the mid 1990s, where the focus was largely on expanding the 
smaller, decentralised, off-grid wind turbines, and a second which focussed on 
manufacturing and implementing large-scale, grid-connected wind turbines (Gan 
1998). The first phase was characterised by government support programmes that 
emphasised rural electrification, as well as the build up of manufacturing capaci-
ties (ibid.). The first subsidy ever given to renewable energy in China was given 
from the Inner-Mongolian local government in 1986 for small-scale wind turbine 
projects (Lew 2000: 277). By the 1990s, China already produced more small-
scale wind turbines than any other country (ibid.). Today China is a global leader 
in the manufacture and export of small wind turbines (up to 100 kW), and be-
tween 1983 and 2008 China produced a total of 508,712 small off-grid wind tur-
bines, with an installed capacity of 57 MW (REN21 2009a: 17,18). However in-
teresting this development is, the second phase is the main focus of attention 
here.  
During the 1990s, regional government policies shifted focus from a household 
level, to larger wind farms that could produce electricity for whole villages (Gan 
1998). The central government started to perceive wind power as a future source 
of large-scale electricity generation, and in 1996 the “Ride the Wind” programme 
was initiated to start up utility-scale grid-connected wind power (Zhao et al. 
2009: 2884). This programme emphasised the introduction of foreign technolo-
gies, as well as supporting local manufacturing of turbines (ibid.). This dual path 
of both building a domestic manufacturing industry as well as ensuring actual 
electricity generation from grid-connected wind turbines from the outset has been 
a core strategy for the Chinese government (BNEF 2010). Naturally, most of the 
technology employed in the beginning was supplied from foreign wind compa-
nies from Denmark, the U.S., the Netherlands, or Germany (Gan 1998). This was 
despite the fact that wind turbine prototypes of 100-200 kW were tested and 
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demonstrated by local manufacturing firms between 1985 and 1995 (ibid: 17). 
The failure in commercialising these Chinese designs resulted in a reliance on 
foreign turbines, which were cheaper at that time. In 1996, only 1.7 per cent of 
the 56 MW of installed wind capacity in China was produced by Chinese turbines 
(ibid: 18). Large foreign companies, such as Vestas and BONUS (today Siemens) 
became increasingly interested in the Chinese wind market at the end of the 
1980s (ibid.), and Vestas is still ranked among the top ten largest wind turbine 
providers in China in terms of total market share today (CWPO 2010). 
Even though the direct indications are difficult to deduce, it is highly plausible 
that the focus on small-scale wind power made it easier for the government to 
promote a legislative framework for grid-connected turbines. The development of 
the larger wind turbines started in the 1990s, and has grown almost exponentially 
since. Yet, to the knowledge of the author, not much spill-over in terms of tech-
nology innovation has happened. Instead, technology was either licensed from 
abroad or jointly designed with a foreign company, something which became the 
prime model of wind turbine development in China  (Lewis 2011: 287). Today, 
some Chinese manufacturers possess the key manufacturing technology for MW-
scale wind turbines, and are capable of doing independent research and develop-
ment (R&D) (ibid.). Also, the industrial manufacturing chain for wind turbines is 
relatively complete domestically, although manufacturing capabilities for some 
key parts, including high-precision bearings, control systems and converters, are 
still weak and depend on imports (REN21 2009a: 18, BNEF 2010, CNRED 
2011b: 17). 
As an example, Goldwind is the oldest large-scale Chinese wind turbine manu-
facturer, established in 1998 (Lewis 2007: 222). This company started out as a 
wind farm developer in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the western most province 
in China, and is 55 per cent state-owned (ibid.).  Goldwind licensed their first 
turbine from a small German turbine designer, Jacobs, which was later acquired 
by the German manufacturer REpower (ibid.). Goldwind has since licensed tur-
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bine designs from REpower and Vensys, and another German manufacturer, 
which designs direct drive turbines (which do not have a gearbox). In 2008, 
Goldwind became the majority owner of Vensys (Lewis 2011: 287). Some of the 
licensing agreements have certain requirements, such as a prohibition of usage 
outside of China, or limitations on future design modifications, as, for instance, 
for the REpower licensed turbine for Goldwind (ibid.). This also applies to other 
Chinese manufacturers. For example, Mingyang, the fifth largest Chinese turbine 
manufacturer, is only allowed to manufacture and distribute their aerodyn li-
censed turbines domestically (Mingyang 2011).  
Furthermore, the licenses are not cheap. As an illustration, the licensing agree-
ment Goldwind had with Jacobs required the company to pay a EUR 5,000 roy-
alty per turbine produced (Lewis 2007: 222), and Mingyang currently has to pay a 
royalty between 0.5 and 2 per cent of the sales price, depending on the amount of 
turbines sold (Mingyang 2011). In 2009, an estimated US$ 450 million, covering 
patent royalties, licenses and technical service, flowed from China to Europe and 
the U.S., financing research and development of wind turbines there (CWPO 
2010: 50). All in all, the strategy the Chinese industry has chosen is perhaps best 
reflected in the slogan of the Chinese-Dutch wind turbine producer XEMC-
Darwind: “Dutch design integrity & Chinese industrialization power” (XEMC-
Darwind 2012). 
The development of the industry will be examined more closely in later chapters, 
but two important issues should be noted for later reference: Firstly, the govern-
ment has initiated several programmes to induce wind power growth. One impor-
tant planned programme is often referred to as the “Three Gorges of the Air”, 
consisting of seven large wind power bases of more than 10 GW each, which was 
started in 2008 (CWPO 2010: 7). This programme covers a major part of the 
added wind power capacity, and a planned capacity of 138 GW will be produced 
from these bases in 2020, provided the grid capacity is adequate (ibid.). Secondly, 
the rapid development of the Chinese industry has lead to several technical chal-
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lenges that need to be addressed. The main challenges are related to the perform-
ance and quality of Chinese turbines, with uncertainties over their long term per-
formance, transmission constraints for remote regions, a lack of qualified person-
nel, and time lags in connecting wind farms to the electricity grid (Martinot 
2010). As I shall later discuss, a common denominator for these problems is the 
speed with which the industry has developed; for instance, the short time-span 
that Chinese turbines have been in operation, which means that their long-term 
performance is unknown. 
2.3 Why a wind turbine industry? 
One might ask why China chooses to pursue such an aggressive manufacturing 
policy given the fact that imported turbines were both cheaper and better-
performing at the outset. An immediate reflection is simply that they can. Manu-
facturing is something that China has much experience in; therefore it seems per-
fectly natural to attract this industry, since China has attracted industry after in-
dustry since the beginning of the reform period in 1978 (Kroeber 2011).
5
 As a 
report from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2010) puts it: “When there is de-
mand for a new product, Chinese companies seek to supply it; PV modules and 
wind turbines are no exception”. Nonetheless, there are several equally viable 
explanations for China’s heavy engagement in the wind turbine industry. China’s 
concern for energy security, climate change (Bambawale & Sovacool 2011), en-
vironmental degradation and pollution (Economy 2010), future comparative ad-
vantage in clean technologies, as well as domestic electricity shortages and politi-
cal stability are all highly compelling explanations that cannot be understood 
solely on their own terms. The industry arguably mushrooms within a nexus of 
demands: energy, environment, politics, and economy. One particularly illuminat-
ing explanation that shall receive some attention here is China’s quest for “in-
                                              
5
 Some examples include high speed rail transport, information technology, auto assembly, and the civil 
aviation sector (Moran 2011: 3). 
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digenous innovation”—where renewable energy serves one of the crucial future 
economic sectors.  
In 2010 the renewable energy industry (solar, wind, and biomass) was one of 
seven new strategic industries the Chinese government named to help advance 
economic development, foster innovation, and promote domestic technologies 
(CGTI 2011: 28). According to this plan, an estimated US$ 231,000 million will 
be invested exclusively in wind power between 2011 and 2020 (Pan et al. 2011: 
14). A much stronger government support signal than this is hard to find in 
China, making renewable energy one of the most important industries in the 
country (Medland 2012). In spite of—or perhaps because of—China’s growing 
manufacturing industry, which has contributed to their rapid economic growth, an 
increasing concern for the government has been China’s dependence on foreign 
technology. “Indigenous innovation” has been proposed as an answer to these 
concerns (Cao et al. 2009, Kennedy 2010, Kroeber 2011). China’s new 15-year 
“Medium to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology”, 
issued in 2006, has as a goal the transformation of China into an “innovation ori-
ented nation”, and gives hints as to how China will deal with issues such as tech-
nological dependency and domestic innovation, environmental concerns and re-
source utilisation, as well as human resources and education (Cao et al. 2009). If 
one looks at China’s export sector, the problem is that most of the high-
technology exports are produced by multinational companies that own the tech-
nology (Moran 2011). Moreover, the technology spill-over effects from these 
investments, Moran (2011) claims, have been very low. So China seeks to ac-
quire not only the manufacturing ability, but also the design capacity, and thereby 
the intellectual property rights. Chinese firms can then “collect rather than pay 
royalties and license fees” (Kroeber 2011: 63).  
In the wind industry, the advantages of building a domestic manufacturing indus-
try are perceived to be numerous. In addition to the “indigenous innovation” con-
cern, the goal from the outset was not only to accelerate the development of wind 
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farms, but also to make it cheaper than relying on imported turbines (Howell et 
al. 2010, BNEF 2010). In the period between 2006 and 2011the industry has cre-
ated an estimated 200,000 direct jobs (Pan et al. 2011), contributing to a substan-
tial increase in China’s proportion of green jobs. While these explanations of why 
China chooses to invest in wind energy are illuminating, they do not tell us how 
the industry has come into existence. They give us important indicators, to be 
sure, but reducing China’s technology dependency in terms of “indigenous inno-
vation” does not seem to reconcile with the strategy of transferring technology to 
China. For this reason the rest of this thesis will focus on examining how China’s 
industry has grown, and what the specific dynamics of the industry are. We seek 
to understand better how technology enters the country, how it is assimilated and 
developed within the country—and how the Chinese government influences these 
processes within the wind industry. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
All theory, dear friend, is gray, but the golden tree of life springs ever 
green. 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
For a tree to grow it needs the right temperature, nutriment, light and soil. Much 
like Goethe’s tree, the act of describing the technical features of a tree cannot 
compare to the beautiful reality of how a tree looks, although providing such a 
description is still a worthy intellectual endeavour. Similarly, the overall objec-
tive of this study is to analyse how a green industry has grown. In order to suc-
ceed in this undertaking, we need hints as to what the right temperature, nutri-
ments, light and soil for an emerging industry are. As we will see in this chapter, 
innovation systems literature provides a comprehensive account of how industries 
grow, and it is therefore convenient for our objective. Wind energy is still a mar-
ginal portion of the energy sector globally, and the technological innovation sys-
tem (TIS) framework in particular has provided better insights into emerging 
technologies and how they face entanglement with a host of vested interests and 
actors. 
3.1 Why an innovation system approach? 
The innovation system literature developed in the 1980s as a response to main-
stream economic theory, which treats innovations as extraordinary, exogenous 
events (Lundvall 2010: 8). Based on Schumpeter’s definition of innovation as 
“already existing knowledge, combined in new ways”, the innovation system ana-
lysts argue that innovation is ubiquitous, continuous and cumulative. Innovation 
should not be regarded as a single, isolated event, but rather as a process where 
interactive learning and collective entrepreneurship are crucial components (ibid: 
9). A core assumption amongst innovation system researchers is that technology 
is structured by its environment, and that innovation processes take place within 
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these structures (Smith 2011: 26). Conceptualisations of technological regimes 
and technological trajectories are frequently referred to when describing how the 
learning and knowledge environment shape the direction technology develops 
through tacit agreements of involved agents (Malerba 2005). Somewhat simpli-
fied put, coordinated activity in terms of organisational and cognitive routines 
shared by firms and engineers constitute a technological regime (Geels 2002). 
These shared routines in turn “decide” what type of innovations may take place 
within the regime, and hence the technological trajectory it takes (ibid.). Tech-
nology can therefore be viewed as part and parcel of a complex socio-technical 
system, a social and dynamic system where learning and interaction happens, and 
where positive feed-back spurs reproduction and re-combinations of knowledge. 
The different determinants of innovations processes include economic, social, 
political, organisational or institutional factors, as long as these factors influence 
the development, diffusion and use of innovations in one way or another (Edquist 
2005: 182). Based on this definition, it quickly becomes evident that the build-up 
of industries is part of the scope, and that this has an important economic impact 
on a country. Therefore, the approach is suitable for understanding the formation 
and growth of an industry. 
The systems approach to innovation has met criticism on several points: that it is 
weak in giving concrete policy goals (Bergek et al. 2008a), that power structures 
and political interests are not sufficiently taken into account (Kasa 2011), or that 
there is a too stark focus on public institutions in the innovation process, which 
can be compared to “trying to understand a disease by studying the doctors treat-
ing it” (Aasen & Amundsen 2011: 243, 244). Some of this criticism is incorpo-
rated in the technological innovation system framework, which has been chosen 
for this study. Under the innovation system umbrella there are several ways of 
defining the level of analysis, and these can roughly be grouped into two main 
approaches: one which “delineates systems on the basis of technological, indus-
trial, or sectoral characteristics”, and one which emphasises geography, such as 
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Figure 5: How a TIS relates to national 
and sectoral innovation systems 
Source: Modified version of Markard and Truffer 
(2008: 600) 
national or regional borders (Fagerberg 2005: 12). Since this study will focus on 
the formation and growth of an industry, the former approach is applied here.  
3.2 The technological innovation system scheme 
The seminal studies viewing technologies, industries and sectors from a systemic 
point were done in the 1980s and 1990s (Hughes 1983, Carlsson & Stankiewicz 
1991, Malerba 2005). According to Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991: 112), tech-
nological systems differ from national systems in three ways. First, the former 
refers to a specific “techno-industrial area”, instead of all areas of a national sys-
tem. Second, technological systems are not necessarily restrained by national 
borders. This means, for instance, that industries that are international or even 
global in nature can be included in the analysis, as is illustrated in Figure 5 be-
low. As China’s growth today is based on the export sector and the inflow of for-
eign investments, interdependencies with foreign innovations systems are impor-
tant factors to include in the analysis (Binz & Truffer 2009). Third, microeco-
nomic aspects are given higher relevance because the macro-perspective is weak 
in pinpointing exactly what contributes where.  
In general, one can say that the 
different levels of analysis address 
innovation dynamics at their re-
spectively aggregated areas. These 
dynamics may just as well influ-
ence the technology in question 
for the TIS analysis. If we, for 
instance, picture TIS 2 in Figure 5 
as the international wind turbine 
industry, we see that wind turbines 
are used across sectors, e.g. the 
energy sector and the agriculture sector, as well as across nations. Even though 
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they are part of the explanation, national- or sectoral systems of innovation are 
not as effective as the TIS framework in capturing all potential influences for a 
specific technology. Nevertheless, one of the great challenges in using the TIS 
approach is to define the limits of the technological system in focus, because di-
viding a system from its environment is not a clear cut-matter. This challenge will 
be addressed several times throughout the study. 
The goal of this paper is to study the growth of the wind turbine manufacturing 
industry in China in order to understand better the dynamics of the industry today, 
and to map the key influential factors. The technological innovation system 
framework not only maps the structural characteristics of a specific innovation 
system, but also attempts to develop concrete suggestions of “functions”, or key 
processes, that need be fulfilled in order for an innovation system to operate op-
timally. Using these concrete suggestions, which have been developed based on a 
number of empirical studies, it is possible to make a judgement of how and how 
well an innovation system works (Bergek 2002, Bergek et al. 2008a, Hekkert & 
Negro 2009). In other words, the TIS framework is a tool which is particularly 
strong in “identifying bottlenecks and systemic strengths and weaknesses” 
(Hanson 2011: 2).  
The framework is grounded in Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991: 111) as the con-
ception of a technological system, which may be defined as: 
a network of agents interacting in a specific economic/industrial area un-
der a particular institutional infrastructure or set of infrastructures and in-
volved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of technology (original 
italics).  
We see that this is in line with the innovation systems approach in general. Carls-
son and Stankiewicz also make a distinction between technology as knowledge 
and competence flows (software) and technology as goods and services (hard-
ware). They choose to incorporate only the former, whilst Bergek et al. (2008a: 
408) include both these in their definition of technology, as well as a third com-
ponent: knowledge as embodied in a physical artefact, i.e. technology itself. This 
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makes the analysis broader, because the spectrum of possibly influential factors 
for technology development is enlarged, but the end-effect is highly dependent 
upon the nature of the questions raised. For instance, if a product is studied, the 
principal interest tends to be the diffusion and usage of a this technology, whilst a 
focus on technology as knowledge tends to be more concerned with problem-
solving and the generation of new knowledge (Carlsson et al. 2002: 239). Irre-
spective of this distinction, the core of the argument remains the same, namely 
that by studying a technological system one follows the evolution of a technology 
and its surroundings, so that the dynamism over time of the involved components 
can be measured. 
3.2.1 The meaning of “functions” 
Thomas P. Hughes (1983: 5), one of the pioneers in studying technical systems, 
emphasises that the interconnected components of technical systems “are often 
centrally controlled”, and this control is practised in order to “optimize the sys-
tem’s performance and to direct the system toward the achievement of goals”. 
The goal of an electric production system, for instance, is to produce enough 
electricity for the end-user. Therefore, one may say that the different components 
of the system all contribute to the goal of the system; otherwise they are not part 
of that system. In the TIS framework, this contribution of the components to the 
goal is referred to as key processes, or “functions” (Bergek 2002: 28). The overall 
goal of the innovation system is often taken to be “to develop, diffuse and use 
innovation” (Edquist 2005: 190). By focussing on the functions that contribute to 
the overall goal, one can dissect the components which together constitute an or-
gan. Hence, the functions indicate the performance of the innovation system in 
question, and this is also where the novelty of the TIS framework appears. Even 
though we shall continue to refer to these as functions, it is important to note that 
they in reality are processes that evolve dynamically as an industry develops. 
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Anna Bergek et al. (2008a) set forth a six-step guide, or scheme of analysis, with 
the objective of identifying key policy issues and set policy goals when analysing 
specific innovation systems. The paper formalises what in this study is taken to 
be the core of the TIS framework. Conveniently, the TIS approach has been de-
veloped chiefly with empirics from the renewable energy field (Hekkert & Negro 
2009: 584). This may facilitate the usage of the framework in this specific re-
search project, because it not only reveals the characteristics of the innovation 
system, but also the main determinants of renewable energy manufacturing indus-
tries.
6
 
Figure 6: Steps for analysing a TIS 
 
Source: Modified version of Bergek et al. (2008a) 
Above, a brief sketch of how the scheme of analysis manifests itself is presented. 
A more detailed presentation of the framework will appear in Chapter 5 with the 
                                              
6
 The functional approach has also received some criticism, for instance by Lundvall et al. (2009: 5), 
where they point out that a functional list can work as a check list for governments,  but add that several 
other factors could be listed, such as competition, openness to international trade and capital flows, labour 
market dynamics, social welfare systems, and social capital. 
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analysis of the Chinese wind turbine manufacturing industry. Some of the steps 
that Bergek et al. (2008a) present have been merged for practical reasons, so that 
this study contains only three steps, namely: 1) defining the TIS and mapping the 
structural components, 2) assessing functions and functionality and 3) induce-
ment and blocking mechanisms. This is shown in Figure 6, where the original 
steps are indicated in small black writing, and the new ones in large white writ-
ing.  
Bergek et al.’s (2008a) six steps are highly interrelated, and by merging some of 
the steps the analysis therefore becomes more coherent when examining the dy-
namics of a TIS. Also, a last step, “Key policy issues”, can be included. It is, 
however, not a part of this study, because this step involves an assessment of 
what should be done. Since the goal of this research project is to understand what 
has been done, including this last step would be an overstretch. Instead, in Sec-
tion 6.8, I discuss what the industry dynamics look like with a given overall goal. 
In light of the interviews conducted for this study, many informants made it clear 
that exporting turbines would become a future challenge. Taking this as an over-
all goal, we can see if the functions currently are served, and how functional dy-
namics would correspond to such a challenge.  
The arrow from step six, key policy issues, which leads back to step two, the 
structural components, indicates that the policy advice is actually addressed to the 
actors, networks and institutions of a TIS. To be sure, changes in policy might 
lead to unexpected changes in the functionality of the TIS. This would imply that 
the analyst should re-start at step one, since a TIS is not static. Apart from these 
changes, the procedure and build-up of the analysis remains similar to the origi-
nal. Notably, these steps are not to be taken as a linear approach, and should be 
examined more or less simultaneously.  
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3.2.2 Step 1: Defining the TIS and mapping the components 
It is crucial to initially identify the boundaries of the technological innovation 
system in question. As is thoroughly underlined by Carlsson et al. (2002), defin-
ing the system and mapping the components are two sides of the same coin. De-
fining the boundaries of the specific technology system can prove difficult, since 
the dynamic character of the system implies that actors, networks and institutions 
may change over time. The delimitation of a field of study is the main determi-
nant for the definition of a TIS. Put differently, the questions asked will define 
the level chosen. According to Bergek et al. (2008a: 411) there are three main 
choices to make: 1) to choose between a knowledge field or a product, 2) to 
choose between breadth or depth, and 3) to choose a spatial domain. Carlsson et 
al. (2002: 239) maintain that the delineation of TISs is not as problematic when 
the focus is on a product group, such as wind turbines. However, the next two 
choices can be more elusive because they have implications for which structural 
components will be included in the analysis. In the case of the wind turbine in-
dustry, a decision has to be made as to how much of a cluster is to be included, 
since the focus is on a group of related firms. Fortunately, it is fairly clear who 
the user of a wind turbine is, how it will be applied, and what the boundary of the 
technology is. This will be outlined thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6. The third 
choice above relates to the fact that TISs generally are of a global character, and 
therefore the global context needs to be closely examined and compared with the 
local TIS (Bergek et al. 2008a). Nevertheless, as we shall come back to at the end 
of this chapter, and in Chapter 5, the spatial characteristics of TISs has received 
less attention in the literature thus far (Coenen et al. 2012). 
The three main structural elements in a TIS are the firms and organisations (ac-
tors), networks
7
 and institutions (Jacobsson 2011: 45). This division is only an 
analytical construct, and in China one will find government involvement across 
                                              
7
 Networks and systems are fairly similar concepts, however, according to Fagerberg et al. (2005: 13), ”a 
system will typically have more ‘structure’ than a network, and be of a more enduring character.” 
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the spectrum. On the one hand, the Chinese state is unique; yet on the other hand, 
fostering a new technology (system) anywhere in the world often requires the 
state to be present. The complexity resides in deciding, for this specific industry, 
what—if any—is the difference in the Chinese case? Certainly, determining the 
exact proportion of government involvement is beyond the reach of this research 
project, yet an attempt will be made to pinpoint the government influence 
throughout the innovation process within the wind turbine industry.  
First, the actors of the chosen TIS need to be identified. These can be firms along 
the whole value chain, universities and research institutes, as well as public insti-
tutions or interest organisations, such as industry associations (Bergek et al. 
2008a). When identifying the actors, it may be difficult to find all the actors in 
the system, and also to decide whether a specific actor actually belongs to the 
system. Most TIS theorists agree that firms are the key actors in an innovation 
system (Coenen & Díaz López 2010: 1152), because they are the ones actually 
carrying out most innovations. The actors within the wind turbine industry can be 
recognized by looking at industry association lists or trade statistics, yet it is more 
difficult to gain access to Chinese government institutions.  
Second, the networks within the TIS should be outlined. Networks in innovation 
systems mushroom when there is a need for communication. This communication 
is crucial in building up trust and reducing the uncertainty that the marketing of 
an invention brings (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991). Networks include all formal 
and informal interaction and communication between the various actors. One ex-
ample is learning networks, or problem-solving networks, which link the suppli-
ers to the users, related firms or competitors, or link universities to the industry 
(Bergek et al. 2008b: 577). These networks are very important, because this is 
where an actor turns to for help when solving technical problems (Carlsson et al. 
2002: 237). Equally important networks are political in nature. Lobbying and ex-
ercising influence on political issues is an important determinant for the success 
or failure of actors in a system (Bergek et al. 2008b: 577). As an example of how 
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important political networks and power structures are, Kasa (2011: 64) shows 
that interests and networks in heavy industries in Norway are crucial for under-
standing why carbon capture and storage (CCS) has received massive investment 
in Norway. This type of network is closely connected to the institutional set-up. 
Finally, institutions need to be addressed, and they include vague terms which are 
difficult to measure, such as culture, norms and routines, as well as more tangible 
laws and regulations (Bergek et al. 2008a). They have typically evolved over 
time, and regulate either directly or indirectly how actors relate to each other 
(Johnson 2010: 25). Important features of institutions include their abilities to 
coordinate the use of knowledge, to mediate conflicts, and to provide incentive 
systems for the involved actors (ibid: 27). Institutions create stability in a society, 
a stability that produces inertia but which also provides the platform necessary for 
changes to occur (ibid.). The success of an introduction of new technology, is 
determined by the way institutions change. This means that the actors in a system 
compete not only over customers, but also over gaining influence on the institu-
tions in the system (Jacobsson 2011: 47). Knowledge is also an institutional arte-
fact which influences the actors’ decisions, by establishing “cognitive rules” in 
the shape of “knowledge products” or “frames that structure learning processes” 
(Geels & Raven 2006: 378).
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 These cognitive rules implicitly or explicitly guide 
the way actors make decisions and solve problems. 
3.2.3 Step 2: Assessing functions and functionality 
Whilst the first step predominantly focuses on issues common to most innovation 
system approaches, the two next steps reveal what makes the TIS framework dif-
ferent. In the second step, the aim is to describe the “functional pattern” of a TIS, 
and whilst doing this, assess how well these functions are fulfilled (i.e. the func-
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 According to Geels and Raven (2006: 378) knowledge products can be “abstract theories, technical 
models, formulas”, and frames that structure learning processes problem are “agendas, search heuristics, 
guiding principles, rules of thumb [or] exemplars”. 
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tionality). The functions delineated here are adopted from Bergek et al. (2008a), 
who in turn have synthesised and further developed these functions from numer-
ous studies on innovation systems. Other approaches covering the functions of an 
innovation system exist, where both similar and new functions are included (e.g. 
Edquist 2005, Hekkert & Negro 2009). One difference is that Bergek et al. 
(2008a) have a greater focus on using qualitative indicators such as interviews, as 
a means of identifying and assessing the functions (Markard & Truffer 2008: 
603). 
One virtue of mapping the 
functions of an innovation 
system is that it allows the 
student to transcend levels 
of analysis, as depicted in 
Figure 7. The functions 
enable a focus on the key 
processes that influence 
the object of study. The 
seven functions, which 
may be partly overlapping and mutually influenced, are subsequently categorised. 
Resource mobilisation is decisive when a TIS develops, and generally two main 
types of resources need be mobilised; namely, human and financial capital. When 
resources are mobilised, they often affect knowledge development and diffusion; 
for instance, by increasing the number of people in higher education, or through 
research and development (R&D) funding. Knowledge development and diffu-
sion is often taken to be the most important function in an innovation system, be-
cause new combinations of knowledge determine how a TIS evolves, as well as 
how it performs both globally and locally. This function also depends on the ex-
isting knowledge base. Knowledge development is achieved, for instance, by 
R&D, learning from application, or imitation.  
Figure 7: How functions aid the analysis of the 
wind turbine supplier industry 
Source: Based on Bergek (2002: 64, 120) 
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Influence on direction of search relates to the inducements mechanism that con-
vinces actors to enter a TIS. This is crucial for a TIS to develop, and these pres-
sures and incentives can come from within (e.g. competing technologies) as well 
as outside (e.g. government directives or established interests) the TIS in ques-
tion.   
Market formation is decisive for successful innovation, even though markets very 
seldom exist for an emerging TIS. This function is closely connected with institu-
tional change, which often is seen as a requirement for market development.  
Creating legitimacy for the technology in question is necessary for a TIS to de-
velop. Legitimacy is a question of social acceptance. The relevant actors need to 
understand the relevance and value of the technology in order to support it. In this 
way demand forms, and political strength is attained.  
Entrepreneurial activity functions as a hub that perceives and processes all rele-
vant knowledge, networks and markets of an innovation system, and turns these 
into concrete actions (Hekkert & Negro 2009). For this study, the notion of entre-
preneurial activity will be used in place of entrepreneurial experimentation, be-
cause it is perceived as more relevant to the Chinese wind turbine TIS. Entrepre-
neurial experimentation is arguably more important in early stages of technology 
development, where performance uncertainty permeates the TIS environment 
(ibid.). In Chapter 5, I will instead argue that the Chinese wind turbine TIS finds 
itself in a “bridging phase”, which is between the early and the mature stages of a 
TIS. The notion “entrepreneurial activity” does not exclude experimentation, 
which can be a part of the function. 
Development of external economies, also often referred to as “free utilities”, is 
advantageous to a whole TIS. The entry of new firms is central to this function 
because 1) new entrants may increase the legitimacy of the TIS, 2) more firms in 
a TIS signals a certain momentum, which can induce more actors to enter the 
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TIS, and 3) the chances of new combinations of knowledge are greater, as more 
connections will occur. Also, external economies may spill over between sectors. 
In order to measure how well these functions are fulfilled, we need to compare 
the functions against a base, so that a “desired functional pattern” can be devel-
oped (Bergek et al. 2008a).  This is necessary, because the “goodness” of each 
function is best understood in relative terms (ibid.). Bergek et al. (2008a) admit 
that more research needs to be done on this, yet they suggest comparing perform-
ance along two lines: 1) establish which phase the TIS is in, thereby determining 
functionality, and 2) compare TISs of different locations (ibid.). Two more meth-
ods can be added to the list; namely, 3) compare similar TISs domestically, and 4) 
confer with the stakeholders in question. A combination of these four strategies 
will be adopted in this study, using the method most convenient for each function 
assessed. As a result, a comparison with both foreign wind TISs and the domestic 
solar TIS is fitting, and a discussion about which phase the wind turbine TIS is in 
will serve to provide an overall understanding of how the functions perform. This 
will be scrutinised in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
It is important to bear in mind that even though some of these functions are frail 
or, conversely, particularly strong, it does not necessarily tell us anything about 
the overall functionality of the system. These functions need to be fulfilled indi-
vidually, but the interaction dynamics between them are also of importance be-
cause they can lead to positive or negative feedback cycles within the TIS 
(Hekkert & Negro 2009: 587). For example, as is particularly the case in China, a 
government goal is set; for instance to limit environmental damage. This is regis-
tered here as an “influence on the direction of search”, which in turn can spur a 
facilitation of “resource mobilisation” and an increase in “legitimacy”. Further-
more, the resources, which may have been used to finance R&D projects, can 
result in “knowledge development and diffusion”. Therefore, in Section 6.8 an 
attempt is made to measure the performance of China’s wind turbine TIS in terms 
of how the dynamics of the functions contribute to achieving an overall goal. 
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3.2.4 Step 3: Inducement and blocking mechanisms 
When a TIS is emerging it faces entanglements with more established TISs and 
industries which have had more time to shape—and be shaped by—existing ac-
tors, networks and institutions. Innovation happens within a technological regime 
which “decides” which new technologies succeed or not (Smith 2011). The way a 
new TIS deals with this is dependent on certain inducement and blocking mecha-
nisms which can be found in the structural components of the innovation system, 
or in the larger context surrounding it (Bergek et al. 2008a). This means that not 
only factors internal to the TIS are decisive for its performance, but also external 
forces. According to Bergek (2002: 128) most inducement mechanisms come 
from government policy measures, whilst blocking mechanisms are more com-
plex and relate to many of the structural components, such as weak networks, 
lack of organisational power or a lock-in to established technologies. Some of the 
key functions described in step 2 may also work as inducement or blocking 
mechanisms. For instance, “market formation”, in the shape of increased green 
demand, could facilitate the mobilisation of resources for a start-up renewable 
energy technology (ibid: 50). The mechanisms influencing the Chinese wind tur-
bine TIS will be thoroughly scrutinised in Chapter 7.  
3.3 Technology transfer and catch-up 
Before we jump to the analysis, some remarks on the specific circumstances of 
innovation systems need to be made. First, there is already a discussion of 
whether National Systems of Innovation approaches are suitable for application 
to developing countries. Since China is a developing country with its inherent 
characteristics, one might question whether the TIS approach is appropriate. As 
Lundvall (2011) points out, innovation scholars have suggested that developing 
countries do not have “innovation systems” but instead have “learning systems”, 
because to a large extent they are dependent on technology transferred from 
abroad. Second, recent research points out that the TIS framework does not ex-
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plain the spatial characteristics of innovation well, which is especially relevant 
when studying global innovation interconnections (Binz & Truffer 2009, 2010, 
Coenen & Díaz López 2010, Coenen et al. 2012, Binz et al. 2012, Truffer & 
Coenen 2012).  
In response to the first issue above, Lundvall et al. (2009: 3) argue that learning 
actually is essential for innovation; for instance, by doing (manufacturing), using 
and interacting with the technology. In this study, learning mechanisms will be a 
part of a wider definition of innovation which includes not only “know-what” and 
“know-why”, but also “know-how” and “know-who” (Jensen et al. 2007). As 
pointed out by Nelson (2007: 10), most now-developed countries in one way or 
another learned from leading countries, and this progress was no less innovative 
because they learned from others. In keeping with the innovation system ap-
proach, domestic conditions are regarded as important determinants as to whether 
a technology successfully transfers to the host country. Successful technology 
transfer therefore entails innovation at the receiving end, and is dependent on 
what is often referred to as the “absorptive capacity” of an industry (Binz et al. 
2012: 157). The absorptive capacity of a firm was defined by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990: 128) as the ability to “recognize the value of new, external in-
formation, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends”. As we will see in 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.2), absorbing knowledge and learning is not a self-evident 
process that happens automatically by increasing R&D expenditure. Rather, it 
may be understood as something which develops together with the TIS, as know-
how and know-who increases.  
The second notion above relates directly to how the TIS framework can be ap-
plied to developing countries. From a TIS perspective, a core assumption is that 
industries are highly globalised (Bergek et al. 2008a: 412,413). This is also true 
for the wind industry in China, where several companies and experts from devel-
oped countries are actively engaged. The wind industry can be regarded as part 
and parcel of a global, dynamic industry. Although this global component is in-
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cluded in the TIS framework, there is confusion as to what geographical exten-
sion the institutions have, something which leaves “institutional structures to 
seemingly float freely across a boundless, global plane” (Coenen et al. 2012: 
973). Thus, the TIS framework does not adequately address spatial characteristics 
of innovation. This has two implications for this study. First, since the TIS 
framework is developed largely with empirics from North-western Europe (and 
Scandinavia in particular) (Coenen et al. 2012), the functional dynamics may be 
rendered less relevant in a country with completely different actors, networks and 
institutions. As Liu and White (2001: 1112) point out, a possibility exists that 
“fundamentally different but equally viable national innovation systems could 
emerge in China”. Applying the TIS framework to China can be viewed as an 
opportunity to expand the theoretical framework by supplementing it with em-
pirical input. Secondly, the international couplings with the Chinese wind turbine 
TIS can be illuminated further. Binz and Truffer (2010) and Binz et al. (2012) 
suggest that one can talk about global and local TISs, where “deficits identified in 
the national TIS may be compensated by couplings with international TIS struc-
tures” (Binz et al. 2012: 158). Although a fully-fledged analysis of this conceptu-
alisation is beyond the scope of this study, the notion can be adopted to illuminate 
certain aspects of the Chinese wind turbine industry.  
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4. Methodology 
Where you stand depends on where you sit. 
Rufus E. Miles (1978) 
While conducting a literature survey at the beginning of this research project I 
found that most reports had similar conclusions: the Renewable Energy Law was 
instrumental for the development of the industry. Yet, few of the dynamics be-
hind the growth of the wind industry were described. Since I felt a comprehen-
sive explanation was lacking, I decided that the overarching objective of this the-
sis would be to tease out some lessons from the historical record of China’s wind 
turbine industry. The wind industry in China is the case we want to comprehend 
better, and the TIS framework is employed to improve our understanding of the 
phenomenon. The TIS framework contains certain basic propositions, for in-
stance, on how technology develops, and is therefore treated here as a theory.
9
 
Since the case study method often takes a theory as a point of departure, whether 
to test or to develop the theory further (Yin 2009: 35), the method is convenient 
to use for this research project. It is not self evident, however, that the present 
approach is the most appropriate, or that it yields the best results. Insights on the 
limitations of a study are crucial for the validity of a research design, such as rec-
ognition that my own perceptions are projected into the study—that where I stand 
depends on where I sit.  
The case study method has much in common with historiography (Moses & 
Knutsen 2007, Yin 2009), and as is evident with the present case, the goal is to 
analyse happenings of the past. Hence one may ask if the case study method 
really is appropriate. Why not, for instance, simply choose the tools adopted by 
the historical method, a method that I am, in fact, well versed in? Case study re-
                                              
9
 This is also debatable. Edquist (2005: 186), for instance, claims that the innovation system approach is 
“not a formal theory, in the sense of providing specific propositions regarding causal relations among 
variables”. He then shows that other scholars disagree on the status of the approach as a theory or not. 
Lundvall (2007: 99) remains less definite, and claims that it “might also be argued that [the approach] 
serves as equivalent to what is normally defined as theory”. 
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search is distinguished from history by employing two more sources of evidence 
that are not as commonly used amongst historians; namely, direct observation, 
and interviews with people involved in the events (Yin 2009: 11). Also, as the 
present study is an on-going and contemporary event, the case study method is 
more applicable. Likewise, other approaches are equally inadequate in answering 
the research questions of this study. Since the topic at heart of this study is to 
generate an understanding of how the Chinese wind industry has grown and how 
it works, purely drawing on statistics or survey data would not suffice, because 
they would not enable an analysis of a wide range of actors participating in a dy-
namically evolving context; they would have the same informative function as 
countless reports already written on the issue. At the same time, relying on in-
depth interviews alone would be too myopic if we are to understand a whole in-
dustry.  
Attitudes and beliefs that are brought into the field can lead to a bias in the col-
lected data (Walsh 1998: 126). One cannot simply forget about these attitudes 
and beliefs—that would at best be self deceptive. Rather, they should be identi-
fied, and explicitly communicated (ibid.). My worldview is best described as 
“pragmatist”, defined as a view which focuses on the outcomes of the research, 
on solutions to problems, and “what works” (Creswell 2007: 22). This worldview 
may have had implications for how the case has been studied, for instance in 
choosing the problem area before choosing a theory I wanted to test. A practical 
orientation may also lead to a focus on doing research which can be applied as 
policy advice later. According to McNeill (1999: 328), it is slightly troublesome 
for a research product to be policy oriented—as is the TIS objective— because it 
may lead to less rigorous research. Therefore, instead of weighing the order in 
which the case and the theory have been chosen, a main point of effort here is 
how the case, the theory and the research questions all are coherently and rigor-
ously examined. 
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The subsequent section shall explain why the case study method is the most ap-
propriate, followed by a description of the data collection methods and a discus-
sion of the constraints for this thesis. 
4.1 Case study research 
Robert K. Yin (2009: 18) has provided a twofold definition of case studies, the 
first part emphasising the scope of a study, and the second concerning technical 
issues and how a case study can be conducted:  
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
o investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-
life context, especially when 
o the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evi-
dent.  
2. The case study inquiry 
o copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be 
many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result 
o relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge 
in a triangulating fashion, and as another result 
o benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis (ibid.). 
This study seeks to understand the dynamics of a phenomenon—understanding 
the how—whilst retaining a holistic and meaningful conception of the Chinese 
wind industry. This is a good starting point for employing a case study method 
(Yin 2009: 4). Looking at the above definition, it is clear that much of the TIS 
approach has much in common with the case study method, such as through em-
phasising a clear delimitation of the case in focus, as well as aiming to explain a 
phenomenon by using the best-suited methods at hand.
10
 The innovation systems 
approach takes on a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective, since it tries to 
cover all the important determinants of innovation, and does this by using per-
spectives from various disciplines (Edquist 2005: 185). Thus, we see that the case 
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 This is perhaps even more evident using this definition: “(...) the basic idea is that a case will be studied 
in detail, using whatever methods seem appropriate” (Silverman 2010: 138). 
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study method and the innovation systems approach deploy similar ways of elicit-
ing “truths” from observations. This serves as yet another argument for employ-
ing the case study method to the Chinese wind turbine industry: as we have seen, 
the TIS framework is not only a theory, but also a blueprint for analysis, contain-
ing hints at how to best study an industry. Therefore, the method is already partly 
ingrained in the approach. Consequently, much of the discussion around the 
boundaries and characteristics of this particular case has been pointed out in the 
theory chapter, and will be scrutinised in depth in the next two chapters.  
In general, three types of case studies can be distinguished, namely fitting, mis-
fitting and generalising (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 133). The first two seek to ex-
plain how a case corresponds, or not, with a general proposition, and the latter 
seeks to generate hypotheses or build theory (ibid.). The starting point for this 
thesis is that the Chinese wind turbine industry can be explained by the TIS 
framework, and we can therefore regard this as a fitting case, because it “serves 
to demonstrate the explanatory power of a particular theory” (ibid.). Robert K. 
Yin (2009: 47) operates with the label “critical case”, where the intention is to 
confirm, challenge, or extend the theory at hand. This label is perhaps even more 
suitable because, as we shall see throughout this study, certain extensions seem 
necessary when applying the theory to new grounds such as newly industrialising 
countries. In this way, we will not blindly accept all the propositions which are 
believed to be true in the theoretical framework, but attempt to refine, modify or 
develop them where necessary. 
Attempting to complete a holistic, interdisciplinary, in-depth case study, one that 
is also rigorous and readable, seems indeed challenging. Undeniably, many com-
plications occur, and few promises can be made. For instance, as is underlined by 
Robert Stake (1994: 238), one danger is to misrepresent the case when focusing 
too much on providing a theoretical contribution. Moreover, when attempting to 
conduct a holistic study, interdisciplinarity can be useful, but claiming to have 
equally in-depth knowledge in multiple disciplines would be misleading. Both 
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these concerns are highly valid for this research project as well. Therefore, the 
intention here is to clarify the approach in as detailed and open a manner as pos-
sible.  
As we shall see, this case has multiple sources of evidence, mainly from inter-
views and documents as well as some observation. One of the strengths of the 
case study method is precisely that converging lines of inquiry can be developed; 
this is frequently referred to as triangulation (Yin 2009: 115). The procedure of 
triangulation is employed in order to reduce the likelihood of misinterpreting a 
case study (Stake 1994). Essentially, triangulation means studying the same phe-
nomenon from multiple sources, so that the validity of a case study increases (Yin 
2009: 116). Whilst this allows for both in-depth as well as overarching perspec-
tives, it can create a challenge that leaves the researcher in a methodological 
limbo: “The analyst’s nearness to the empirical detail and his heavy reliance on 
theory mean that he is constantly forced to address the sundry ways in which 
theoretical claims and empirical evidence often collide” (Moses & Knutsen 2007: 
140). The best remedy for this is to constantly be reassured that the overall objec-
tive, the research design and the case are all well aligned (ibid.). Keeping in mind 
Yin’s definition for a case study above, I shall now turn to the practicalities of 
data collected for this study. 
4.2 Methods of data collection 
I had initially chosen a very broad starting point for this study, intending to cover 
both the wind turbine and solar cell industry in China, in order to compare and 
contrast their respective developments. Even though this lead to extra work in the 
beginning, encompassing far more preparatory research before entering the field, 
it ultimately proved to be useful for several reasons. For one, this study benefits 
from a comparison between the wind industry and the solar industry, something 
which has enriched the analysis greatly. Second, and more importantly for the 
fieldwork, it led to a broader network of potentially useful contacts. This yielded 
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more interviews, as I employed sampling methods based on purposeful, snowball 
and opportunistic sampling (Scheyvens & Storey 2003: 43). Purposeful sampling 
means that individuals are selected based on their ability to “purposefully inform 
an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study” 
(Creswell 2007: 125). This sampling strategy contains some potential pitfalls, 
such as a risk of biased selection, and some virtues, such as saving time and re-
sources. When selecting interviewees this way, the choice was often based on 
literature review or an explicit search for professionals, researchers or govern-
ment officials within the wind industry. I was searching for people with insights 
on, or a thorough understanding of, how the wind industry had developed. Snow-
ball sampling usually involves finding one person with relevant knowledge, and 
then asking if he or she knows others that suit the criteria (Scheyvens & Storey 
2003: 43). The purpose of opportunistic sampling is to follow new leads and take 
advantage of situations as they arise (Creswell 2007: 127), a technique which was 
convenient in Beijing, where I occasionally had unplanned opportunities to speak 
to people with ties to the wind industy.  
As was mentioned in the theory chapter, interview candidates were identified 
through online research, industry association lists or trade statistics, but most im-
portantly by using the snowball method. The underlying principle when selecting 
and conducting the interviews was to map the opinions of the central actors, in 
order to get a representative picture of the important factors in the industry. The 
interviews would therefore involve inquiring the relevant stakeholders on their 
perceptions about the overall performance of the wind industry. Candidates that 
were perceived as relevant were informed experts at universities, organisations, 
consultancy firms and in the government, as well as wind turbine company em-
ployees. These groups were relevant both because of the knowledge they pos-
sessed about the industry, and because of the backgrounds they had from differ-
ent segments of the industry. To be sure, this selection could, for instance, have 
been limited to government officials or company employees exclusively. How-
ever, according to Yin (2009: 130), the most preferred strategy of analysing the 
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case study data is to rely on the theoretical propositions of the theory chosen. 
Therefore, following the TIS scheme, the collected data preferably should be 
broadly selected amongst the institutions and the actors involved in the TIS.  
From the very beginning I had arranged meetings with potentially helpful sources 
that could help me find relevant interviews; an endeavour which continued 
throughout the fieldwork. There were many failed attempts to reach people, and 
as expected, many sent e-mails were never responded to. The five months long 
field stay was a great aid in circumventing this problem. 
The interviews 
Though 13 formal interviews were conducted, one withdrew later, leaving 12 
interviews for the analysis. Only one of the interviews was not recorded, and all 
of the recorded interviews were transcribed afterwards. The interviewees are 
listed in Appendix 1. The informants have backgrounds from various fields, rang-
ing from government officials and technical wind industry experts to company 
employees from large, medium and small wind turbine manufacturers. Three of 
the interviews were with women, and nine with men. Additionally, several infor-
mal conversations were conducted throughout the whole period with experts and 
people involved in the renewable energy industry. This includes wind farm de-
velopers, researchers, foreign wind industry experts and professionals, and both 
domestic and foreign wind turbine component manufacturers. 
All the interviews were semi-structured, containing “a sequence of themes to be 
covered, as well as suggested questions” (Kvale 1996: 124).  The idea was not to 
get hard facts from the interviewees, but to “elicit data on opinions and behav-
iour” (Scheyvens & Storey 2003: 41). This way, the interviews allowed for a 
change of theme which naturally corresponded with the interviewee’s reasoning, 
and answers were followed up when suitable. The interviews always started by 
going through the purpose of the study, then clarifying the amount of time needed 
to complete the interview as well as the plans for using the information gathered, 
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and finally informing the interviewee of the policies on confidentiality and ano-
nymity (Creswell 2007: 134). Most of the informants had received a copy of the 
interview guide before the interview. 
It is important to reflect on how the interviews will be analysed before the inter-
views are conducted (Kvale 1996: 178). Therefore, the interview guide, a sample 
of which is attached in Appendix 2, was shaped with a view to the problem at 
heart for this study, and in line with the theoretical framework. The use of follow-
up questions during the interviews was meant to clarify the position of the infor-
mant, or to confirm or reject my own hypotheses about the nature of the industry. 
The interview guide was revised several times, and adapted to the individuals I 
interviewed. Also, as I learned more about the topic, some questions were added 
or removed.  
Before I went into the field I contacted experienced researchers and professionals 
in China working on similar topics, in order to find out if getting enough sources 
would prove difficult. All responded that this would become a major challenge 
unless I had contacts, especially when contacting people at the government level 
in China. I also decided to do a pilot interview in advance, which was conducted 
as a phone-interview, in order to acquire information as well as test and adjust the 
questions in my interview guide (Widerberg 2001: 60). This interview is not, 
however, included in the final analysis.  
One development was that it was easier to find willing interviewees in the wind 
industry than in the solar industry, something which lead to the decision to focus 
solely on the wind industry. As getting the interviews was no longer a large bot-
tleneck, the question of quantity started to emerge: how many interviews would 
be sufficient? Ultimately, I had opportunities to get more interviews, but at one 
point I decided that I had enough material, because most aspects from the wind 
industry were covered. However, my sampling methods yielded a low number of 
informants from the research community, so I had to intensify my search in this 
sector. Unfortunately, this did not yield results, although I did have some infor-
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mal conversations with researchers in the wind industry. Since no formal inter-
views from the research community are included the analysis, the discussion re-
lated to research and development was considerably undermined. Luckily, the 
experts interviewed had knowledge on these issues, and available secondary 
documents were used to build the argumentation.  
Except for one interview, which I transcribed myself, all the recorded interviews 
were transcribed by a paid assistant. All the transcriptions were performed by the 
same person, and after each transcription was done, I read the transcript and lis-
tened to the audio material simultaneously in order to verify and correct the tran-
scripts. The subsequent analysis was organised using the computer-assisted 
analysis software called NVivo. This software was of great assistance in coding 
and categorising the material so that the analysis could be conducted in a system-
atic fashion. All interviews were conducted in English, and in three of the inter-
views an interpreter was used. This interpreter also proved very useful in contact-
ing and booking meetings with relevant informants. Using an interpreter has both 
advantages and disadvantages: it allows for flexibility regarding note-taking dur-
ing interviews, but also heightens the probability of information manipulation 
when reiterated (Scheyvens & Storey 2003: 133). I cannot be sure that informa-
tion transmitted was entirely accurate. Nevertheless, the translator I used had 
worked for several years as a professional interpreter, including on assignments 
within the wind industry. Based on the interpreter’s experience and professional-
ism (e.g. using industry specific words), I felt assured that the interviews were 
interpreted as accurately as possible.  
During the interviews, as well as the subsequent analysis, the utmost care has 
been taken to evaluate possible ethical concerns for the informants. The follow-
ing three principles were particularly stressed: informed consent, privacy of the 
informant and a potential conflict of interest (Scheyvens & Storey 2003: 142). 
Appendix 3 includes the Information and Consent Form, which was used in all 
the formal interviews, and signed by both the interviewer and interviewees. This 
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form ensures that the interviewee is adequately informed about the project, and 
that the participant freely agrees to take part in the research project. It also obli-
gates the interviewer to comply with the ethical considerations stated in the form. 
The outline of the consent form was based on Scheyvens and Storey (2003: 143) 
and Creswell (2007: 123, 124).  
All the interviewees were informed that they could remain anonymous, yet only a 
few chose to remain so. Nevertheless, throughout the analysis I have chosen to 
highlight names only when explicitly quoted, and not when the informants were 
referred to collectively, such as “many of the informants agreed that ...” After the 
analysis was conducted, the informants were consulted and asked to confirm, cor-
rect, or reject their quotes, as agreed upon in the consent form. None of the 
quotes were rejected, and one was corrected for grammar. The privacy of the in-
formant was further ensured by constantly making sure that field notes, interview 
recordings, and transcripts were stored safely and only used for research pur-
poses.  
Observation and participation 
Since the beginning of 2011, I have attempted to immerse myself in the Chinese 
renewable energy industry, signing up to various e-mail lists, such as the Beijing 
Energy Network, and participating in online groups; for instance, on LinkedIn, a 
professional networking website. I stayed in China for almost five months, from 
August to December 2011. The majority of the stay was spent in Beijing, with 
some excursions to renewable energy industry sites as well as a 10-day organised 
“China Energy Trip” conducted outside of Beijing. My attitude when entering the 
field was that of a learner (Walsh 1998: 99); the people I met within the renew-
able energy industry were the experts who had knowledge and experience I 
wanted to tap into.  
When in Beijing, I attended several meetings organised by the Beijing Energy 
Network, where I also met people who could help me arrange interviews. I also 
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attended other, similar functions that were relevant; for instance, events arranged 
by Greenpeace or Beijing Green Drinks. The most important occasion I partici-
pated in was the China Wind Power 2011 conference and exhibition, which 
yielded many fruitful leads in terms of new knowledge, written material, contacts 
and interviews. According to the conference web pages, the exhibition is one of 
the top events for the wind industry both inside and outside of China, and in 2011 
had 612 exhibiting companies with almost 27,000 visitors (CWP 2011). The con-
ference also had speakers from all the leading wind turbine and components 
manufacturers across the globe. Some of these speeches and debates were re-
corded, and serve as additional direct sources for the analysis. In December 2011, 
I also attended Intersolar China 2011, a conference and exhibition for the photo-
voltaic solar industry. This conference was highly informative as well, and laid 
the basis for a better comparison with the wind industry, where this was neces-
sary in the analysis. 
Documents 
Before, during and after the fieldwork, documents were used as sources of infor-
mation. Since the beginning of 2011 I have followed all the sources I could dis-
cover that dealt with the Chinese wind industry—predominately information ac-
cessed online. The documents reviewed for this thesis had the double function of 
providing information about the specifics of the wind industry, in addition to in-
dicating which questions remained unanswered regarding the dynamics of the 
industry, and therefore should be brought up in the interviews. Given the rapid 
changes in the industry, an explicit effort has been made to use updated sources 
and recent literature on the industry. Nevertheless, incorporating the most recent 
changes is a chronic problem for students of China, as the access to relevant in-
formation often lags behind the developments themselves. Scott Kennedy (2011: 
3) expressed the frustration in this way: “There seems to be a disjuncture between 
how quickly China is changing and how slowly we are adapting the way we study 
the country’s politics”.  
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The documents which lay the foundation for the analysis include scientific and 
technical articles, books and anthologies, proceedings from the China Wind 
Power 2011 conference, press releases and news articles, policy documents, tech-
nical reports, global wind market reports (e.g. from Mercom), statistics, articles 
in popular magazines on renewable energy, annual reports, and promotional ma-
terial from manufacturers. In general, as the renewable energy industry in China 
is fairly new, statistical work is either weak or impossible to retrieve (CNRED 
2011b), and has therefore not been used to a large extent. It was also difficult to 
access accurate and reliable data on financial transaction, company ownership 
details and patent applications. This has weakened the analysis somewhat, yet, I 
would claim, to some extent has been compensated by information retrieved by 
the interviews. Many documents were accessed during the fieldwork, for instance 
information material from CREIA, or from the various companies I visited. News 
articles online were especially useful in retrieving the latest information available 
on the rapidly developing wind industry in China. One of the great strengths of 
using written material is the impact they have on the reproducibility of the case 
study. Most of the sources were accessed online, or are in any case readily acces-
sible for anyone who would want to reproduce or simply verify the information 
retrieved.  
4.3 Barriers and ethical dilemmas 
In China, access to information and relevant informants can be a function of the 
sensitivity of the research topic. Heimer and Thøgersen (2006: 13) claim that po-
litical sensitivity in China “becomes a question of timing as well as the audience 
and the use of the information”. Having conferred with experienced researchers 
in the field of energy and China before I entered the field, it was established that 
renewable energy is not at all sensitive; on the contrary, it seems to be a field 
China is proud of. Rather than the sensitivity of the topic, what proved to be a 
barrier to access was the informants’ schedules and availability combined with 
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the small perceived gain for participation. This combination lead in the beginning 
to an ethical dilemma: it seemed—based on the few contacts I had—that potential 
interviewees wanted something in return for participating; for instance, that their 
company would be mentioned several times (favourably). Also, since I did not 
have any affiliation with an institution or a network of expertise in China—
something which would increase my own status, as opposed to affiliation with an 
institution far away in a small country such as Norway—it seemed few of the in-
formants would be interested in my project.  
Fortunately, this conflict of interest did not turn out to become a real problem 
after the interviews were already booked and conducted. Getting in touch with 
relevant people of a certain rank, however, proved more difficult because of my 
lack of status in the domain of research. The easiest way to book an interview 
was through connections with affiliated people, or through direct interaction 
where I had already met the informant and exchanged name cards, as was the 
case at the conferences. Also, some of the people with experience within the re-
newable energy industry in China informed me that inviting people to interviews 
could be much easier if the invitation was sent from someone with higher rank. 
Therefore, on one occasion my supervisor helped me send an invitation to a high 
level government official, which was responded to positively within few hours. 
Language was the largest barrier for both the fieldwork and the written informa-
tion accessed, although I received great assistance from my interpreter. Luckily, 
the wind industry in China is fairly international, and many of the central actors 
spoke English well. Furthermore, a large number of foreigners engaged with en-
vironment, energy and business topics are situated in Beijing, all of whom I 
communicated with in English. In spite of the fact that the methodology literature 
does not recommend combining fieldwork with other activities, I found it con-
venient to engage in three months of intensive language training while in China. I 
thus acquired a basic knowledge of Mandarin, which was very useful in establish-
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ing a positive interview atmosphere, as it conveyed a sentiment of genuine inter-
est. 
Lastly, an ethical consideration arose with regard to the interviews; namely, that 
giving gifts is very common in China. I was advised by several people, both lo-
cals and foreigners with long-term experience in China, to bring a small personal 
gift for the interviewee, preferably something from my own home country. In 
order to avoid appearing impolite I took the advice, and decided to bring each 
interviewee a small Norwegian chocolate as well as a very small bottle of Scan-
dinavian vodka. 
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5. The Chinese wind turbine TIS and structural 
components 
The wind turbine is like a system, like a human body 
 Sebastian Meyer (interview 08.11.2011) 
The emphasis on “functions” in the TIS framework does not mean that the struc-
tural components of the system should receive less attention. On the contrary, it is 
crucial to accurately map these structures in order to comprehend how the inno-
vation system performs. Nevertheless, a whole book could be written on each of 
the following structural components within a Chinese context. Therefore, some 
key factors deemed important to the study are outlined below. The delimitation 
will be strictly related the wind turbine industry, even though there may be other 
factors influencing the development. These other factors, which are external to 
the technological innovation system, will be dealt with in Chapter 7.  
5.1 Defining the TIS 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, it is difficult to define the limits of a specific 
TIS. The technological system is merely a theoretical construct, and there exists 
no right or wrong way to define its boundaries. Yet, it is crucial to define the lim-
its to a certain extent, because the boundaries of the system greatly affect the 
analysis (Markard & Truffer 2008: 600). Similar to the delineation suggestions 
made by Bergek et al. (2008a), Sandén et al. (2008: 3) propose that four aspects 
of system boundaries should be included; “technology, value chain, time and ge-
ography”. Let us look at each of these respectively.  
As for technology and the value chain, a wind turbine in itself is easily identifi-
able, and in this way we already have a strong indication on what to look for. A 
value chain includes all the activities that contribute to the end-price of a product 
(Porter 1998). These are here divided into down and up-stream actors and activi-
ties. Down-stream actors accounted for in this TIS comprise the buyers and users 
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of wind turbines. The developers of wind farms are the ones who typically pur-
chase wind turbines, and as we shall see, these developers are largely state-owned 
electric power producers in China. As seen on the right hand side in Figure 8 be-
low, the users of the wind turbines are the wind power generating companies. 
Electricity-grid companies, however, are taken to be outside of the TIS, for the 
very same reason: even though they are obligated to connect all wind power to 
the grid, they have little direct influence on the wind turbine industry, since they 
are not the turbine buyers or wind farm operators.
11
 Nonetheless, since they are 
operating the electricity grid system, they do have an indirect impact, and the grid 
companies will therefore be examined more closely in Chapter 7 under the head-
ing blocking mechanisms. 
Figure 8: Value chain for Chinese wind turbine manufacturers 
 
Source: Zhao et al. (2012: 426) 
All the components suppliers listed on the left hand side in Figure 8 count as up-
stream actors in the Chinese industry. Because the wind turbine industry is fairly 
global, it is difficult to limit our search to China alone, especially on the up-
stream side. The manufacturing of a wind turbine includes knowledge, technical 
components and personnel which come from many different places, both inside 
and outside of China. Yet, as we have seen, a distinct feature of the industry is the 
domestication of manufacturing along the whole wind turbine value chain. Al-
though the main focus will be directed towards the domestic Chinese turbine 
manufacturers, the degree of foreign influence inevitably needs to be addressed. 
With regards to the end-use of turbines, it is easier to limit the spatial parameters 
to China alone, as most Chinese turbine manufacturers do not yet export their 
                                              
11
 State Grid has invested in wind farms, although it is still a relatively minor actor (Li et al. 2012: 58). 
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turbines to a great extent. In other words, up-stream development by necessity 
needs a broader geographical boundary, whilst down-stream events can be 
uniquely limited to China. 
A matter of key importance in understanding how a TIS performs is what stage 
the TIS is in, something which has to do with the time-aspect mentioned by 
Sandén et al. above. The time frame chosen for this investigation is relatively 
short, because the intent is to capture the rapid growth phase, which took off 
around 2003, and has endured into 2011. Even though there has been support for 
a growing wind industry in China since the 1980s and 1990s (Taylor 1982, C. Wu 
et al. 1994, Lew 2000), most of this development was focussed on small-scale 
wind turbines, and the real explosion of utility-scale wind turbine markets started 
after the introduction of the first concession round in 2003 (Howell et al. 2010).  
This short time-span has some implications for the phase the Chinese wind tur-
bine industry is currently in. The TIS framework was developed to understand 
formations of new TISs, yet it is somewhat unclear how well the framework 
works for later stages of technology development. Markard and Truffer (2008) 
purport that “a TIS begins at some point in the formative phase and ends at some 
point in the growth phase”. This is to say that the TIS framework can only be 
used within a specific timeframe of the development of a technology. The two 
authors confess that mapping conditions which define the end point of a TIS is 
difficult. In any case, since the gap between the formation and the rapid growth 
phase of the Chinese large-scale wind turbine industry is so narrow, the frame-
work can still be used to explain the industry.  
As touched upon in the theory framework, the framework is not as well equipped 
to understand the TISs of countries that are “catching-up”, where technology of-
ten enters in shape of foreign investments, and where the economy often is more 
export-oriented than that of a developed country (Binz et al. 2012). In order to 
compete, China has had to catch up with the global industry. As a result, it is eas-
ier to picture the Chinese market as an extension of the global market, where the 
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goal is to move towards cost reduction and ultimately a mature mass market 
which can compete with conventional electricity production. This means that the 
Chinese market quickly passed from the “nursing” phase into the “bridging” 
phase, which is characterised by an expansion of market volume (Dewald & 
Truffer 2012: 407). We can therefore take the TIS to be in a “bridging phase”, 
between the “nursing phase” where the technology is still a small niche, and a 
“mass market” phase, where large scale deployment of wind power is the case 
(Bergek et al. 2008a: 416). Wind power technology still is not a mature technol-
ogy which can compete with conventional energy technologies on the market 
(Jørgensen & Münster 2010).
12
 In short, which phase the TIS is in will have seri-
ous impacts on what the ultimate goal of the TIS is; which, after all, is what the 
functions are supposed to fulfil. The implications this has for the analysis will 
become clearer in Chapter 6, when assessing the functionality of the TIS and 
looking at the dynamics of the functions (Section 6.8). An important remark 
made by Carlsson et al. (2002: 239) which also has a bearing here is that “there is 
no reason to hide that the delineation may often be somewhat arbitrary and partly 
based on informed guesses by the researcher”. As we go on to plot the structural 
components, a clearer picture of the system delimitation will be formed. 
5.2 Actors 
No matter how one looks at it, the government is a central actor in the Chinese 
wind turbine industry. The government exercises its influence in a variety of for-
mal and informal ways, and exact information about its workings is difficult to 
acquire. All the largest Chinese wind turbine manufacturing enterprises are par-
tially or fully state-owned, and the development plans which are outlined and fol-
lowed by the government have an important part in the success or failure of an 
                                              
12
 Since wind power still is not competitive, one cannot say that the market phase is a “mass market”. 
According to estimations by the International Energy Agency (“New Policies Scenario”), wind will be-
come competitive around the year 2020 in Europe, and around 2030 in China (WEO 2011: 507).  
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industry in China. Given the elusive role of the government, its influence will be 
highlighted and contrasted where it occurs throughout the analysis. For the wind 
industry, the government is particularly relevant because of its policy-creation 
capacity, which will be discussed in detail. For now, some instrumental govern-
ment bodies can be highlighted. Thus, in Figure 9 below a general overview of 
the key actors in the wind turbine innovation system is displayed. 
Figure 9: Key actors in China’s wind energy innovation system 
 
Source: Modified version of Delman and Chen (2008: 25) 
Most of the above actors will be touched upon at some point in the following de-
scription and analysis. The intermediaries mentioned in the figure are loosely 
government-connected bodies that sustain the industry in some way, such as pro-
fessional or business associations, or chambers of commerce (Delman & Chen 
2008: 28). 
5.2.1 The enterprises 
According to the China Wind Power Outlook (2010: 36) there were 86 wind tur-
bine manufacturing enterprises in China at the end of 2009, of which only around 
15 engaged in mass production (CWPC 2012). The top three manufacturers, Si-
novel, Goldwind and Dongfang respectively, accounted for nearly 60 per cent of 
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newly installed capacity in 2009, and the top ten firms accounted for approxi-
mately 85 per cent (ibid.: 38). This means that the remaining 76 companies share 
a relatively small portion of the newly installed market. Amongst the top ten 
firms by the end of 2009, six were Chinese and four were foreign companies, and 
the latter had a market share of new and cumulative installed capacities of around 
11 per cent (ibid.: 34). All these foreign companies manufacture their wind tur-
bines locally in China, something which creates major learning-opportunities for 
Chinese domestic companies, as we shall see in Section 5.3 (Lewis 2011: 286).  
The China Wind Power Centre, which has relatively up-to date information on 
the wind industry, lists 41 partially or fully state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
China, and this includes most of the largest ones (CWPC 2012). According to 
statements from some of my informants, it is an advantage to be a SOE in the 
wind industry, for reasons ranging from easier access to capital and better con-
nections, to a larger control of the whole value chain.  
A general assumption amongst the analysts and scholars I talked with is that over 
80 manufacturing companies is too large a number for the industry to support, 
and that this number will be dramatically reduced over the next five years. Mr. 
Sebastian Meyer (interview 08.11.2011), a China wind expert from Azure Inter-
national, holds the view that the large companies that are now established will 
keep their positions, but the industry will become less concentrated and stabilise 
with around 20 equal players. However, as Mr. Li Junfeng (interview 
30.09.2011), president of CREIA, points out, this does not necessarily mean that 
the smaller companies will all disappear, but rather that those with weak technol-
ogy will phase out. This will happen primarily as a response to government poli-
cies meant to enhance the quality of the Chinese turbines, as we will see in Sec-
tion 5.4. 
In addition to the turbine manufacturers, the industry consists of a string of con-
tractors and parts providers. In contrast to other countries, the Chinese wind 
power equipment industry is sharply divided between the turbine manufacturers 
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that produce mainly one or two parts themselves (usually the blades), and profes-
sional parts manufacturing enterprises (CNRED 2011b: 20).
13
 In China both for-
eign and domestic companies produce turbine components, many of them being 
joint ventures. By the end of 2009 there were 52 blade manufacturers, 10 gearbox 
manufacturers, 16 bearing manufacturers, and 12 power electronics manufactur-
ers (CNRED 2011b: 20).  
Amongst the turbine blade manufacturers three companies capture a large market 
share; these are China National Aviation Teng-hui Wind Electricity Equipment 
Co. Ltd., Zhongfu Lianzhong Composites Group Ltd., and LM Fiberglass (Tian-
jin) Co. Ltd. (CNRED 2011b: 21). Amongst the gearbox producers, there are two 
domestic-funded enterprises which account for more than 50 per cent of the mar-
ket share; these are Nanjing High-Speed & Accurate Gear Group Co. Ltd. and 
Chongqing Gearbox Co. Ltd. The largest turbine manufacturing company, Sino-
vel, receives gearboxes from its subsidiary Dalian Heavy Industry Group (ibid.). 
Bearing manufacturing is also provided by Chinese companies, yet gearbox and 
generator bearings are today fully dependent on imports, because of the technical 
requirements involved in their manufacture, which Chinese companies have not 
yet fully mastered (ibid.: 21).  
The last group of relevant companies are the buyers of the wind turbines; namely, 
the developers. By the end of 2009 more than 50 companies had invested in wind 
parks in China, yet the top ten companies accounted for 71 per cent of the in-
stalled capacity (CWPO 2010: 38/39). Of these ten, eight were owned by the cen-
tral government, and the top five were all state power utilities, covering 54 per 
cent of the market (ibid.). As we shall come back to, the top four of these devel-
opers are all large thermal-power producing companies (the “big five”). 
                                              
13
 According to the China Wind Power Outlook (2010: 78) relationships between manufacturers, parts 
producers and developers need to be well handled, and the present state cannot be a permanent solution. 
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5.2.2 Organisations and associations 
As maintained by Scott Kennedy (2005: 26), many industry associations in China 
have little autonomy (albeit, far from all). For the wind industry in particular, 
there are mainly two industry associations that are relevant. These are the China 
Wind Energy Association (CWEA) (a subsidiary of the All-China Federation of 
Industry and Commerce) and the Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Associa-
tion (CREIA). The Global Wind Energy Council is also present in China, and 
supports various arrangements, such as wind power conferences. The main tasks 
of these associations are to draft laws, plan research and policy decisions, and 
mediate between the industry and policy makers (CWPO 2010: 42), as well as 
arrange venues for industry players to gather. However, because of the rapid de-
velopment of the whole renewable energy industry, these associations have not 
yet gained the influence and capacities that they desire (ibid.). This was also con-
firmed by my informants from the industry, many of whom did not regard the 
associations as imperative for their development.  
Other relevant organisations are the Chinese Society for Electrical Engineering 
(with a professional committee for wind power), standard organisations, such as 
the National Technical Standards Committee on Wind Power Equipment, and 
several local organisations and associations administered in the provinces 
(CNRED 2011b: 46, 47). There are also numerous international environmental 
NGOs and public sector agencies, such as the National Resources Defence Coun-
cil, WWF China, The Climate Group, Carbon Disclosure Project, Joint US-China 
Collaboration on Clean Energy and the World Resources Institute (Medland 
2012).  
5.2.3 Universities and research institutes 
A central university dealing with wind power research is the Shenyang University 
of Technology, which has a history of 25 years in wind power generation tech-
nology (CNRED 2011b: 89). The university has been able to independently de-
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velop turbines, recently with capacities as high as 3 MW (CWPO 2010: 34), 
which it licences to various Chinese wind turbine companies. North China Elec-
tric Power University and Lanzhou Science and Technology University have also 
established wind power research institutes (CNRED 2011b: 89). Additionally, 
Changsha Science and Technology University, Hebei University, Hehai Univer-
sity and Inner Mongolia Industrial University all have wind energy engineering 
programmes (ibid.).  
There are several national research and development (R&D) centres, such as the 
National R&D Centre for Wind Power Engineering Technology, and the newly 
established (2010) centres on Wind Power Blade R&D, Large-scale Wind Power 
Grid-connected Systems R&D, and Offshore Wind Power Technology and 
Equipment R&D (CWPO 2010: 41). The National R&D Centre has had an espe-
cially slow start, due to the very restricted access to resources, as well as weak 
implementation of policy (ibid.). As we shall see in the next chapter, the common 
perception is that these institutions have not made a great impact on the industry 
in general, and that their development capacities are still mediocre compared with 
the international standards (ibid.).  
5.3 Networks 
Networks between the various players in the Chinese industry are crucial to look 
at if we are to comprehend the dynamics in the industry. Informal networks 
within the industry are naturally hard to detect, and will include some guesswork. 
The formal networks, however, are easier to map. As mentioned in the theory 
chapter, two important types of networks are learning networks and political net-
works. Purely political networks are common in China, and are usually informal. 
For instance, one important way of achieving success in China is having connec-
tions with central decision makers, something which facilitates the operations of 
a firm. As I shall come back to in Chapter 6, two of the firms interviewed here 
61 
emphasised that either the CEO’s connections or the company’s influence in a 
particular region was important for the company’s development.  
According to some of the informants from the industry, one arena for encounters 
are the various conferences that are organised in the wind industry, such as the 
China Wind Power conferences. Here, the various players from all segments of 
the turbine industry meet each other and exchange information. A similar net-
working function is assumed by CREIA, which may function as an arena for dis-
cussion between the different wind turbine enterprises.  
When it comes to learning networks in terms of research and development in the 
wind industry, for instance, there seems to be a general consensus that networks 
are weak in China. According to the Sino-Danish Renewable Energy Develop-
ment Programme, there is a lack of general coordination mechanisms in the Chi-
nese renewable energy industry (CNRED 2011a: 164), something which has been 
pointed out by several reports and studies on the industry (REN21 2009b: 27, Z. 
Wang & Li 2009, Martinot 2010). This was also reiterated by many of the inter-
viewees. Amongst others, Li Junfeng (interview 30.09.2011) from CREIA and 
the Energy Research Institute affirmed this lack of coordination and added that 
pricing, R&D, and industry funding are managed by different sectors. This lack 
of coordination only increases with the rapid growth of the industry, and can po-
tentially harm industry dynamics.  
To be sure, competitors in the industry do not willingly share key information, 
and therefore networks of learning can be more indirect. For instance, as was 
voiced by some of the companies interviewed, knowledge often flows between 
companies when personnel change workplaces. It is not a secret that Chinese 
companies actively try to attract skilled personnel from competitors, both domes-
tic and foreign. In it’s earlier days, Goldwind frequently hired employees trained 
by foreign-owned firms that were based in China, which enabled the company to 
tap into state-of-the-art knowledge (Lewis 2007: 228). Based on information pro-
vided both from the interviewees and from personal conversations with profes-
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sional, one can assume that this is a widespread practise in the Chinese wind in-
dustry, and is not only limited to a domestic-foreign axis, but also occurs between 
“indigenous” companies in China. 
5.3.1 International networks 
According to Joanna Lewis (2007, 2011), highly important learning networks for 
the Chinese wind industry are the ones established with the foreign companies 
that are either license-owners or joint developers. She argues that these global 
and regional learning networks have been crucial ever since the formation of the 
wind industry, and that the emerging markets in China and other Asian countries 
serve as “valuable regional learning networks for new firms” (Lewis 2011: 283). 
Furthermore, she argues, these new markets have also made an important contri-
bution to “global learning networks of knowledge and innovation”, because of 
the global character of the industry (ibid.).  
In China, as was mentioned at the beginning of this study, much of the wind tur-
bine technology has been transferred in one way or another from abroad. Argua-
bly, this has also lead to many connections between the players, and these net-
works are important for the ultimate performance of the joint developers or the 
licensing firms. To illustrate the case in point, Lewis (2011: 297) has developed a 
most informative chart that maps the linkages between turbine manufacturers and 
technology source agreements. Depicted in Figure 10 below, this chart has been 
updated and modified partly by the author. 
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Figure 10: Wind power technology transfer networks for Chinese firms 
 
Sources: Based on Joanna Lewis (2011: 297), and modified by the author to include more Chi-
nese firms. It should be noted that this chart is not exhaustive, and that more connections and/or 
agreements may exist than portrayed here. Note also that relative box-sizes do not reflect the 
actual sizes of these companies.  
As is easily observable from the chart, most of the Chinese firms have licensing 
agreements with German firms. The nature of these networks can vary, and 
whether information is shared or not depends on the agreement. Joanna Lewis 
(2011: 296) maintains that these networks can be both positive and negative, be-
cause on one hand they can “increase access to global learning and experience 
worldwide, which is likely beneficial”, whilst on the other hand they can “create 
competitors and make it harder to safeguard valuable or sensitive information”. 
What is certain is that such a global wind turbine network leads to new encoun-
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ters. For instance, when Goldwind acquired a majority stake in Vensys in 2008, it 
became engaged with research and development activities in Germany, although 
the company thus far had been uniquely focussed on China (ibid: 297). Other 
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have also established R&D centres abroad, 
as we shall see in Section 6.1. Hence, the flow of resources goes both ways: ex-
pensive license and trademark fees motivate Chinese firms to develop their own 
designs. This is difficult, as the money paid to the designers of the turbines is 
spent to design newer and more competitive models, potentially leaving Chinese 
manufacturers one step behind. 
From Figure 10, we can also observe that relatively few merger and acquisition 
(M&A) deals are carried out by Chinese companies. As revenues of Chinese 
firms grow, combined with relatively difficult times in the global industry, it 
seems unavoidable that more such deals will be closed. For instance, a rumour is 
currently circulating that Goldwind and Sinovel are both competing to acquire the 
world’s largest wind turbine maker, and long time player in the field, Vestas 
(Morales & Sulugiuc 2012). Such an acquisition would have serious implications 
for the learning possibilities of the Chinese firms, since this way they would own 
and have full insight into the design of the technology. 
Another important learning network for Chinese manufacturing firms is more 
regional, and can be found at the sites where both Chinese and international firms 
perform their wind turbine testing in China. Lewis (2007: 228) illustrates this 
with the case of Goldwind, which has placed its testing operations in a popular 
wind farm site where almost all of the leading global wind turbine manufacturers 
in China have also installed turbines. This may have lead Goldwind to benefit 
from the learning shared amongst “these manufacturers coming from the other 
wind learning hubs of the world, as they all tested their designs in China” (ibid.). 
The same can be assumed about most large wind turbine manufacturers in China. 
This implies that international networks are effective both locally and globally, 
meaning that they share knowledge, in terms of licensing agreements and other 
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encounters, and they share experiences and routines, from which Chinese manu-
facturers can learn. Section 6.2 delves deeper into these learning mechanisms in 
the Chinese wind turbine TIS. Already now we are starting to understand the im-
portance of foreign knowledge in building up a Chinese industry. Therefore, we 
can confirm Binz et al.’s (2012) observation, that shortcomings in the Chinese 
TIS are compensated by connections with international TIS structures. 
Furthermore, many learning networks have been established in the form of direct 
cooperation on a governmental level, as well as between universities and research 
institutes in order to sustain China in its wind turbine industry development. 
There are a host of projects and bilateral cooperation institutions, and an exhaus-
tive list of all such agreements is beyond the scope of this study. Some examples 
of cooperation between China and the Nordic countries are provided by Delman 
and Chen (2008):
14
 the Danish wind energy development programme (WED) in 
cooperation with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), 
the Danish-Chinese Renewable Energy Programme (RED) also located at the 
NDRC, the Swedish-Chinese exchange programme on renewable energy between 
the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA) and the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering (CAE), and the EU-China Energy and Environment 
Programme (EEP) (ibid.). In addition, several other countries have activities 
within the renewable energy field in China, such as France, UK, Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the United States. For example, Germany’s 
GIZ, a federal enterprise which supports the German Government in international 
cooperation for sustainable development, had a wind power project in China be-
tween 2005 and 2010, which “Strives to improve the ‘technical capabilities of 
private and state institutions for the nationwide development of grid-bound wind 
energy use’” (CWPP 2010: 12). One of their core tasks was to educate personnel 
                                              
14
 Yet, the authors warn that given the lack of coordination within the Chinese renewable energy system, 
the Nordic countries might “easily waste resources and the mysteries of the system would remain” 
(Delman & Chen 2008: 33). 
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and managers, since China was, and perhaps still is, lacking this particular exper-
tise within the wind sector (ibid.).  
5.4 Institutions 
In the theory chapter it was explained that within the innovation systems frame-
work, institutions are taken to include culture, norms, laws, regulations and rou-
tines, which in one way or another regulate either directly or indirectly how actors 
relate to each other. When looking at culture and norms, it becomes evident that 
institutions and networks can easily be conflated. For instance, strong family 
networks or the strengths of guanxi (relationships / connections), could simply be 
placed under the network heading, whilst within the innovation system frame-
work they should be understood as cultural (Serger 2009).  First, some formal 
rules and regulations in the wind industry will be dealt with, and then a small dis-
cussion on the impact of culture and norms in the wind industry will follow, al-
though the latter topic to a lesser degree will be strictly limited to the wind indus-
try. Institutions are important for an industry to be functional, and a central con-
cern is that institutions fail to align themselves to the needs of the new technol-
ogy (Bergek 2002). As an illustration, M. Wang (2007) has showed how the Chi-
nese Energy Efficiency Law, in sharp contrast to the Renewable Energy Law, 
failed to be effective because the process of creating the policy could not keep up 
with rapid the development in the energy industry. 
5.4.1 The laws and regulations in the wind industry 
I find it convenient to divide the legislative measures undertaken by the central- 
and local governments into two main policy areas; namely, 1) policies which 
promote industry development directly, and 2) regulations that are aimed at in-
creasing renewable electricity production—although, to be sure, the two are in-
terconnected, so this division is far from clear-cut. The following by no means 
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represents an exhaustive list of the various policies that have influenced the wind 
industry, but seeks to elucidate some of the more influential policies. 
Industry development 
There are at least three important determinants that promote China’s wind indus-
try development directly: the domestic content requirements, speedy approvals, 
and policies promoting large renewable energy investments in China (Yadav 
2011). First, the domestic content requirement on wind turbine manufacturing in 
China has lead to the development of its supply chain markets; second, speedy 
approval for wind power projects at a provincial level has resulted in the huge 
number of additions each year; and third, according to Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, in 2010 China attracted $49,000 million in renewable energies invest-
ment, 78 per cent of which went to wind projects (BNEF 2011: 18, 20). This 
means that China attracted the most new financial investments for renewable en-
ergy in the world, far ahead of the U.S. which was in second place with around 
$25,000 million in 2010 (ibid.). 
China’s economic development of the last thirty years has been induced to a great 
extent by attracting foreign investments and building manufacturing industries 
(Long 2005: 316, Y. Wu 2006: 1), and it is within this fine-tuned industry ma-
chinery that the domestic Chinese turbine industry has grown. Infrastructure-
building, as well as supply of cheap labour, energy, and land, have therefore be-
come key issues of concern to local governments that want to attract industries 
(Gu & Lundvall 2006: 11). This has given China experience with a host of meas-
ures in industry-building, ranging from financial mechanisms and preferential 
taxes for manufacturers, to geographical content restrictions on products.  
Before 2002 the development of large-scale wind energy in China was slow, even 
though several policies were in place to promote the development, such as low 
electricity tariffs for wind electricity and local government support, as well as 
assistance from abroad (CWPP 2010: 20). In 2002 the government wanted to 
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stimulate the development through a national wind concession programme, which 
allocated selected sites for wind farm construction to the company bidding the 
lowest electricity tariff (ibid.). Some prerequisites were made in order for projects 
to be accepted, such as turbine size and local content restrictions.
15
 In effect, the 
price of electricity not only decided who won the bid, but also to what extent the 
turbines were manufactured locally (Q. Wang 2010: 705). According to a gov-
ernment statement in 2000, the domestic content requirements of wind turbines 
became a policy because the dependence on imported turbines and lack of local 
manufacturing of key parts were hampering the development of wind power in 
China (Howell et al. 2010: 50). During the first concession round which started in 
2003, the local content requirement of turbines was set at 50 per cent, a require-
ment which increased to 70 per cent in 2004, and was finally phased out in 2009 
(Q. Wang 2010). In addition to the content requirements, import tariffs on preas-
sembled wind turbines were at 17 per cent in 2007, whilst tariffs on their compo-
nents were set to only 3 per cent (Martinot & Li 2007: 20). This policy, together 
with the removal of the local content requirements in 2009, is thought to have 
“allow[ed] domestic manufacturers to more easily access wind components from  
foreign  suppliers  as  they  build  the  prototypes  for  their  larger  turbines” 
(BNEF 2010: 9). This helps the industry in its goal of building larger turbines, as 
will be examined closer in Section 6.3. According to Eric Martinot (2010: 288), 
the local content policy alone “marked a turning point in wind industry and tech-
nology development in China.”  
Other regulations of relevance were issued by the Ministry of Finance in 2008, 
where turbine manufacturers received a VAT and import tariff rebate on certain 
wind turbine components, which applied to companies with annual sales of more 
than 50 turbines of minimum 1.2 MW per turbine (CWPP 2010). Estimations 
made by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2010: 20) show that this policy alone 
produced US$ 80 million in R&D funding in 2009 for the top three wind turbine 
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 We shall come back to the implications of turbine size restrictions in the next chapter. 
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producers. Also, the Ministry of Finance issued another incentive policy in 2008 
under the label “rewards replacing subsidies”, which applied to all domestic 
brands (with over 51 per cent Chinese investment ownership) (CWPO 2010: 71). 
This policy gives the 50 first wind turbines over 1 MW a reward of 600 Yuan per 
kWh from the government, given that the company uses domestically manufac-
tured components, and that the generator enterprise and the key components 
manufacturer share the subsidy fifty-fifty (Q. Wang 2010: 707). These policies 
show that the government aims to increase the size of turbines, something we will 
return to in the next chapter.  
The wind power concession rounds have been successful in promoting the devel-
opment of wind projects in China, and developers and manufacturers both local 
and international have been convinced to invest in the industry (He & Chen 2009: 
2893). This is also reflected in attractiveness indices conducted by Ernst & 
Young Environmental Finance team, where the Chinese wind industry is by far 
the most attractive renewable energy investment area globally (EYEF 2011). Yet, 
they note that this may change in the coming year, because of stricter government 
regulations regarding wind farm approvals. The importance of financial mecha-
nisms will be further scrutinised in the next chapter. 
Up until 2011, however, the swift approval of wind farm projects has been an 
important contributor to the rapid wind industry growth in China. Large-scale 
projects of 50 MW or more all had to be approved by the central government. 
Projects of sizes up to 50 MW, however, could be approved by the provincial 
authorities, albeit with the verification of the NDRC, and in total this represents a 
large share of the wind farm development. The provincial governments are inter-
ested in attracting wind farms to their areas, because this would increase their tax 
base, and could attract local manufacturing capacity (CWPP 2010). To attract 
wind farm projects, the provinces offer higher prices than the centrally-
administered projects, something which attracts investors as well as makes the 
projects more financially viable (ibid.). According to the China Wind Power Cen-
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tre (2010: 25), in 2008 most registered projects were below 50 MW in order to 
circumvent the national approval process. In principle, several 50 MW projects 
are built right next to each other, making the real sizes of the wind farms often 
much larger, perhaps even 10 times or more (Jiang 2011: 94). This practise has 
come to an end as of November 1
st
 2011, when the much debated “grid code” 
was implemented in China, which, amongst other standards, requires that all pro-
jects be centrally approved through the NDRC (Jiang 2011). After this policy 
came into effect, the approval of wind farm projects slowed down considerably, 
and it marked an important change in government policy regarding rapid wind 
farm expansions.  
Wind electricity generation 
Most of the measures which are aimed at increasing the proportion of renewable 
electricity production in China are covered in the Renewable Energy Law 
(ReLaw), which was enacted in 2005, and brought into force on January 1, 2006, 
with amendments effective from April 2010. The measures include government 
installation goals, mandatory market shares, a tariff system, a cost sharing 
principle, and a special fund (Jiang 2011: 105). 
In Chinese government plans, such as the Medium and Long Term Development 
Plan for Renewable Energy of 2007 (until 2020) or the 12
th
 Five-Year Plan of 
2011, there are clear future installation goals, which are equivalent to market-size 
guarantees at a certain point in the future. For instance, in the 12
th
 Five Year Plan, 
there is a goal of 90 GW of installed wind power in 2015, even though these 
goals change rapidly, as the development happens quickly.
16
 Now, by the end of 
2011, it is estimated that the installed capacity is at 62.7 GW, and if the added 
capacity continues at the same pace as between 2010 and 2011 (18 GW), the 
2015 goal will have already been reached by the end of 2013. 
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 In the Medium and Long Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy of 2007, the goal of installed 
wind capacity in the year 2020 was set to 30GW, although this goal was already surpassed by 12 GW in 
2010. The function these goals have will be returned to in the next chapter. 
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The largest investors in wind farms in China are four state-owned power genera-
tion companies, all of which are part of the “big five” government power genera-
tion companies, Guodian, Datang, Huaneng, Huadian and China Power Invest-
ment Group (CPI) (CWPO 2010: 39).
17
 The reason these utilities invest in wind 
energy to such a large extent is that they are mandated by the government through 
the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy to install at least 3 per cent non-
hydro renewable power as a portion of their total capacity in 2010, and 8 per cent 
in 2020 (ibid.). This applies to all utilities that have a capacity of more than 5 GW 
of thermal power electricity generation (ibid.). These mandated market shares 
undoubtedly lead to an increase in wind power investments, but a downside may 
be the fact that these large power utilities only care to fulfil their installed capac-
ity criteria, and have less of an incentive to focus on the kWh produced (CWPP 
2010)—something which demands more resources in terms of operation and 
maintenance. Also, in accordance with the ReLaw, electric utilities are obligated 
to purchase all wind power produced; an important change in this regulation ap-
peared in the 2009 amendment of the ReLaw, when the utilities were obligated to 
purchase all the wind power even when there is not sufficient power demand on 
the grid (Martinot & Li 2010).  
The feed-in tariff of the 2005 Renewable Energy Law was based on “government 
guided” prices, which were adjusted year-by-year based on competitive bidding 
(Martinot & Li 2010). In 2009, a fixed feed-in tariff (FIT) was established, which 
varies according to available wind resources and project construction conditions 
(Jiang 2011: 107). This has divided the country into four different classes for on-
shore wind power, all with different FIT benchmarks, ranging between 0.51 and 
0.61 Yuan per kWh, where the lowest tariff applies to the regions with the best 
wind resources, and the highest to the regions with least favourable farm wind 
conditions (ibid.).  
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 CPI was listed as the eighth-largest wind power developer in China in 2010—the four others were listed 
as the first four in the order with which they are listed above. 
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Implementing feed-in tariffs is not free, and the gist of the cost-sharing policies is 
to evenly share the additional costs of renewable energy through a combination of 
civic duty and responsibility by various stakeholders. This has been achieved by 
an overall electricity price surcharge in China, which started out on 0.001 Yuan 
per kWh in 2006, increased to 0.002 in 2008, 0.004 in 2009, and finally 0.008 
Yuan per kWh in November 2011 (Jiang 2011, Reuters 2011). This money is to 
be spent on three main areas: the FIT, operation and maintenance costs, and grid 
integration costs (Jiang 2011: 108).  
There was also an intent in the ReLaw of 2006 to establish a special fund for re-
newable energy which could be used to finance science and technology research 
of renewable energy development, and standards development and demonstration 
projects (Jiang 2011: 110). But this has proven more difficult to implement, be-
cause no specific amount of money is proposed in the legislation measures, and 
how the fund would be used has been vaguely defined (CWPO 2010: 77).  
5.4.2 Culture and norms 
During informal conversations with the R&D director of a German wind turbine 
bearings producer subsidiary in China, it was pointed out that culture was a main 
difference between China and Germany. As one example, the director explained 
that workers refrained from asking for advice when a problem occurred, appar-
ently because they were afraid of “losing face”. This slowed down progress, be-
cause it would take more time to detect the problem. Even though this incident 
tell us little about the general manufacturing conditions in China, it gives a small 
hint as to what kind of cultural differences might occur for foreign companies 
there.  
Strong opinions exist on the influence of culture, norms, and routines in terms of 
innovation performance in China. For instance, after the death of Steve Jobs, a 
discussion surged in China regarding “Why can China not produce its own Steve 
Jobs?” (e.g. chinadaily.com.cn 2011, Mourdoukoutas 2011). Attempted explana-
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tions ranging from cultural to systemic issues were provided by experts from 
China and abroad. For instance, one observer wrote that “China's traditional Con-
fucianism cannot integrate with the Western Schumpeter corporate spirit, so 
throughout Chinese history, we rarely see respect for innovators and business-
men” (chinadaily.com.cn 2011). However, there is scant evidence backing up 
such claims. Moreover, these types of statements are oftentimes based on an old-
fashioned view that innovation is a Western phenomenon, and that Western insti-
tutions need be replicated in order to innovate. This is not in accordance with 
what the innovation systems literature claims, where a combination of mecha-
nisms is emphasised, and where culture is but one influencing factor.  
In any innovation system, people are the most important resource, but, of course, 
people cannot be forced to innovate. Although we shall not engage in a discus-
sion on the appropriateness of the term “social capital” here, it is commonly re-
ferred to as a measure of people’s willingness and likelihood to share knowledge 
and information, defined as “shared values, norms and trust that reduce transac-
tion cost” (Serger 2009: 63). It can thus roughly be equated to what we are look-
ing for in this section. In a study on innovation in China, Gu et al. (2009: 385, 
386) purport that  
(...) Chinese people believe in the positive role of science and technology 
while there is a weakness in social capital —values, norms and trust that 
are shared by the social community. Weak social capital is reflected in the 
low level of willingness by either academia or business enterprises to in-
teract, cooperate and engage in knowledge sharing with individuals and 
organizations outside their family circles or immediate “neighbors”. (...) 
[S]ocial capital underlies interactive learning; well-developed social capi-
tal is a prerequisite for absorbing, diffusing and using knowledge in the 
innovation system. In the increasingly complex division of labor and col-
laboration in innovation, education and social capital are necessary ele-
ments in order to create new ideas and the economic value deriving from 
them. 
If it is correct that there is a low willingness to engage in knowledge sharing in 
China, then this is no small obstacle for successful innovation, recalling from the 
theory chapter that diffusion of knowledge takes a central part in the overall goal 
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of an innovation system. Although sharing knowledge with family circles or im-
mediate personal networks, commonly referred to as guanxi, seems no different 
in the wind turbine industry than in other industries in China, it is difficult to say 
whether this hampers knowledge sharing outside these relationships. Given the 
industry’s close connection with foreign manufacturers, one might say that the 
wind industry is forced to share knowledge with outsiders.  
Sylvia Schwaag Serger (2009: 64) claims that the reason for this low willingness 
to share knowledge with outsiders in China is that there is a low level of trust. 
Corruption and intellectual property rights (IPR) infringements are taken as prox-
ies to measure the level of trust, where high levels mean low trust (OECD 2008: 
406).
18
 To the author’s knowledge, there is currently one IPR infringement case 
in the Chinese wind industry, and that is the still-unresolved issue between 
China’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, Sinovel, and the U.S. based energy 
technology company American Superconductor (AMSC). Without entering into 
the details of this particular case, it is clear that one such case may jeopardise the 
trustworthiness of the whole Chinese wind turbine sector, something which 
would have a huge impact. As voiced by the interviewee from Goldwind, cus-
tomers were concerned that Goldwind would “turn around and stab us in the back 
like Sinovel did to AMSC”. If the case is decided against Sinovel, and if more 
such cases occur, it could indicate that there is indeed a low level of trust in the 
wind turbine sector; but it could also in itself make the industry seem less trust-
worthy. However, ascribing such a turn of events to cultural values would be too 
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 Corruption seems to be a chronic problem overall in China and is not specific to the wind industry, even 
though solving the problem is high on the agenda in the Chinese government (Saich 2011: 373). Corrup-
tion could be one major difference from other countries, and according to the Transparency International 
corruption perception index of 2011, China ranked 75th in the world, with a score of 3.6, where 0 is 
highly corrupt and 10 is very clean (CPI 2011). 
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hasty, knowing that there are similar cases of IPR infringements in countries 
commonly associated with a higher level of “social capital”.19 
Another scholar, Erik Baark (2007: 354), concluded in a study on knowledge and 
innovation institutions in China that: 
(...) the predicament of innovators [in China] today may still be difficult, 
swimming as they do in a sea of acidic attitudes towards the new and un-
tried, with precious little effective support from peers, officials, or the 
population at large. 
This quote alludes to the fact that the education system in China still seems to be 
too heavily influenced by earlier legacies as a plan-based system. With regards to 
the wind turbine industry, this highly broad discussion of education and cultural 
impact will be addressed in the next chapter, where the functions “knowledge 
development and diffusion” (Section 6.2) and “entrepreneurial activity” (Section 
6.6) are particularly relevant.  
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 For instance, there is currently a dispute between the multinational enterprise General Electric Company 
(GE), based in the U.S., and the Japanese Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Both parties have filed wind 
power patent suits against each other, started by GE in 2008, a case which still remains unresolved (Lane 
2012).  
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6. The functions and functionality of China’s 
wind industry 
In the following section the functional pattern of the Chinese wind turbine indus-
try will be described and an attempt will be made to judge to what extent these 
functions are successfully filled. I shall address each of the functions elaborated 
on in the theory chapter, and the functionality, or “goodness”, of these functions 
is continually assessed, alternating between the four methods described. These 
four methods are: 1) establish what phase the industry is in and thereby judge 
functionality; 2) compare TISs of different locations; 3) compare similar TISs 
domestically; and 4) confer with the stakeholders in question. Lastly, in Section 
6.8, the dynamics of the industry is assessed by employing the described func-
tional pattern, and a given overall goal for the industry. 
6.1 Resource mobilisation 
Mobilising resources is crucial in many ways for an industry, and its importance 
is often closely connected with the function “influence of the direction of 
search”, because of the implication this has for the break-through of a technol-
ogy. The case of Germany’s wind turbine industry is illustrative, where resource 
mobilisation proved to be large and flexible enough to sustain several directions 
of research and development, something which made the industry comparatively 
successful (Bergek 2002: 151). The resources can be both financial and human, 
and they are crucial contributions to all activities within an innovation system 
(Hekkert & Negro 2009: 586). As we shall see, in China both financial and hu-
man capital have contributed to development in recent years, yet whether this is 
due to government or private initiative is more difficult to judge. This section will 
start by looking at the financial mechanisms, followed by an examination of hu-
man resources.  
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6.1.1 Financial resources 
It should be emphasised at the outset that there is gap between financial invest-
ments undertaken by global as well as local investors in China, and government 
investments in the shape of funding and subsidies. To give a rough figure, it is 
estimated that the total financial investments in the Chinese wind industry were 
US$41,400 million in 2010 (BNEF 2011: 20), whilst the government portion of 
these investments is seemingly marginal. This was pointed out in the interview 
with Li Junfeng (30.09.2011), where he underscored that the government ac-
counted for a marginal share of the investments, perhaps as little as 0.1 per cent 
of the total direct investments; amounting to around US$50 million. According to 
him, some of this money goes directly to R&D, and some is allocated through an 
“industrialisation fund”. Yet, the picture is more complex than this. For one 
thing, this government funding figure does not seem to include the subsidies that 
go to the generation of wind electricity, where the government spent approxi-
mately US$1,000 million, between January and September 2010 alone (Jiang 
2011: 108). To be sure, this subsidy is covered by money from the electricity 
price surcharge, which would total about US$1,500 million based on the electric-
ity consumption of 2009 (ibid.), and around US$3,000 million with the doubled 
surcharge of 0.008 Yuan per kWh as of 2011 (with the same electricity consump-
tion). One can therefore argue that this subsidy is not covered by the government, 
but by the consumer. At any rate, the figure mentioned by Li is not in congruence 
with the available annual financial statements of the two large and publicly traded 
companies, Goldwind and Mingyang. According to their annual reports for 2010, 
Goldwind, the second largest Chinese company, received approximately US$ 30 
million, and Mingyang, the fifth largest company, approximately US$ 17 million 
(Goldwind 2011a, Mingyang 2011). These funds were given mainly in order to 
compensate for R&D expenses of the companies. If these two companies together 
received almost US$50 million, it is natural to assume that the industry in total 
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would receive much more.
20
 Still, if we include these subsidies, the government 
contribution does not come close either to the total financial investments in the 
wind industry, or to the fossil-fuel subsidies, which according to the International 
Energy Agency, cost the Chinese government US$21,000 million in 2010 (WEO 
2011: 514). 
For the functionality of the innovation system, it matters more that resources are 
mobilised at all than where the resources come from. However, in order to com-
pletely understand the performance of the function, it is necessary to look behind 
the numbers and figures. Mapping the role the government has apart from the 
direct investments is a real puzzle, since much of what happens behind the scenes 
in China is never revealed to the public. This goes for the Chinese banking sector 
as well, where, according to three interviewees (two of them specialists in wind 
energy financing in China) the government exerts a great deal of influence in the 
wind industry. It is no big secret that the Chinese banking system overall is gov-
ernment-controlled, and that there are four major commercial banks which ac-
counted for over 70 per cent of China’s financial assets in 2009 (Walter & Howie 
2011: 27).The main task for Chinese banks has largely been to support the SOEs, 
even after restructuring the banking and finance sector as a part of the economic 
reforms (ibid.: 43). According to Tony Saich (2011: 293, 294), the commercial 
banks are directed to lend to state-owned enterprises even after the three so-called 
“policy banks”, which would specifically look after government-mandated lend-
ing, were created in 1994. In effect, this means that the banks are instruments that 
the government can use to achieve development goals.  
In order to fully grasp what this means for the wind industry, recall that the larg-
est investors in wind power projects are large energy investment companies 
owned by the central government. We can assume that these SOEs obtain loans 
more easily than private competitors. Also, a preference for SOEs may cause 
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 These estimates, together with the subsidy-policies mentioned in Section 5.4.1., constitute the renew-
able energy subsidy figure mentioned in Table 1. This estimate excludes the FIT subsidies. 
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price advantages, as was pointed out by one interviewee: “In general for such 
kind of agreements [the SOEs] will order in large quantities and of course this 
will give them an advantage in negotiating the components price, and that of 
course will get the price down”. There are at least three dangers related to this. 
First, there is a possibility that private companies will encounter barriers to entry 
into the market if SOEs are preferred, risking new and useful knowledge being 
potentially barred from access. This is especially true for periods when the market 
is more difficult, as it became in 2011. Second, even though the support of large 
SOEs has created rapid growth thus far, their preference might lead to a lack of 
project evaluation behind credit decisions. This concern was expressed by Sebas-
tian Meyer (interview 08.11.2011), who said that:  
The government approves the projects and the money is going to state 
owned companies, so within the state sector there is no major perception 
of risk. So on the one hand, there is no technical and commercial dili-
gence, or specifically what we would call project finance behind most 
wind farms. But on the other hand, when the signal is alright, every loan 
officer or every bank knows it’s not a bad idea to lend money to wind pro-
jects, and that has enabled the wind industry to flourish. But it flourished 
also at a time when investment and infrastructure also experienced mas-
sive growth. 
We thus see a potentially destructive combination in preferring low-quality state-
owned projects, induced by government investment. In conversations with the 
turbine manufacturers, this picture was confirmed. For instance, in a discussion 
with an employee from Geoho, a private wind turbine producer, it was empha-
sised that since they were not able to move as quickly as the SOEs, they decided 
to focus on making high-quality products. There is reason to believe this strategy 
will become difficult when the market growth is slowing down. Liming Qiao (in-
terview 12.09.2011), the China Director of the Global Wind Energy Council 
(GWEC), put it this way:  
for the manufacturers: quite a lot of them belong to the state, so it’s easier 
[for them to access capital]. And for others, like private companies, it’s 
also easy to get financing because wind was a promising sector; but all this 
is changing now, this year [2011]. What I just said, was the old story; now 
this year everything is becoming tight. 
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One reason things became tighter was that the deposit reserve ratio (i.e. the 
minimum reserves each bank must hold of customer deposits) was increased sev-
eral times respectively, making it more difficult for the banks to lend out money. 
According to Bryan Davis (interview 01.11.2011) from Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, this is one key measure the government has to control the market. But 
presumably the main reason things became tighter in the wind industry is the 
aforementioned government game-change as of 2011, with the “grid code” ad-
justments and the shift from provincial to central approval of wind projects. 
The third danger is connected to the relationship this function has with “influenc-
ing the direction of search”, as the quest for ever-larger turbines may outstrip the 
marketing potential for the turbines. As showed by Anna Bergek (2002: 159) and 
Staffan Jacobsson, this happened in the Swedish wind turbine industry, when in 
the early 1980s they were already pushing towards 2 and 3 MW-scale turbines. 
Sweden was therefore considered a world-leading wind turbine nation (ibid.). In 
spite of this, the market and the industry for wind turbines developed very slowly 
in Sweden, perhaps due to a serious lack of legitimacy for wind power as com-
pared with nuclear power (ibid.). Similar stories of failed large-scale turbine re-
search programmes have been observed in Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
U.S. (Garud & Karnøe 2003, Kamp et al. 2004).  
In China, even though most interviewees for this study reflected upon larger tur-
bines as exclusively positive, a concern was voiced amongst foreign turbine 
manufacturers at the China Wind Power Conference 2011. Henning Cruse, the 
Director of Governmental Affairs of Siemens, the world’s 9th-largest company in 
2010 (REN21 2011), and Wolfgang Jussen, the CEO of REpower (Beijing), also 
amongst the world’s largest wind turbine companies, both warned that focussing 
too much on large turbines could be disastrous. Mr. Jussen put it this way at the 
conference: 
I would say that for China I would recommend, by all these bad experi-
ences from onshore, with technical problems: take it slowly, develop it 
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step by step. You have the technology—finally, Sinovel has this proved 
technology of intertidal turbines—but don't aim to be the first to have a 
10MW machine in the deep sea water somewhere from China. This is a 
dimension we as a leading company on deep water installations—we know 
how these challenges can ruin a company. 
Presumably, these challenges that can “ruin a company” are related to too-high 
expenditures on R&D, which would have disastrous consequences should any of 
the designs meet with bottlenecks too serious to overcome, causing the invest-
ment to fail to pay off. Nevertheless, too high R&D expenditures are not yet a 
major concern for Chinese turbine manufacturers. 
Lastly, another feature of the Chinese financial sector is its venture capital sys-
tem, which according to Xielin Liu (2009: 134) is still immature both in terms of 
financial resources and capabilities of the actors involved. Even though venture 
capital in theory has a potentially important role for innovation performance by 
not only supplying financial capital, but also competence (Bergek 2002: 119), 
there is still not enough empirical evidence to back up these claims (O'Sullivan 
2005: 250). However, it is curious that the Chinese wind industry, which is the 
largest in the world in terms of manufacturing capacity, received no venture capi-
tal funding deals in 2011 (Mercom 2012), and only modest sums in the period 
between 2004 and 2010 (BNEF 2010). 
6.1.2 Human resources 
Education institutes were briefly touched upon in the previous chapter, but no 
real evaluation was made of how adequate education is in assisting the wind tur-
bine development in China. Considering the fast growth of the industry, one 
could expect that skilled personnel would be scarce. What typically distinguishes 
a skilled worker is that he or she possesses “know-how” which often has been 
learnt in apprenticeship-relations (Jensen et al. 2007: 682). Interviewees were 
asked about the access to “qualified personnel”, and interestingly there was a di-
vergence in responses between the industry, and the government officials and 
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industry experts. The industry largely claimed that they had no troubles finding 
enough personnel, whilst the latter two groups claimed that it was a serious prob-
lem. Weiquan Wang (interview 29.09.2011) from CREIA expressed it this way: 
“For the long term we do not have enough human power for renewable energy, 
because [the industry] is very new. And in the meantime it grows very quickly, so 
sometimes the industry has a lack of human resources.” The difference in re-
sponses might simply be explained by a diverging focus of the interviewees; 
whilst the manufacturers perhaps see no large human-resource bottlenecks in 
producing the turbines, the government officials and industry experts include op-
eration and maintenance in their analysis, where the personnel constraint seems 
more prevalent. For instance, Sebastian Meyer (interview 08.11.2011) presented 
the following rough equation: 
Basically every new wind farm needs about 10 dedicated staff to operate it 
as soon as it’s installed. So you look at last year, 20 Gigawatts being in-
stalled, divide that by a 50 megawatt project, so it’s like 1000 projects. 
You need 10000, 20000 workers to just service on an ongoing basis, and 
it’s not easy to turn out the technicians.  
This problem is dealt with both on the firm and government levels in China. First, 
by far the most established university for wind power engineering education is 
North China Electric Power University, which in 2005 established a four-year 
degree programme on a recommendation from the NDRC (Howell et al. 2010: 
59). Second, many wind turbine companies have their own training facilities, and 
Goldwind has even established a corporate university, which was founded to 
“enhance the competitiveness of Goldwind and advance the competency of the 
company’s personnel while fulfilling its corporate social responsibilities” 
(ChinaWindEnergy 2011). On another note, qualified personnel shortages are not 
limited to China; the European offshore wind industry lacks access to a trained 
workforce with skills needed to further develop the industry (Jacobsson & Bergek 
2011: 50). 
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6.2 Knowledge development and diffusion 
Obviously, access to resources is not tantamount to successful industry develop-
ment. A prominent testament to this is the Danish – U.S. comparison of “break-
through” versus “bricolage”. As was argued in a seminal paper by Garud and 
Karnøe (2003), Denmark’s development of a wind turbine industry was compara-
tively ahead of the game, even though the U.S. wind turbine industry, with their 
breakthrough strategy, was deploying more resources into R&D projects. Learn-
ing processes and input from local actors was important in the Danish case 
(ibid.), and learning mechanisms arguably are at the core of any innovation sys-
tem. Therefore, knowledge development and diffusion are important prerequisites 
for a successful industry (Hekkert & Negro 2009: 586). Knowledge is taken to be 
a vital resource for innovation, whilst learning is often understood as an essential 
activity accompanied by innovation (Coenen & Díaz López 2010: 1154). Knowl-
edge can be classified into different categories, and depending on what knowl-
edge one draws from, two modes of learning can be distinguished: 
One mode is based on the production and use of codified, scientific and 
technical knowledge, the Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) mode, 
and one is an experienced-based mode of learning based on Doing, Using 
and Interacting (DUI-mode) (Jensen et al. 2007: 680). 
According to Jensen et al. (2007) both these modes are important; in fact they 
claim that mixed strategies that combine the two modes are what really improve 
innovation performance—but the science-based learning mode commonly re-
ceives more attention than the experience-based. As the example of Denmark and 
the U.S. shows, no optimal amount of investments in research and development 
can be pin-pointed. This notion is reinforced by the contrasting experiences of the 
German and Swedish wind turbine industries, where both allocated large sums to 
R&D; but whilst the focus in Germany was on a variety of turbines, in Sweden it 
was almost solely on large-scale turbines, which ultimately lead nowhere for the 
Swedish industry (Jacobsson & Bergek 2011: 48). It is suggested by Bergek et al. 
(2008a) that one can measure knowledge development and diffusion by looking 
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at the number, size and orientation of R&D projects, assessments by managers or 
others, and learning curves. We will here concentrate on R&D projects and as-
sessments by interviewees. Nevertheless, incorporating a focus on both R&D and 
on more tacit forms of learning and innovating, as implied in the DUI-mode 
above, conveys a more complete picture of the Chinese case.  
6.2.1 Science-based learning 
To start by looking at R&D activities, according to the China Wind Power Out-
look (CWPO 2010: 34) all of the top 10 Chinese enterprises have established 
their own R&D centres. Furthermore, 
(...) seven enterprises - Sinovel, Goldwind, Dongfang, Zhejiang Windey, 
XEMC, Guodian United Power and Guangdong Mingyang - essentially 
possess the design capability and key manufacturing technology for MW-
scale wind turbines, and are in an excellent position to carry out independ-
ent research and development through introducing or developing advanced 
design software and control strategies, establishing high level laboratories 
and other R&D platforms and cultivating professional technical personnel. 
(...) Generally, however, there is still a large gap between the R&D level 
of China’s wind power industry and the international standard in terms of 
the numbers of institutions, their employees and the quality of work 
(CWPO 2010: 34, 41). 
The CWPO is, on the one hand, focussing on the R&D level already achieved in 
the Chinese wind industry, and on the other hand, contrasting this with the com-
paratively low level in a global perspective. The latter perspective was reinforced 
by the interviewees; for instance, Mr. Li (interview 30.09.2011) expressed that 
“the research institutions and universities are very weak”. Nevertheless, several 
companies are able to independently develop their own designs. In fact, even 
though there is a gap between the domestic and international R&D level, conver-
sations with researchers and professionals in the industry revealed that several 
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have established research centres in leading 
wind turbine research and development communities globally, such as at Risøe in 
Denmark (e.g. Mingyang and Envision). Presumably, this enables these compa-
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nies to tap into highly valuable knowledge or skilled personnel, crucial to further 
develop their turbine designs. 
There is a general propensity in China to invest more in research and develop-
ment, and an overall goal is an increase in R&D expenditure to 2.5 per cent of 
GDP by 2020, up from 1.42 per cent in 2006 (Cao et al. 2009: 247). In compari-
son, the OECD average R&D spending as a percentage of GDP was 2.3 in 2008 
(OECD 2011: 179). To delve into the specifics of the wind industry, let us look at 
the available numbers for R&D spending. Even though the interviewees did not 
know any specific figures, it was commonly assumed that the portion spent on 
R&D in comparison to the total revenue, the R&D intensity, was very low. The 
example from the only U.S.-listed Chinese wind turbine manufacturer, Mingyang, 
is illustrative. Their 2010 annual report states that the 2010 R&D intensity was 
0.78 per cent, in 2009 it was 4.5 per cent and in 2008 it was 9.6 per cent 
(Mingyang 2011). The company started in 2006, and it is therefore natural that 
their R&D expenses were higher in the inception, but a decline to 0.8 per cent in 
2010 is interesting. Available figures for Goldwind shows a R&D intensity of 
0.75 per cent in both 2010 and 2009 (Goldwind 2011b).
21
 Seemingly this is the 
standard for the more established large companies in China. Unfortunately, ac-
cess to detailed information is limited because of low transparency and few listed 
companies. Yet, a comparison with some other large wind companies reveals that 
this level is fairly low. For instance, according to Vestas’ latest annual report, 
even though 2011 was not a good year for the company they still spent 6.9 per 
cent of their revenue on R&D (Vestas 2012). Furthermore, Suzlon, an Indian 
company that in 2010 was the sixth-largest wind turbine manufacturer globally, 
spent 3.3 and 1.75 per cent respectively in 2009/10 and 2010/11 (Suzlon 2011).  
To take a quick peek into R&D projects, there are several projects funded by both 
international and national institutions. Sinovel, for instance, received US$ 1.2 
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 All figures are calculated by the author as a ratio between the companies’ investments in R&D and net 
sales according to annual report figures. 
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million in government funding in 2009 for a centre that would “develop a large 
scale wind power generator unit driving set, speed change control system, and a 
massive data collection and management system” (Howell et al. 2010: 31,32). 
Other examples include the China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program 
(CRESP), which is a collaboration between China, the World Bank and the 
Global Environment Facility, to support concrete turbine development projects. 
As an example, between 2007 and 2011 they financed five Chinese wind turbine 
companies, amongst them the three largest, with a total of approximately US$ 41 
million for what they call wind turbine technology transfer projects, which in-
cludes design, assembling and testing of various MW-scale prototype turbines 
(CRESP 2012). Furthermore, whole teams with experts from other countries have 
been involved in research and development activities in the Chinese wind indus-
try (CWPO 2010: 41). Even though an independent assessment of the value of 
these R&D projects has not been conducted, there is little doubt that they have 
contributed to the development of independent designs for the Chinese compa-
nies.  
6.2.2 Experience-based learning 
Especially when talking about tacit or localised knowledge, including the notion 
of doing, using, and interacting (DUI) in a broad definition of innovation be-
comes important (Lundvall et al. 2009). According to Jensen et al. (2007: 682) 
different types of knowledge can be distinguished, where “know-what” and 
“know-why” relate mainly to the STI learning mode referred to above, and 
“know-how” and “know-who” are produced by the DUI-mode. So if one part of 
the learning in the Chinese industry refers mainly to R&D efforts, one can as-
sume that another part relates to the DUI-mode. As we saw in the last chapter, 
much of the technology in the Chinese wind industry is based on licensing 
agreements with foreign companies. A good deal of communication happens with 
the licensing company so that a diffusion of knowledge occurs, and wind turbine 
companies today have a global reach (Lewis 2011). Also, joint designs and 
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M&As occur as methods to obtain independent technology for Chinese compa-
nies (CWPO 2010: 34). Therefore, one could say that the Chinese industry taps 
into a global knowledge base, with the goal of adapting and developing the 
knowledge at a local base. This type of learning can be classified as learning by 
interacting—and relates to how knowledge is diffused through networks (Hekkert 
& Negro 2009: 586). How far such learning may take a company is not easy to 
determine, yet it proved highly propitious in the Danish wind turbine industry, 
where interaction between the turbine users and turbine producers was helpful 
(Kamp et al. 2004). However, when talking with an employee of Geoho, a private 
turbine manufacturer, it was pointed out that licensing turbines prevents a com-
pany from applying adaptive changes to turbine designs. Depending on the li-
censing agreement the different firms have, this may inhibit the companies in 
China actually developing and adapting the technology, and they may be confined 
to merely production and assembly of the turbines. An increasingly common 
strategy in the Chinese wind industry is therefore to acquire a company (M&A) 
which has developed its own turbine, and cooperate on designing a Chinese tur-
bine locally. In this way the companies circumvent any restrictions within licens-
ing agreements, and also avoid future potential intellectual property lawsuits. 
In Denmark, the users and producers of a wind turbine maintained a close and 
persistent connection, and the feedback this yielded improved the turbine designs 
(Hendry & Harborne 2011: 780). This kind of learning-by-using has been preva-
lent in Europe, where both manufacturers and developers are the ones establish-
ing demonstration projects and learning from those experiences (Borup et al. 
2009: 97). In China, the most frequent users of the turbines manufactured are the 
state-owned utility and grid companies, even though some manufacturers also 
operate wind farms. Because many Chinese turbine manufacturers are so new, 
their lack of a track-record is arguably a major barrier for further developments of 
products as well as in convincing buyers that they have the best product. 
Vivienne Lu (interview 03.11.2011), the marketing manager for Nordex (Bei-
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jing), a German turbine manufacturer in China, emphasised that their long track-
record enabled the company to learn from past experience:  
We are continually doing technical improvements or upgrading the exist-
ing technology. To do this we take the experience from the past to make 
the future turbines better. (...) For our 1.5 [MW turbine] we already have 
more than ten years global track record, and that is an experience that can-
not be replaced.  
The Chinese manufacturer with the longest track-record is Goldwind, which ar-
guably has an advantage in its technology development. Therefore, not only the 
fact that the company built its test-facilities close to the international companies, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, but also their longer track-record of wind farm 
operations have potentially been significant for Goldwind’s advancement. Never-
theless, in 2010 their longest-serving wind turbine had only been in operation for 
six years (Goldwind 2011a). Another interesting case of learning-by-using is 
Guodian United Power, a subsidiary of Guodian, one of the five state-owned 
electric power companies (the “big five”), and by far the largest wind power in-
staller (CWPO 2010, gdupc.com.cn 2012). Since Guodian United Power was es-
tablished in 2007, it grew to become the fourth largest Chinese turbine manufac-
turer in 2009—and this in the world’s largest wind turbine market. Presumably, 
the company has benefitted greatly from the unique position its parent company 
has in wind farm development. This was also emphasised in an interview the 
Deputy Director of United Power’s Chief Engineering Office, Mr Xiao Jinsong, 
did with DNV (2011):  
(...) United Power has the advantage of control throughout the entire sup-
ply chain. In addition to providing the complete machine, we also produce 
major components—blades, gearboxes, generators, pitch systems, invert-
ers, etc. Furthermore, our parent company, Guodian, is the largest wind 
power developer in Asia (emphasis added). 
According to Jensen et al. (2007: 683), experience-based learning “is acquired for 
the most part on the job as employees face on-going changes that confront them 
with new problems”. Given the fact that the Chinese industry manufactured 
around 87 per cent of all installed turbines in 2009 (CWPO 2010: 37), Chinese 
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companies have considerable learning-by-doing experience, and their learning 
curves have been steep. Many of the interviews and conversations with manufac-
turers indicated that a large portion of the innovative activities in the Chinese tur-
bine industry relate to adapting the turbines to local geographical and climatic 
conditions. For instance, in conversations with a Goldwind employee, it was indi-
cated that they have adapted the turbines to the rough conditions found in Xinji-
ang and Inner Mongolia, by increasing the protection against dust, humidity and 
extreme weather. According to Mr. Meyer (interview 08.11.2011), since Gold-
wind uses air-cooled direct-drive turbines, it was crucial to find an isolation 
which was robust enough to cope with air containing more sand and dust than in 
Europe.
22
  
Another common feature of the Chinese wind turbine industry is that experience 
from different sectors is used when producing the turbines and their components, 
since many of the players have grown out of large industrial companies 
(Schwartz & Hodum 2008). For instance, the central government administered 
Dongfang Electric, the third-largest Chinese wind turbine manufacturer, has a 
history of more than 50 years in manufacturing heavy-duty machinery and 
equipment, such as steam and hydro turbine generators (DEC 2012). This com-
pany, which is one of the largest steam turbine producers in China, did not en-
gage in the wind industry until 2005, when it started cooperating with European 
turbine design companies (Zhao et al. 2009: 2886). Also, the XEMC group which 
was founded in 1936, had previous experience in machinery and electricity 
equipment manufacturing before jumping into the wind turbine industry (XEMC 
2012). According to the interviewee from XEMC Windpower, their experience 
with electric generators in particular gave the company a large advantage in de-
veloping their wind turbine technology. Looking at the list of top ten wind tur-
bine manufacturers across the globe (REN21 2011: 39), it is clear that previous 
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 In fact, for precisely this reason, Goldwind has been listed for two years in a row as one of the 50 most 
innovative companies in the world, by the MIT Technology Review (MIT 2012). 
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experience in a different sector is highly common, and according to my own 
knowledge this applies to at least six of the ten major companies: Sinovel (2
nd
), 
GE Wind (3
rd
), Enercon (5
th
), United Power (6
th
), Siemens (7
th
) and Dongfang 
(9
th
).  
6.3 Influence on the direction of search 
What kinds of incentives and pressures exist for actors seeking to enter the Chi-
nese wind turbine industry? As we have seen already, more than 80 manufactur-
ers and several up- and down-stream firms are engaged in the industry, and un-
derstanding what drives this engagement is important to saying something about 
how the wind turbine industry works. It is clear that this function has a close con-
nection with the functions “market formation” and “resource mobilisations” since 
these are clear indicators for industrial actors seizing new opportunities (Bergek 
2002: 155, 178). Jacobsson and Bergek (2011: 49) indicate that “influencing the 
direction of search” has much to do with institutional factors, many of which 
were described in the previous chapter. Several circumstances influence the di-
rection of search; for example, expectations, visions and beliefs in growth poten-
tial, incentives from factor prices, and the extent of regulatory pressures (Bergek 
et al. 2008a: 415). The government is a core player in determining beliefs in 
growth potential through goals set in five-year and longer-term plans. These types 
of government targets are closely connected with increasing the legitimacy of the 
wind industry, something which increases the attractiveness of the industry, and 
this will be further scrutinised in Section 6.5. Yet, it is challenging—if not im-
possible—for a government alone to delimit a path of development. As will be 
explained further in Section 7.2, environmental deterioration and climate change 
are forces that may have influenced the increased interest in renewable energy in 
China.  
Within the Chinese wind industry two basic directions of search can be clearly 
distinguished; namely, a drive towards larger turbines, and a divergence between 
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direct-drive and double-fed technology turbines. Even though the government is 
directing much of the influence in the Chinese wind turbine TIS, other factors are 
important as well. As we have seen already, government funding for wind turbine 
R&D was potentially destructive for the industries, such as in the Netherlands, 
the U.S., and particularly in Sweden, where the focus was on ever-larger turbines. 
In China, this influence is exercised in terms of restrictions on turbine size usage 
for wind farms, and is motivated by a concern for quality (Lewis 2011: 285). 
Since the beginning of the concession rounds, minimum turbine sizes have been 
postulated, beginning with minimum 600 kW, then increasing to 750 kW and 
finally 1 MW in 2009 (CWPP 2010, Howell et al. 2010).
23
 As was expressed by 
Weiquan Wang (interview 29.09.2011) at CREIA, “[with this policy] they can 
produce wind turbines with more quality and improve their technology. I think 
generally speaking it’s good for the development of the industry”. Nevertheless, 
according to the European Chamber of Commerce, in China these restrictions are 
not only harmful to the industry, but will “increase the risk of installing turbines 
that are unsuitable and inefficient” (Howell et al. 2010: 57). Also, in terms of 
R&D funding, the government has explicitly mandated that the money is to be 
used to develop larger turbines: Chinese companies were impelled to “think big” 
(BNEF 2010).  
From a TIS perspective, supporting a variation of turbines has been the most suc-
cessful policy in other countries, for the formation of a wind turbine industry 
(Bergek 2002: 173). Yet, looking at the industry from a global perspective, the 
Chinese industry has quickly caught up, and it tries to adapt to international stan-
dards and mass production, where there is a trend towards large-scale wind tur-
bines aimed especially for the offshore-market (CWPO 2010: 2). Since standardi-
sation, codification and formulation of “best practises”, or what Geels and Raven 
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 The policy-suggestion as of 2010  restricted “the  operation  of  wind  turbine  manufacturers  that  did  
not  have  the  capability  to  produce  a  2.5 MW  or larger turbine, did not have at least 5 years of experi-
ence in a related industry and  did  not  meet  various  financial,  R&D  and  quality  control  require-
ments” (Lewis 2011: 285). 
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(2006: 378) call “aggregation activities”, have come so far internationally, it is 
necessary for the Chinese manufacturers to reach this level in order to capture 
market share abroad. It is clear that reaching the goal of larger turbines is impor-
tant for the industry, given that the Chinese wind industry finds itself in a “bridg-
ing phase”, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
So scaling up might yield positive results in terms of market possibilities, but 
then another problem appears, namely the long term performance and electricity 
generation of a wind turbine. At the China Wind Power conference 2011, com-
pelling concerns were raised: First, foreign turbine manufacturers were concerned 
that a focus on installed capacity in terms of MW would prevail over a focus on 
long-term performance in terms of MWh. Second, the equipment manufacturers 
worried that price-competitions would lead to a deterioration of quality. These 
two concerns are related, because a turbine with poor-quality components will not 
produce electricity efficiently during a 20-year lifecycle. Especially now that 
Chinese manufacturers are looking to export more turbines, it will be challenging 
to convince international buyers of the long-term performance of the turbines. In 
any case, we see that international standards are influencing the direction of 
search in China, and that influence is likely to increase with the overseas expan-
sion of the Chinese wind industry. 
China has chosen to sustain a relatively new technology, the direct-drive perma-
nent magnet wind turbine generator.
24
 Goldwind and XEMC Windpower are 
leading this development, and together with the German company Enercon they 
are the three largest direct-drive design turbine producers globally (REN21 2011: 
40). The total global market captured by this technology is almost one-fifth of the 
total (ibid.), and within China the direct drive technology has increased steadily 
from an estimated market share of 0.1 per cent in 2006 to 21.5 per cent in 2010 
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 Hybrid solutions have also received increasing attention, where the gearbox and permanent magnet 
generator both contribute to electricity generation of one single turbine. 
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(Jiang et al. 2011: 41).
25
 According to Mr. Meyer (interview 08.11.2011) from 
Azure International, this development was intentionally promoted by the govern-
ment: 
(...) there was a clear signal for instance at the government for direct-drive 
technology in that a lot of grant money was given to develop commercial 
prototypes, then there were different tax rebate systems designed to enable 
the roll-out of scale manufacturing for first turbine companies. 
Goldwind and XEMC Windpower are the only two large turbine manufacturers 
in China that have chosen this technology in place of the double-fed turbine, and 
it is interesting to see what lead to that choice. According to Owen Chan (inter-
view 27.10.2011), key account manager at XEMC Windpower, they were con-
trasting these two models before they made a final choice:  
When we made the choice over whether we choose double-fed technology 
or direct-driven, we really hesitated for a long time. Based on trend and 
tendency, we finally chose direct-drive units. (...) In the past, the power 
companies only thought the double-fed turbines were acceptable, but now 
these electricity power companies have begun to think our direct-drive 
models are acceptable. 
Even though it is difficult to assess based on these statements what ultimately 
lead to this direction of search, this illustrates that it is possible to make a bold 
choice in the Chinese industry even when the largest investors, the electricity 
power companies, are hesitant to the technology. One might ascribe the choice to 
the comparatively cheap prices of permanent magnets in China, since China pro-
vides around 95 per cent of all rare earth elements, and at the same time has an 
export quota for these elements, making them cheaper to purchase domestically 
than abroad (DOE 2011: 16, 20). Also, as suggested by Geels and Raven (2006: 
375), the direction of search and development activities is influenced by expecta-
tions and visions that are oriented towards the future. The interviewee from 
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 The permanent magnet commonly used for direct-drive turbines is Neodymium iron boron, a rare earth 
element (DOE 2011: 19).  
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Goldwind (interview 14.11.2011) emphasised expectations of future performance 
when talking about their direct-drive technology:  
About 2005-2006 Goldwind basically took a 180 [degrees], they got rid of 
the gearbox design; it wasn’t the future—and went into the permanent-
magnet design with the Vensys turbine. (...) and that’s when you had com-
panies like XEMC follow suit with their direct-drive turbines. 
We see, therefore, that a change in direction took place in the industry, based on 
expectations, trends and tendency. One can only speculate what exactly lead to 
this change, but at the time conventional turbine gearboxes were problematic. 
The direct-drive turbines, which do not need gearboxes, provided a quick and 
simple solution (de Vries 2007). Nevertheless, the choices made by the individual 
companies were likely influenced by local factors, for example government fund-
ing—hence “resource mobilisation”—as well as global factors, such as the links 
XEMC Windpower and Goldwind had with their licensing or joint design and, 
finally, fully-acquired companies.
26
 
6.4 Market formation 
Market formation is perhaps the strongest function in the Chinese wind turbine 
technological innovation system, at least until 2011. The wind industry is based 
predominately on a domestic market, in sharp contrast to the sister TIS of the 
Chinese solar cell manufacturing industry, which is also world-leading, but ex-
ports almost all modules to Europe and the U.S. (CNRED 2011a). Given the fact 
that China today has the largest market for wind power production, the market 
formation policies must be considered a great success, even with the constraints 
the market is now experiencing. According to the latest figures, China captured 
44 per cent of the total world installed capacity in 2011, almost as much as the 
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 Both XEMC and Goldwind have had licensing agreements with direct-drive design companies. In the 
case of XEMC, they first licensed and later rebranded the Dutch-Japanese Lagerwey/Zephyros (owned by 
Harakosan), and later, in 2009 they took over the assets of Darwind, a direct-drive offshore wind turbine 
company (XEMC-Darwind 2012). Goldwind first licensed from, and later became the majority owner (70 
per cent) of the German company Vensys (Lewis 2011: 287). 
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rest of the world put together (GWEC 2012). As explained in the previous chap-
ter, it was first the concession programme, and later the Feed-in tariff, along with 
the mandated market share for power companies in the ReLaw that spurred mar-
ket growth in the industry. In contrast to some European countries, China has not 
encountered large barriers related to space allocation for wind farms (Jacobsson 
& Bergek 2011). Market formation is naturally crucial in a formative phase of a 
TIS, but it is equally important when the goal is to build up an industry which 
ultimately competes with conventional power sources. Considering this as the 
overarching goal of the Chinese wind turbine TIS can help us understand how 
this function is performing. 
Much literature has drawn attention to the role government legislation has had on 
wind turbine market development in China, such as the aforementioned conces-
sion rounds and the ReLaw. To be sure, this is an important focus, but research 
on market formation activities points out that a unique focus on the strengths of a 
national subsidy scheme as a main market formation mechanism for emerging 
technologies may be too simplistic (Dewald & Truffer 2012). Studies on the 
Feed-in tariff for solar panels in Germany have shown that there are regional dif-
ferences in market dynamics, and that local processes can be important in form-
ing markets (Dewald & Truffer 2011, 2012). Article 9 of the ReLaw states that 
“opinions should be solicited from relevant units, experts and the general public 
(...)” (emphasis added), yet this is commonly ignored by the developers (M. 
Wang 2007: 243, 244). If we look at the geographical distribution of wind farms, 
most are installed in Inner Mongolia, which contains 36 per cent of the total in-
stalled capacity, mainly because this is where the best wind resources are found 
(CWPO 2010: 15). Local governments there actively sustain the development and 
are often eager to attract wind projects (REN21 2009a: 19). There are currently 
plans to build two 10GW scale wind power bases in Eastern and Western Inner-
Mongolia, yet curiously, most of these plans are centred around specific cities; 
for instance, Chifeng City where almost half of the planned projects in Eastern 
Inner-Mongolia will be built (CWPO 2010: 25). Whilst this area has high-quality 
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wind resources, such a high concentration of projects could also imply that this 
area has been more effective in drawing attention to the market opportunities 
there. As suggested by Dewald and Truffer (2012: 415), such initiatives could 
range from “motivating actors from conventional business sectors to join the 
business networks”, to simply “providing legitimacy” for the local wind market.  
One market mechanism which has not been discussed thus far is the Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM). Briefly put, the CDM allows industrialised coun-
tries to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by developing or financing 
projects that reduce GHG emissions in developing countries. China has been the 
largest host country for CDM, with wind power projects accounting for 23 per 
cent of the total projects in 2010 (CWPO 2010: 54,55). An important part of the 
CDM legislation is that the projects will only be approved if they are considered 
“additional”; that is, without the CDM support they would not have been put in 
place (Schroeder 2009: 239). The developer must prove that the project needs 
CDM support in order to start up. Without additionality a wind project is re-
garded as business-as-usual, and will not receive CDM support (ibid.). Interest-
ingly, more than one-third of the wind farms that were built in 2008 and more 
than half in 2007 were supported by the CDM, something which de facto makes 
this mechanism a truly important contributor, given that these projects would not 
have been built without the support (Lewis 2010b: 2879). Nevertheless, further 
investigation into the matter reveals that CDM is rarely the primary reason a wind 
farm gets developed in China, and can be viewed more as a useful subsidy (ibid: 
2884); thus, one can assume the additionality criterion is broken. So even though 
the initial intent of the CDM was to form new markets, one can instead regard it 
as a market propulsion mechanism which made project development more attrac-
tive for investors (WWF 2008). 
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6.5 Creating legitimacy 
In order for a market to be shaped, it is necessary that the technology in question 
has gained enough legitimacy; that is, gained “social acceptance and compliance 
with the relevant institutions” (Bergek et al. 2008b: 581). Increasing legitimacy 
for a TIS is a process which takes time, and as we shall see, there are several 
strategies to adopt. Cre-
ating legitimacy is also 
dependent on positive 
feedback mechanisms; 
when new actors enter 
the market, legitimacy 
may be increased. One 
issue which was not 
debated in the section 
on institutions is the legitimacy that the central and local governments provide in 
China when signalling an area of priority through long-term plans. The Five-Year 
Plan is the most important government document, and the attention given to new 
and renewable energy has increased over the course of 12 Five-Year Plans, start-
ing with the 6
th
, and culminating with the latest plan for the period 2011-2015 
(Yuan & Zuo 2011). These government indications without a doubt play an im-
portant role in paving the way for emerging industries. If we look at the timing of 
establishment for the largest wind turbine manufacturers, we see that most of 
them were created fairly recently, between 2004 and 2007 (CRESP 2009), some-
thing which coincides with the announcement of wind-friendly government poli-
cies.
27
 This increase also corresponds to the increase in CDM projects, and a 
rapid growth of the market, as illustrated in Figure 11. On a less aggregated level, 
we shall see that legitimation processes have had an impact as well.  
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 With the exception of Goldwind. 
Figure 11: Correspondence between policies and 
market growth 
Source: Yang et al. (2012: 146) 
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One way of aligning institutions, and thus increasing the legitimacy of a TIS, is 
related to “conformance”, which means to follow the rules of the already existing 
institutions (Bergek et al. 2008a: 417). A clear example of this is when the gov-
ernment decided to introduce the mandated market share of non-hydro renewable 
energy for the established power producers in China.
28
 Another strategy of le-
gitimation is to “manipulate” the rules of the game (ibid.). In a way, these two 
strategies are related, because the wind TIS has gained legitimacy in China within 
established institutions, and also by using this existing legitimacy to shape new 
outcomes through exploiting existing practises. Many of the large, influential 
SOEs have engaged in wind turbine manufacturing, and it is clear that their po-
litical influence in a region has facilitated their growth. According to the infor-
mant from XEMC Windpower, the company “has a certain influence in Hunan 
province, because the head of the Hunan province came from XEMC”. As a re-
sult of the political connections this company has, one can assume it also does its 
fair share to convince policy-makers of the benefits of wind turbines. Apparently 
this link between state-owned companies and political career is not infrequent. 
When Mr. Recknagel (interview 26.09.2011) talked about the mandated market 
share, he noted that: 
(...) the incentive for the leaders of the power companies: if they don’t ful-
fil this requirement, they will be held accountable, that they didn’t fulfil 
the goal that the party said, and this will directly impact their personal ca-
reers. 
Rosen and Houser (2007: 19) point out that the executive leadership of these 
large energy SOEs is appointed by the Ministry of Personnel, and this ministry is 
synchronised with party politics. Therefore, as many energy SOE professionals 
have political ambitions (ibid.), one can expect that government legislation is 
complied with, and perhaps even over-achieved.  
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 These companies in turn, because they are mostly large, central government owned companies, take part 
in shaping government policy (Rosen & Houser 2007: 19). 
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In the first section of this chapter it was mentioned that the government does not 
really give much direct funding to the wind turbine industry. Yet in several of the 
interviews it was indicated that state support oftentimes meant more in terms of 
politics than in terms of economics. Again, XEMC Windpower (interview 
27.10.2011) serves as an example: 
Interviewer: If you would compare the amount of investment XEMC 
Windpower does and the amount the government gives, how important 
would government funding be then? 
Interviewee: The company’s investment is larger than government fund-
ing, but state funding is also very important to us, just to show that the 
state encourages [us] to keep up. Especially for our group, a very large 
SOE with a long history, the state funds mean more [for the] encourage-
ment than the real impact. After the state funding, we have more voice in 
Hunan province, which means the Hunan provincial government would be 
more supportive to us. 
A similar line of argument was presented by Huang He (interview 08.11.2011) 
from the Energy Research Institute of the NDRC: 
[The government] has promoted R&D a bit—some national research cen-
tres and test centres have been supported by the government—and that has 
been enough because it proved the legitimacy of the industry. 
What we observe here is a divergence between provincial and central government 
interests that characterise Chinese politics. According to M. Wang (2007: 244-
246) local governments increasingly care only about local economic growth, and 
“are enthusiastic about, and spare no effort in, starting thermal power plants, 
while renewable energy generation projects are often ‘pending discussion’”. Al-
though provinces have become more economically independent from the centre 
(Saich 2011: 183), it is clear that central government approval also shapes the 
provinces’ opinions on where the profitable investments are. As a result, when a 
company or a sector receives central support, it indicates a safer bet for provincial 
governments that seek to build up an industry. This makes a difference when the 
local governments face the choice to start a wind project rather than a thermal 
power project.  
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On a closer examination of the legitimacy of the Swedish wind turbine TIS, 
Jacobsson and Bergek (2011: 582,583) show that the media played a negative 
role in shaping expectations and desirability of wind power. The role of the me-
dia was particularly observed with the downturn in the Chinese wind turbine in-
dustry in 2011. Yet, as the media is largely state controlled in China, we again see 
the influence the government can exert. This was highlighted by Liming Qiao 
(interview 12.09.2011) from the Global Wind Energy Council:  
[The government] can one day say that “we think this industry is very 
promising” and everything [is] good about it, that’s why you see in the 
past two years this massive developments and everything you can see re-
lated to wind in the news are good. And this on the other hand reinforces 
the industry to expand, and we would say a bit too rapid, and now this year 
it’s a time when some of the problems that were hidden started to get ex-
posed. Like the quality issue, like the standards issue, like the grid issue - 
everything started to get out, and (...) then you suddenly see a change of 
everything. Like media, like the banks and others that would switch away, 
and go to solar. (...) Every problem was there two years ago, it’s just that 
you were not allowed to say that, so it didn’t seem to be there. But now we 
are suddenly allowed to say that, and people get a feeling that wind started 
to show its side effects. But it’s not true, the side effects have always been 
there, it’s just that you allow them to be exposed at this stage; people will 
get a bad feeling, that this sector is going away or something like that. And 
that’s really not good. 
This striking quote illuminates to a great extent how important the media is for 
the legitimacy of the wind industry. What we basically observe is a government 
which uses legitimation as a tool to increase or decrease interest in the wind in-
dustry, fluctuating with the current development goals. To be sure, highlighting 
the challenges that the industry faces regarding turbine quality or grid connection 
issues is important for the overall performance of the industry. Yet, the fact that 
these issues have been evident for some years without having repercussions be-
fore 2011 testifies for the importance of information control in China. Legitima-
tion seems, therefore, to be a well trained muscle of China’s institutional body, 
and the strength of this function for the wind industry ultimately depends on the 
degree that the government and industry goals are in-sync. 
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6.6 Entrepreneurial activity 
The role of the entrepreneur in innovation and economic changes has been recog-
nised since Schumpeter’s early work (1911) (Fagerberg 2005: 6). The main task 
of entrepreneurial activities is to reduce uncertainty in a new TIS, and according 
to Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991: 106), the entrepreneur “has to perceive the 
(future) need, identify the necessary ingredients, secure the resources that may be 
missing initially, and communicate his vision to the relevant agents”. The entre-
preneur can therefore be understood as a facilitator, a crux, or a node which 
drives innovation. As has been argued here, the Chinese wind turbine TIS is most 
adequately referred to being in a “bridging” phase. Entrepreneurial activities are 
important not only in an early phase of a TIS, but in later stages as well (Bergek 
et al. 2008a: 415). Literature on entrepreneurial activity in China tends to con-
clude that “entrepreneurship is unfortunately a very scarce resource in China. 
This has much to do with incentive systems as well as with education and train-
ing” (Gu et al. 2009: 381). Also that “the Chinese government seems to have less 
understanding of the importance of managerial initiatives and objectives, espe-
cially towards building internal organizational capabilities and a culture of entre-
preneurship” (Liu & White 2001: 1107), and in the same vein that “despite Chi-
nese firms being acutely aware of the need for creativity, the application of [man-
agement] techniques would still seem to run deeply against traditional manage-
ment culture” (Alcorta et al. 2009: 456). From these quotes we derive that the 
problem is perceived as highly institutional, and we can flesh out two main con-
cerns; management issues and education and training. For the Chinese wind in-
dustry specifically, the latter point was discussed in the human resources section, 
but the first will be further illuminated below. Unfortunately, an institutional un-
derstanding of entrepreneurship has yet to be developed, and we therefore lack 
precise criteria for how to assess this function (Lundvall et al. 2009: 382).  
Even so, Bergek et al. (2008a: 416) suggest mapping the number and variety of 
experiments taking place in the TIS, by measuring, for instance, the amount of 
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new entrants, as a means of measuring entrepreneurial activities. As we have al-
ready seen, there were many new entrants between 2004 and 2007, and most of 
these are engaging in developing and testing and have not started mass produc-
tion of many turbines (CWPC 2012). At a first glance, it looks like entrepreneu-
rial activities are very present. However, the role these new entrants have is less 
clear. Liming Qiao (interview 12.09.2011) expressed, in response to the question 
about new entrants, that “it’s not really that way; the vibration is not coming from 
the new entrances, because a new entrance doesn’t really mean they really own 
the technology that way.”  
Based on the above definition of an entrepreneur, management is closely con-
nected to entrepreneurial activities. All the informants were asked how entrepre-
neurial activities in the Chinese wind industry were managed, something which 
yielded some examples of how the companies actually improved products. As a 
case in point, Owen Chan (interview 27.10.2011) from XEMC Windpower re-
counted the following story: 
Also I would like to give you another example of a staff installing the 
equipment. The nacelle, when he equipped the nacelle, he found a new way 
to equip the nacelle so as to save much time, energy and labour. So, after 
we [got to] know his way, his good idea, we just named this way with his 
name, and also translate his installation way to become the standard, and 
promote his way around the whole group. And this person, for installing the 
nacelle, felt respected. 
We see therefore, that in some companies creative activities are cherished—a 
sign that leeway for alternative methods may exist. Yet, this example most likely 
belongs among the exceptions. This was especially reflected by Mr. Meyer (in-
terview 08.11.2011) from Azure international, who remained sceptical towards 
the significance of these Chinese innovations: 
You have the original engineers and the pedigree behind somebody who 
would understand it, but you take it out of the context and the Chinese are 
fast to innovate things, but as often as not the innovations that they may 
make may be leading to an imperfect solution.  
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Keeping in mind that the kinds of innovations Mr. Meyer here discusses are often 
the ones which lead to price reductions, one can recognise these innovations as 
failures in understanding the trade-offs when changing a product.   
An interesting comparison in terms of management is the Chinese solar manufac-
turing industry, which ranks as the largest manufacturer of solar panels globally, 
and has developed in a similarly astonishing pace as the wind industry (CGTI 
2011: 15). Two recent studies on innovation in the Chinese solar manufacturing 
industry, namely Marigo et al. (2010) and de la Tour et al. (2011), indicate that 
managerial competences and the presence of internationally trained managers 
have been advantageous for the Chinese solar industry. These highly-skilled ex-
ecutives bring “capital, professional networks, and technology acquired in foreign 
companies or universities to China”, and more than 60 per cent of the board 
members of the three largest photovoltaic manufacturers have experience from 
abroad (de la Tour et al. 2011: 765). In the wind industry in China, the interna-
tional presence is low both at the management and the personnel levels. Yet, 
many of the largest companies are trying to attract skilled workers from foreign 
companies. As was mentioned in the last chapter, Goldwind has been able to at-
tract skilled workers from many of the largest international players, and, in fact, 
this ability has gained momentum with the growth of the company (Lewis 2011: 
287). Attracting workers is not enough, however, and it remains to be seen how 
the management will deal with these resources. In terms of entrepreneurial activ-
ity in the Chinese wind turbine TIS, it seems plausible that firm management is a 
weakness, especially when the companies now are facing outwards. 
6.7 Development of external economies 
Even though the definition of this function in the theory chapter places impor-
tance on the amount of new entrants to an industry, as we saw in the previous 
section, it is difficult to measure what function new entrants have for the Chinese 
wind industry. We do know that there were many new entrants between 2004 and 
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2007, but the end effect of the great number of new entrants for the industry as a 
whole is dubious. “Development of external economies” is perhaps one of the 
least autonomous functions, since it induces feedback into the other six functions, 
thus strengthening the dynamics of the whole TIS (Bergek et al. 2008a: 418). 
Some examples of external economies, often referred to as free utilities, can be a 
base of mobile and highly skilled workers, a pool of goods and services that are 
needed by the manufacturers, or the integration of knowledge and experience 
from other fields (Carlsson & Stankiewicz 1991: 102). For example, in the Dan-
ish wind industry in the 1980s, the experience from agricultural equipment manu-
facturing was brought into the industry, and close, collaborative networks be-
tween wind turbine users, owners, and research institutions created positive feed-
back into the industry (Kamp et al. 2004: 1632). In this way, the virtues of exter-
nal economies can be understood as the added value, which is more than the sum 
of each component.  
We have seen that many Chinese wind turbine manufacturers have previous ex-
perience from the heavy machinery industry (e.g. Sinovel), equipment manufac-
turing and electrical generators (e.g. XEMC), and other turbine industries, such as 
steam turbines (e.g. Dongfang). In the wind industry it is a common phenomenon 
for new entrants to come from related industries. Entrants to the German wind 
turbine industry, for instance, came from shipbuilding, gearbox manufacturing or 
agriculture machinery (Bergek & Jacobsson 2003). To give one more example 
from the Chinese wind industry, Shanghai Electric is one of these large industrial 
groups which entered the wind turbine business in 2007 (shanghai-electric.com 
2012b). The company started out producing air conditioners in 1959, and then 
diversified into other industries, such as diesel engines, and the thermal and nu-
clear power generator industries (ibid.). Today, the company is the 6
th
-largest 
Chinese turbine manufacturer, and ranks amongst the top 15 turbine manufactur-
ers globally. According to the company itself, this is in large part thanks to its 
ability to quickly absorb knowledge from their licensing (DeWind) and joint de-
velopment (Aerodyn) agreements, and finally independently design their own 
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turbine (shanghai-electric.com 2012a). The specific competences that these re-
lated industries bring to the industry can be regarded as powerful external 
economies. It is important to recognise this previous experience, this local 
knowledge base, as an important contributor to their success in quickly absorbing 
knowledge. Thus, we can say that external economies are largely developed from 
new entrants with a background in related industries. 
According to Bergek et al. (2008b: 585) knowledge spillovers are central in shap-
ing external economies, but also important are structural components, such as 
shared networks or institutions. This is especially relevant if there are several 
similar minority TISs, for instance in China where new renewable energy compa-
nies are marginal in comparison to the coal power producers. These TISs could 
then be visualised as “running in packs” in order to increase their influence on the 
incumbent system (ibid: 587).
29
 In China, it is clear that the ultimate goal of the 
government is to increase the production of renewable electricity, not just wind 
electricity alone. As a result, the mandated market share for the electric power 
companies did not specify which source the electricity should come from, except 
that hydro-power was excluded. In the interview with Huang He (interview 
08.11.2011) from the Energy Research Institute, he confirmed that the political 
power of the renewable energy industry has increased:  
The lobbying power is increased; they are taken more into account. One 
proof of this is how much more they are mentioned in the national media 
now. (...) Also, the National Energy Administration actually received in-
creased status within the NDRC because of the promotion of renewable 
energy. 
This is closely connected to increasing legitimacy, but the fact that renewable 
energies together have achieved a higher status within the National Energy Ad-
ministration, an important organ under the NDRC which is “responsible  for  
                                              
29
 This way of competing in policy influence is also sometimes referred as “advocacy coalitions”, or for 
new technologies, one can talk of “technology-specific coalitions” (Jacobsson & Lauber 2006). Scott 
Kennedy (2005) shows that such lobbying also is important for businesses in China’s political sphere. 
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planning  within  the  energy  sector,  industrial  policies  and  standards (...)” 
(Delman & Chen 2008: 26), testifies to the added value of “running in packs”.  
Another interesting feature, which may be regarded as a positive externality, is 
the effect that the CDM has had on the Chinese wind industry. In addition to pro-
pelling the market, the Clean Development Mechanism has had other beneficial 
functions which have removed barriers from investment: 
(...) CDM has contributed to increase market transparency, improve data 
availability, raise product quality in turbines across the board, and finally 
relieved part of the high demand on local manufacturers by allowing in-
creased market access for more efficient foreign manufacturers (WWF 
2008: 24). 
Interestingly, this is very similar to the way performance-publishing contributed 
to enhancing the performance of Danish wind turbines (Kamp et al. 2004: 1632). 
The performance of several Danish turbines was disclosed in a magazine set up 
by a Danish wind association, something which put pressure on the manufactur-
ers (ibid.). In fact, because the Danish industry was able to prove their perform-
ance through these statistics, their chances of capturing a substantial portion of 
the Californian market in the 1980s was increased substantially (ibid. 1633). In 
the same way, as the above quote shows, the CDM has had feedback effects into 
several functions of the Chinese wind turbine TIS, including market formation, 
resource mobilisation, and knowledge development and diffusion. Also, with in-
creased market transparency, one can say that the legitimacy of the Chinese in-
dustry has been enhanced amongst foreign investors.  
6.8 Overall goal and dynamics of the industry 
Having looked at the structural components as well as the key functions in the 
Chinese wind turbine TIS, it is now time to take a step back and highlight some 
of the dynamics between the functions we have scrutinised. As we saw in the de-
scription of the functions, the government has powerful ways to exert its influ-
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ence. In terms of the two functions “resource mobilisation” and “legitimation”, 
we have seen that the government can quite effectively steer the development in a 
given direction. Nevertheless, each function taken individually has strengths and 
weaknesses, depending on the focus one has for the Chinese wind turbine TIS. 
For example, it is not exclusively advantageous for the industry if the function 
“market formation” very strong, if the installed turbines have quality and grid 
connection issues. This leads to lower electricity generation, and could have re-
percussions for the legitimacy of the industry, and subsequently the dynamics of 
the whole TIS. Depending on the overall goal set for the industry, on can deter-
mine the functional dynamics, and ultimately the performance of the TIS. As we 
saw in Section 6.3, the direction of search is increasingly influenced by interna-
tional developments, because the Chinese industry now increasingly seeks to ex-
port their turbines. Overcapacity and increased competition domestically induces 
this trend. This was for example voiced by the Deputy Director of Guodian 
United Power’s Chief Engineering Office: “As an old Chinese saying goes, dis-
tant water won’t help to put out a fire close at hand. So exploiting the overseas 
market has become the only way out for Chinese manufacturers” (DNV 2011: 
30). 
We can therefore say that conquering international markets is now an important 
overall goal for the industry. Taking this as a point of departure, we can assess 
the dynamics of the industry in light of the seven key functions. For starters, be-
cause the government influence presumably does not stretch far outside China’s 
boarders, the function “legitimation” is weak. However leashed this function may 
seem, in the near future its performance will be less dependent on domestic con-
ditions. Chinese turbines must first prove themselves outside of China before in-
ternational legitimacy is ensured. In fact, the main topic of concern for the wind 
turbine industry at the moment is the legitimacy of Chinese turbines abroad. 
Many of the larger Chinese manufacturers search to expand internationally, but 
so far buyers have been reluctant due to “thinner documentation” of their wind 
turbine performance, as well as questions related to operation service and main-
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tenance abroad (Rechargenews.com 2011). Therefore, many of the projects that 
are installed abroad at present act as demonstration projects. For instance, Sinovel 
recently erected two test turbines in Sweden with the stated purpose of a “demon-
stration effect”: 
If Sinovel turbines are accepted by local users for the quality and technol-
ogy, and meet no problem in access to the grid, it will pave the way for its 
turbines to enter the European market (Sinovel.com 2012). 
As I have highlighted throughout the analysis, the mandated market share for 
power-producing companies has been important for attracting investments, and 
therefore “resource mobilisation”, and perhaps as well “legitimation”, given the 
role these centrally-owned companies have domestically. If Chinese wind turbine 
companies’ markets are found increasingly abroad in the future, these two func-
tions need to change—institutions need to be aligned for export. This could in-
duce the following functional dynamic: “market formation” would no longer be 
dependent on domestic favourable policies, rendering the government less influ-
ential. Financial “resource mobilisation” would become more difficult for the 
large SOE wind farm investors if their projects are found abroad, because they do 
not have the same political influence as domestically. Therefore, it would be dif-
ficult to convince banks abroad to finance projects (i.e. establish “bankability”), 
especially when turbines have not yet been tested over a long amount of time 
within China—thus being perceived as too risky investments (BNEF 2010). Con-
sequently, human resources would need a boost, as exported turbines presumably 
increases both total demand and quality demand from the buyers. In the same 
vein, “legitimation” would become less dependent on political connections with 
the government, rendering this function more or less dependent on the actual 
quality of the product delivered. Another potential risk for Chinese state-owned 
companies is that they are perceived as national entities when they expand into 
other countries’ energy sectors. For instance, in the U.S., being a Chinese state 
owned company “carries heavy political baggage”, and could have serious impli-
cations for the legitimacy of the Chinese actors there (BNEF 2010: 13). 
109 
When the Danish industry in the 1980s suddenly noticed market opportunities in 
the U.S. in what is called the “Californian wind rush”, an increased focus on re-
search and development was triggered because of a different customer demand 
there (Kamp et al. 2004: 1633, Hendry & Harborne 2011: 781). Hendry and 
Harborne (2011: 788) suggest that experience based learning was important in the 
formative phase of the Danish wind industry, but that in a later phase, where the 
market was expanding, learning by search became more important. As we have 
seen, much of the “knowledge development and diffusion” of the Chinese wind 
industry thus far has been based on learning from experience, as well as adapting 
designs to Chinese geographical circumstances. In following Hendry and Har-
borne’s (2011) explanation of the Danish industry, a shift to science-based learn-
ing is needed in China, in order to cope with challenges of an overseas market. If 
one agrees with this argument, then a consequence is that Chinese companies 
need to start spending more money on research and development. Thus, one can 
say that whilst “absorptive capacity” was important in order to understand and 
manufacture the technology which entered into the Chinese wind turbine TIS, we 
might also observe an industry which is actively taking part in global wind tur-
bine technology development.  
One other consequence is seen in the “entrepreneurial activity” function. It was 
mentioned that firm management might be a weakness in the wind turbine TIS, 
compared to the solar photovoltaic TIS. One determinant for how successful the 
TIS becomes is how well firm managers are able to convince foreign buyers. It is 
hard to imagine that companies would be able to succeed in this task without in-
creasing transparency in terms of how their turbines perform. If performance sta-
tistics are revealed to a greater extent, it could have positive feedbacks on the 
whole industry, as we saw in the Danish case (Section 6.7)—and hence, the de-
velopment of “external economies”. Also, given that the solar industry to such a 
large extent has been successful in exporting their products (Section 6.6), the 
wind industry might consider adapting similar strategies, such as by increasing 
the amount of internationally trained managers and personnel.  
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Keeping in mind as well that the function “influencing the direction of search” 
was heavily guided by developments abroad, e.g. with regard to turbine sizes, the 
Chinese TIS is constantly abreast with which direction the international industry 
is moving. One direction both internationally and in the Chinese industry today is 
an aim, at least amongst the largest Chinese companies, to produce offshore tur-
bines. Such a change in the direction of search would spur repercussions in the 
“knowledge development” function, which needs both financial and human re-
sources, and legitimacy from the established institutions. If this “legitimation” 
happens through the large coal-power producers, one could imagine that they 
would be less interested in investing in projects that are too far away from their 
own production facilities, and the function could therefore be weakened. This 
comes in addition to how the media is negatively influencing the legitimacy of 
the wind industry in general, as we saw in Section 6.5. This brings us to the topic 
of the next chapter where we shall discuss the external impacts that may shape 
the outcome of how these functions are fulfilled in the wind turbine TIS. 
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7. External mechanisms influencing the wind 
turbine TIS 
You cannot solve a problem using the same thought process that created it 
Albert Einstein 
In this chapter I shall pinpoint the major blocking mechanisms preventing the 
wind industry from developing, and the external forces that are inducing the ad-
vancement of the industry. As we shall see, these mechanisms are highly related 
to the discussion on carbon lock-in and incumbent energy technologies. In the 
TIS framework, the inducement and blocking mechanisms are ways of incorpo-
rating potentially influential factors that are outside of the system in focus. For 
the wind turbine TIS these can be found within the energy sector, such as the grid 
companies, or in a wider context, such as the discourse on climate change. Be-
cause this context is widely defined, this last step of the analysis has received 
criticism. Markard and Truffer (2008: 610) point out one weakness in treating 
these mechanisms as purely exogenous: that it rules out a way to internally deal 
with these potentially influential factors. A similar critique is presented by 
Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012: 75), who add another problem, namely that “it is 
not clear whether all possible mechanisms have been identified or whether the list 
can further be extended”. As we shall see shortly, one influential blocking 
mechanism which is not included in the TIS is the Chinese grid-system, which 
has to absorb all the newly installed wind power. Although the above critiques 
have been taken into consideration, due to the lack of an appropriate alternative 
method, an attempt will be made here to map relevant blocking and inducement 
mechanisms at hand.  
7.1 Blocking 
In just about any article one reads about the Chinese wind power development, it 
is mentioned that a significant portion of the turbines have not yet been connected 
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to the electricity grid (e.g. Yang et al. 2012). Hitherto we have focussed on the 
influence of the large, state-owned electricity producers, who, since wind elec-
tricity represent a minimal part of their generating capacity, perhaps do not take 
their wind farm management that seriously (WWF 2008: 24). One group of actors 
which take serious notice of the added capacity of wind power are the electricity 
grid companies, which are obligated through the ReLaw to connect all renewable 
energy to the power grid (Martinot & Li 2010). It is frequently reported that 
around 30 per cent of the installed capacity is not connected to the electricity 
grid, which is a large amount. Martinot and Li (2010) claim that this mostly has 
to do with time lags in testing the turbines before connecting. Indeed, the in-
stalled wind power capacity doubled annually between 2004 and 2010 (Ni & 
Yang 2012), and increased almost 50 percent in 2011. In this respect, a grid-
connected ratio of 70 per cent does not seem all that bad, yet, for the wind turbine 
TIS, the problem is deeper than this. 
No transition without transmission? 
In terms of carbon lock-in, electricity grid companies take on a doubly challeng-
ing role, because on the one hand they represent the established electricity re-
gime, and have sunk costs and vested interests in that system (Unruh 2000), 
whilst on the other hand they are necessary in order to transport the electricity 
from new renewable technology. In Germany, for instance, large grid utilities 
were initially fiercely against the introduction of more renewables, and used sev-
eral means to combat the progressive German Feed-in tariff policy (Jacobsson & 
Lauber 2006). In China there are only two electricity-grid companies that manage 
the whole national power grid system: State Grid Corporation of China (“State 
Grid”) and Southern Grid (Ngan 2010: 2146). Nevertheless, the power grid is 
separated into regional clusters which are operated rather independently (IEA 
2011: 12). The most important grid company for the wind farms, and for China in 
general, is State Grid, which operates four of the six regional grid clusters, 
mainly in the north of China (ibid.). As is testified in the joint report between 
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Vestas and State Grid, managing such a large grid system is a huge task (Jiang 
2011), so one can easily understand that problems with connecting the rapidly 
growing wind power supply. 
One of the core issues is 
the distance between 
electricity demand cen-
tres and wind power gen-
eration areas in China, as 
Map 1 shows. Transmit-
ting electricity over dis-
tances from 1500 to 2500 
kilometres requires a 
high-voltage transmis-
sion grid which is expen-
sive and challenging to 
build. It is estimated that 
a bit more than half of all 
the electricity generated 
from wind in 2015 must be transmitted on long-distance lines, whilst the rest will 
be consumed locally (Ni & Yang 2012: 38). China’s investments in power grid 
development as a portion of total investments in the electricity sector have been 
low in comparison with developed countries (Li et al. 2012). This has lead to an 
unbalanced development of electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, 
and this in turn reduces the generation capacity (ibid.). All the interviewees were 
asked what factors they thought might inhibit the development of wind energy in 
China, and several answered that grid companies could take such a role. The in-
terviewees were also asked about the future challenges of the wind industry, and 
many mentioned grid connection as a major bottleneck. For example, Weiquan 
Wang (interview 29.09.2011) from CREIA expressed the following concern:  
Map 1: Distance between wind farms and power 
demand centres in China 
Source: Li et al. (2012) 
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For the interests, I think the biggest interest conflict is between the renew-
able energy producer and the power grid, but inside the renewable energy 
field I think there are few conflicts. They can work together to move for-
ward instead of conflicting with each other. But for the producers, for ex-
ample the owners of the wind farms or the owners of the solar power sta-
tions, they have a conflict with the power grid you know. Renewable en-
ergy is not stable, it’s unstable compared to fossil fuel power plants. So 
sometimes the power grid rejects them, they don’t allow the wind farm to 
connect to the power grid. 
According to the Vestas and State Grid report, successful and long-term electric-
ity deliverance from wind farms requires both grid-friendly wind farms and wind-
friendly grid systems (Jiang 2011). The reason grid companies are hesitant to ac-
commodate wind energy is that the stability of power systems needs more atten-
tion when balancing the unstable inflows of wind power, as we see in Wang’s 
comment above. As a result, if enough electricity is generated, wind farm opera-
tors are often asked to stop the electricity production (referred to as curtailment) 
in order to keep the balance on the grid (ibid: 35). This obviously decreases the 
total electricity production of a wind farm. According to Liming Qiao (interview 
12.09.2011) from the Global Wind Energy Council, this issue could have been 
managed better by the grid company: 
If [the grid operators] invest more time to improve their management, then 
they should be able to cope with [the wind farm], but now they don’t really 
have the incentive to change their current management; it has become a 
routine. The easiest way for them is to inform you to shut down (emphasis 
added). 
Interestingly, the wording Ms. Qiao is using here conforms to how technological 
regimes are described, and how carbon lock-in is self-perpetuating. In a techno-
logical regime, one expects firms “to behave in the future according to the rou-
tines they have employed in the past” (Nelson & Winter 2002: 30). This makes it 
particularly difficult for an established firm to change practices. Elsewhere, this 
type of organisational routine has been perceived as a barrier to the adoption of 
low-carbon technologies (Unruh 2000). Optimal integration of wind electricity in 
the Chinese power grid therefore necessarily takes time. 
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A second issue relates to the low flexibility of Chinese power system operations, 
due to the large proportion of coal-fired power (Jiang et al. 2011). The combina-
tion of wind power and a high penetration of thermal electricity production is 
disadvantageous because its poor balancing capacity creates high energy ineffi-
ciency (Li et al. 2012). As an example, in Inner-Mongolia, where the largest wind 
power capacity is found, the proportion of wind and coal electricity is 4.7 and 
92.6 per cent respectively (ibid: 56). Using coal-fired power plants to balance out 
the electricity from wind may reduce efficiency, and actually increase CO2 emis-
sions because of the efficiency loss which occurs when ramping up and down the 
steam-turbines (ibid.). This would have the opposite effect of increased wind 
power supply, which is supposed to reduce CO2-emissions. This, in turn, is an 
argument that energy incumbents can use to stay in power, and hence securing 
their role within the regime.  
Nevertheless, looking at the grid companies exclusively as an obstacle to wind 
industry development may be simplistic, as they also are the ones holding knowl-
edge and potential solutions for a successful wind power development. This was 
pointed out in a conversation with a Danish wind industry expert, who empha-
sised that grid companies in Denmark were giving feedback and constructive so-
lutions to the wind turbine industry. The two Chinese grid companies are large, 
have access to resources, and possess a high degree of ingrained legitimacy in the 
Chinese power sector. This is perhaps a defining feature of blocking agents: they 
embody both the problem and the potential solution to that problem.  
Other blocking mechanisms can be considered relevant as well, one important 
being international trade, and possible trade restrictions. This goes both for Chi-
nese wind turbine component exports, and for future complete wind turbine ex-
ports. If complete wind turbines are to be exported, they may face intellectual 
property rights litigation issues. This goes perhaps especially for the U.S., which 
had over 1500 wind energy-related patents in 2010, most of which have repercus-
sions for wind turbine to grid connection (BNEF 2010). Almost all entrants to the 
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U.S. market face these challenges, and some turbine manufacturers are even 
barred from access because of intellectual property rights issues (ibid.). Even 
though such cases are not always valid, litigations are often costly and time con-
suming to pursue through the courts (ibid.). Regarding component exports, there 
are ongoing anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese wind 
tower exports (Rechargenews.com 2012). Irrespective of these claims being well 
grounded or not, it is clear that they are effective blocking mechanisms that can 
jeopardise China’s export possibilities, and seriously affect the development of 
the industry.  
7.2 Inducement 
It is widely acknowledged that the Chinese government has, through legislation 
and industry incentives, induced the development of the wind turbine industry. As 
mentioned several times already, long-term plans and ambitious policy has in-
duced the growth of the industry. Therefore, we shall here direct our attention to 
two potentially underestimated mechanisms: the effect of environmental pollution 
amongst Chinese citizens, and a concern for adverse climate change effects in 
China. 
Interestingly, only two informants mentioned environment or climate concerns as 
important contributing factors for the rapid development of China’s wind turbine 
industry. Bryan Davis (interview 01.11.2011) from Bloomberg New Energy Fi-
nance expressed it this way: “(...) obviously the environmental side of it is very 
important. I think there are people who have a real commitment to reducing the 
number of days with skies as polluted as today”. On that particularly grey day in 
Beijing, perhaps the interviewee was forced to think more about the environment 
as a critical issue, but it is a fact that people in China are increasingly noticing 
pollution in their daily lives (Keeley & Zheng 2011). Countless public environ-
ment-related health crises have emerged over the last three decades, ranging from 
dietary and water pollution, to cancer and skin rashes from toxic waste (Economy 
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2010: 87-91). This has lead to considerable social unrest in China, and in 2005 
alone there were 51,000 pollution-related protests (ibid.). Rural instability and 
social unrest is something which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to 
avoid at all costs (McGregor 2010). One way this is avoided is to control infor-
mation, so that Chinese people do not get a full view of the existing environ-
mental problems (Saich 2011: 270). Yet, given the scale of these protests, and 
with today’s wide-ranging social media in China (e.g. weibo), concrete govern-
ment action is demanded, and the development of clean electricity can be viewed 
as one such mitigation measure. Therefore, one inducement mechanism is the 
Chinese people themselves, and the environmental pollution and degradation that 
economic growth has carried with it.  
Climate change clearly does not differentiate between geographical borders, and 
affects people all over the world. CO2 represents the largest source of green 
house gas emissions growth since the 1970s, with the use of energy as the source 
of about 65 per cent of these gases, and power generation capturing the largest 
share (Barker et al. 2007: 27). At the same time CO2 is the most important con-
tributor to radiative forcing (ibid: 38), affecting Earth’s radiation budget and 
thereby inducing climate change. Therefore, within the energy regime, climate 
change is perceived as a major problem (Geels & Raven 2006: 386). The realisa-
tion that climate change can have negative effects on the country’s future has also 
become more widely acknowledged amongst China’s leadership (Economy 2010: 
191). 
If we take a closer look at what role the media is playing, it is evident that climate 
change awareness has increased during the period the wind industry has grown. 
According to a recent survey on climate change media coverage in China, it was 
concluded that:  
The emphases are almost always on two issues: Firstly what China and 
Chinese industry need to do to be better prepared for the future uncertain-
ties caused by global warming and secondly, seizing the opportunities to 
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become the leader in the low-carbon economy of the future (Midttun et al. 
2012: 18).  
Renewable energy investments and climate change attention in the media have 
both increased in China and especially after the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit, where the increase in media coverage was quite noticeable 
(Geall 2011). Of course, this does not imply that there is a causal relation be-
tween the two. Yet, this inducement mechanism likely has an influence on several 
functions, such as “legitimation” or “resource mobilisation”, because with in-
creased climate change attention, a realisation grows that carbon-emitting electric 
power production needs to be substituted. This means that the climate change 
discourse has probably spurred change in Chinese energy politics. Ironically—
although the inverse would be preferred—it seems climate change is what in-
duces political change. 
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8. Conclusions 
Today, wind energy is the world’s fastest growing energy source (Jørgensen & 
Münster 2010), much thanks to the People’s Republic of China. Within China, 
however, wind energy is the third fastest growing energy source, far behind coal 
power, and right after hydro power (CWEA 2011). Armed with a theoretical 
framework that explains the growth of industries, 12 semi-structured interviews, 
several conversations with wind industry experts and professionals, and hundreds 
of written documents, I set out to examine the growth of the Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturing industry. The main endeavour of this case study was to find out 
how it has flourished and what the industry dynamics look like today. In answer-
ing these questions, light was also shed on what role the Chinese government has 
played, and how important technology transfer has been in the process. More sig-
nificantly, this study provides a better understanding of what the growth of the 
wind turbine industry means for a future transition from a “grey” to a “green” 
electricity supply in China. 
Make no mistake; coal power will likely remain the dominant electric power 
source for a long time to come in China. History shows that large scale transfor-
mation processes may take decades to unfold, and that novel technologies often 
face numerous obstacles that hinder rapid diffusion (Geels et al. 2008). This is no 
different for renewable energy technologies in China’s electricity sector, yet the 
pace with which things happens in China might imply that a “green” transition 
will come about more quickly—given that the key processes in emerging renew-
able energy technology systems are sustained. There are no neat solutions to 
complex problems, and innovation systems constitute perhaps some of the most 
multifaceted relationships in society. This thesis is only commencing the huge 
task it is to understand how an industry grows in China. Chinese circumstances 
are in themselves complex: as Tony Saich (2011: 4) puts it: “China is a maze of 
intricacies, complexities and contradictions”. Low transparency, limited access to 
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reliable data, and control of information do not facilitate the work for a student of 
China (Heimer & Thøgersen 2006). This study has taken on the task and gives 
some initial suggestions as to where to look, and what to look for.  
There seems to be a general consensus that the global competitiveness of China’s 
manufacturing industry is grounded on factors other than innovativeness (e.g. 
Zhang et al. 2009: xv). The discussion on China’s innovation-performance is 
therefore all the more important. According to Edward Steinfeld (2010: 143) the 
stances in this discussion can be divided into “believers” and “doubters”. Argua-
bly, both stances have important points, yet, ultimately, how one defines innova-
tion decides whether “innovativeness” is crucial. Perceptions that rest on innova-
tion as being a specifically “Western” phenomenon are simplistic at best and 
dangerous at worst. This research project has adopted an innovation system ap-
proach—which studies innovation as resulting from socio-technical processes—
in an effort to bring new perspectives on innovation in a non-Western context.  
 “Transition” is not an uncommon way to define the rapid changes seen in China 
the last three decades, with transitions ranging from demography and economy, to 
the role of the individual (Saich 2011). Predictions of whether the end-result of 
China’s economic development is a “market” economy, “capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics”, or liberalisation and democratisation are all possible (Kennedy 
2005, 2011). In the innovation system literature, economic performance and in-
novation are viewed as two sides of the same coin. Countries that today are de-
fined as “developed” cannot be grouped under one uniting political heading—but 
they are all, ipso facto, defined by similar economic characteristics in terms of 
innovation and technology development. Using technology as a point of depar-
ture, this thesis says something about how innovation can affect the trajectory of 
a changing China, yet, without defining this within a specific political context. 
Let us now turn to some of the results emerging from this thesis.  
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Industry growth and dynamics 
In Chapters 5 and 6 the instrumental factors for the growth of Chinese industry 
were mapped. Progressive industry policies have been important, as have policies 
focussing on generating more renewable electricity, such as the Renewable En-
ergy Law. Furthermore, other interconnected factors have been emphasised as 
crucial, for example mobilising resources for large wind power projects, creating 
legitimacy for the wind industry, nurturing the absorption of wind turbine tech-
nology, and inducing the entry of large industry conglomerates to the wind tur-
bine manufacturing industry. Especially after the wind farm concession rounds 
were initiated in 2003, the growth of the industry took off. Most companies en-
tered the industry between 2004 and 2007, and many of these were diversifica-
tions from large multi-industry corporations. The two major exceptions to this 
rule are Goldwind and Mingyang. Nevertheless, the conglomerates have brought 
their competences to the industry, and contributed substantially to the growth. 
Therefore, the rapid growth of the industry can partly be attributed to the velocity 
with which these large industry conglomerates have absorbed and developed the 
wind turbine technology.  
When looking closer at the dynamics of the industry, we have seen that the men-
tioned functions are highly intertwined. Section 6.8 emphasised that the industry 
dynamics depend partly on the overall goals set for the industry. Taking wind 
turbine export as an overall goal for the industry today, we can scrutinise the dy-
namic pattern of the TIS. For one, “legitimation” needs to deal with interests out-
side of China, where the Chinese government institutions are not as penetrating. 
This may weaken “resource mobilisation”, as this function largely has been de-
pendent on the favourable position that large state-owned power companies have 
in the financial sector. As we saw in Section 6.1, research and development ac-
tivities are fairly low in the Chinese industry, with weak networks between estab-
lished research institutes, universities and the industry (Section 5.3). These net-
works have proved propitious in pioneering wind turbine industries, and could be 
paid more attention to in China. Weak “knowledge development and diffusion” 
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can have repercussions for “market formation”, as we know that success in the 
export-markets is dependent on the comparative advantage (e.g. price) and qual-
ity of the Chinese turbines.  
Furthermore, the function “entrepreneurial activity” is perceived as stunted in 
terms of expanding markets abroad. For one, the Chinese wind turbine TIS may 
learn from the solar cell TIS, where a sizeable portion of the managerial staff 
have been educated abroad or have substantial international experience. This is 
important in order to gain legitimacy abroad, and can be determined by how well 
managers can handle media or government relation issues, for instance. Second, 
management practises in China do not seem to grease the wheels for experimental 
activities amongst engineers and workers. Even though an occasional novelty 
might develop, entrepreneurial activities need to be fostered in order for China to 
take over the technology development wheel in the future, as was highlighted in 
Section 6.6. Also, in Section 5.4.2 on cultural aspects, “acidic attitudes towards 
the new and untried” were mentioned as hindrances to technology development.  
Regarding the “development of external economies”, one issue which comes 
forth from this study is related to the political position and the self-sustaining 
practises that the wind industry can develop. One of the characteristics of estab-
lished technologies is that they generate positive feedback-loops which further 
manifest their position in a technological regime (Unruh 2000). When institutions 
are forced to align with new technologies, there necessarily will be challenging 
encounters, where the likelihood of dwarfing the newcomer is high. It was men-
tioned that the National Energy Administration has increased its status within the 
NDRC as a result of the rapid renewable energy expansion (“running in packs”). 
Also, the fact that China is manufacturing such a large amount of wind turbines 
might in itself produce positive feedback loops—as was part of the case with 
Denmark. Nevertheless, as markets are increasingly sought abroad in the wind 
turbine industry, the momentum that wind energy has had thus far in China may 
be weakened, and the energy incumbents might regain, or at least retain, their 
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institutional position. Ultimately, this may prolong the sustainability transition 
that takes place in China—a transition which is necessary in order to avoid dan-
gerous climate change effects.  
Lastly, the technology licensing agreements that the various Chinese wind turbine 
companies have, can potentially harm the dynamics of the TIS. Details of these 
agreements are seldom publicised, yet, many of them typically contain restrictions 
on design modifications or on their use outside of China. In seeking to export 
turbines, it seems few other options are left than for Chinese wind turbine manu-
facturers to independently develop their own designs—designs that do not rely 
too much on other turbine designs. As we have also seen, some external forces 
may inhibit the development of the Chinese wind turbine industry. The most ur-
gent of these are related to characteristics within the Chinese electricity transmis-
sion management, where bottlenecks are presently perceived 
Role of the government 
The government—for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer—plays a key role in 
China. Yet, there is no consensus amongst China specialists as to how, and to 
what extent the government controls the system (Saich 2011). The abstruse ways 
in which this influence is exercised in the wind industry have been highlighted in 
this study. In all of the functions mentioned, the Chinese government to a varying 
extent has had a finger in the pie. For instance, we have seen that through the 
functions “legitimation” and “influence the direction of search”, the government 
has facilitated the build-up of the wind turbine industry. Also, state owned enter-
prises have advantages that are conditioned on their closeness to government. 
What is remarkable, is that the government constantly seems to be adapting and 
revising its policy-approaches; be it by creating incentives for research and de-
velopment on larger turbines, and thus influencing the direction of search, or in 
regulating the market expansion through the new “grid code”. In these respects 
the government is facilitating wind turbine industry dynamics. Nevertheless, “the 
government” is not adequately addressed as one, unified entity, and local gov-
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ernments or state-owned enterprises are fully capable of hampering industry dy-
namics, irrespective of central government intentions.  
The ultimate success of China’s wind industry rests largely on the grace of the 
government. If there would be a sudden turnaround in China’s renewable energy 
aim, one could not expect that the industry survives in competition with the 
cheaper coal-electricity. The Chinese government set the stage for a flourishing 
Chinese wind turbine industry, especially by forming a wind turbine market in 
combination with a domestic content policy. This engendered a keen interest for 
building a green industry, both in and outside the country. 
International wind industry 
Setting the stage is only part of the answer; the actors filling the stage are just as 
important for the performance. As has been stressed in this thesis, the global wind 
industry has had an important impact on the development of the Chinese industry 
in several ways. If one looks at the wind turbine industry development through a 
global lens, one might say that China jumps into the technology development 
stage which deals with technology diffusion and firm expansion, and where an 
innovation system shifts towards cost reduction. Such a shift is “in part achieved 
by exploiting economies of scale. The system must, thus, identify and facilitate 
the formation of mass markets.” (Bergek 2002: 148). The Chinese industry is 
found in a “bridging phase”, helping to expand markets and reduce costs both 
locally and globally.  
In China, there is a vibrant community of foreign and domestic wind turbine 
manufacturers. In one way or another, wind industry organisations, components 
manufacturers and turbine producers share knowledge, routines, technical capa-
bilities and personnel. It is therefore simplistic to say that technology is intro-
duced from abroad through licensing agreements alone, and produced in China. 
As we saw in Section 5.3, the Chinese wind industry takes part in a global tech-
nology network, where turbine designs are either licensed, joint designed, or 
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where companies are merged and acquisitioned. Learning takes place in clusters 
of domestic and foreign companies, for instance, where turbines are tested. 
Moreover, Chinese companies have established research and development centres 
abroad, which presumably enable them to tap into valuable knowledge from ex-
perienced research communities. 
Edward Steinfeld (2010) claims we must speak of a new era of globalised inno-
vation, where China’s market is used to drive innovation-programmes in multina-
tional companies. This goes perhaps especially for the energy sector:  
In the energy domain in particular, China today faces serious challenges 
across virtually every key issue: assurance of adequate supply, depletion of 
domestic resources, and dire pollution problems. For each of these areas, 
the Chinese government, broadly  speaking,  could  have  thrown  up  the  
barriers  and  waited—perhaps for an eternity—for an indigenous solution 
to arise (ibid: 173, 174).  
Instead, China has attracted both foreign investments as well as research and de-
velopment activities. China cannot be viewed as a passive “receiver” of technol-
ogy, but as a participant, dynamic adapter and developer—in effect; an important 
contributor to enhancing innovation processes globally. For this reason, Steinfeld 
(2010: 174) claims it is very likely that “in an area like climate change remedia-
tion, technologies that prove indispensable globally will have had their origins in 
the Chinese market”.  
Steinfeld’s reflections on China have important implications for transition proc-
esses: they are not only locally, but also globally determined (Coenen et al. 2012, 
Binz et al. 2012). In fact, we may conclude that partly because there is an interna-
tional dimension to innovation, certain aspects are outside of government influ-
ence. The Chinese government may turn its influence to certain directions, but all 
in all, the direction chosen is affected by external trends. This recognition leads to 
another insight regarding inertia in transition processes: if we agree that techno-
logical regimes exist globally, and that carbon lock-in is true, then this also has 
implications for technology diffusion (Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006). As 
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argued in this thesis, since innovation happens in a socio-technical context, the 
diffusion of technology implies not only knowledge absorption, but also an ex-
tension of routines and practises—implying that old practises are withheld, and 
that renewal can take as long in developing countries as in developed. Simply 
put, developing countries may risk entering the same carbon-intensive path as 
developed countries, meaning the leapfrogging effect will be minimal (ibid.). 
Ironically, therefore, these routines and practices—which are crucial in learning 
processes (Nelson & Winter 2002)—can be helpful in building a new industry, 
but can create further inertia for the established technological regime. For the 
wind industry more specifically, this recoils upon mechanisms both internal (e.g. 
learning) and external (e.g. energy incumbents) to the TIS. Understanding how 
such international coupling affects the development of industries is a topic which 
deserves more scholarly attention in the future. 
The “quickstep” strategy 
Government measures alone cannot successfully solve China’s green electricity 
supply bottleneck. A range of concurring measures need to be supported in order 
to speed up China’s transition from a grey to a green electricity supply, many of 
which have been highlighted in this study. In a way, the Chinese wind industry 
can be compared to a fast growing broiler chicken. It grows fast, producing a lot 
of meat, but the bone-structure is underdeveloped and too weak to carry it. This is 
perhaps the most evident when looking at how the electricity grid cannot to a full 
extent absorb the rapid increase in wind power production, as we saw in Chapter 
7. Many scholars agree that the Danish wind turbine industry was successful be-
cause they developed their turbines step-by-step (Wicken 2011: 76). The Danish 
strategy has been named bricolage, which connotes “resourcefulness and im-
provisation on the part of the involved actors” (Garud & Karnøe 2003: 278). If I 
had to give the Chinese approach a name, I would call it a “quickstep” strategy—
a strategy which builds on existing local and global knowledge bases, and which 
enables the industry to step up their manufacturing capacities with unprecedented 
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velocity. China has gone from tiptoeing gently in the early 2000s, to quick-
stepping up the development whilst tapping into a global knowledge field, and 
finally taking the lead in terms of manufacturing and installed capacity at the turn 
of the decade.  
We cannot predict the future, but we can learn from the past—and as we all 
know, history tends to repeat itself. Looking at how the Chinese wind industry 
has grown has helped to pinpoint the key contributory factors for the growth of 
this green industry. What will eventually lead to changes in an established re-
gime, and ultimately a break from the carbon lock-in, remains to be seen. The 
history of industrialisation has shown that emerging technologies can disrupt an 
existing regime, and the rapid wind industry development may well represent the 
dawn of such a change in China. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: List of the formal interviews 
No. 
Company/ 
Organisation 
Date Person 
Background of 
interviewee 
Topic Affiliation 
1 
Global Wind 
Energy Council 
12.sep 
Liming 
Qiao 
China Director of 
the Global Wind 
Energy Council 
(GWEC) 
Wind 
Policy / 
Research 
2 
Hanergy (solar 
manufacturer 
and wind 
developer) 
15.sep Anonymous 
Representative of 
Hanergy Holding 
Group Limited 
Solar  Industry 
3 
Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
(GIZ) GmbH 
26.sep 
Paul  
Recknagel 
Project Manager, 
Renewable Energy 
Programme, GIZ 
Wind 
Policy / 
Research 
4 
Chinese 
Renewable 
Energy Industry 
Association 
(CREIA) 
29.sep 
Weiquan 
Wang 
Vice Secretary 
General, CREIA 
Wind / 
Solar 
Policy / 
Research 
5 
Energy 
Research 
Institute (ERI) 
of the National 
Development 
and Reform 
Commision 
(NDRC).  
30.sep Li Junfeng 
Deputy Director 
General of ERI and 
Secretary General 
of CREIA 
Wind / 
Solar 
Government/ 
Policy 
6 
XEMC 
Windpower 
27.okt Owen Chan 
Key Account 
Manager of XEMC 
Windpower  
Wind Industry 
7 
China Creative 
Wind Energy 
Co. Ltd. 
31.okt Weihua Liu Sales Manager Wind Industry 
8 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 
01.nov 
Bryan 
Davis 
Wind Analyst Wind 
Policy / 
Research 
9 Nordex China 03.nov 
Vivienne 
Lu 
Marketing 
Manager, Nordex 
China  
Wind Industry 
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10 
Azure 
International 
08.nov 
Sebastian 
Meyer 
China Wind 
Expert, Director 
Rearch & Advisory 
(Renewables) at 
Azure International 
Wind 
Policy / 
Research 
11 NDRC, ERI 08.nov Huang He 
Research Associate 
on Economy and 
Energy Policy, 
Sino-Danish 
Renewable Energy 
Development 
Programme, 
Energy Research 
Institute of the 
NDRC  
Renewable 
energy 
policy, 
Wind / 
Solar 
Government/ 
Policy 
12 Goldwind 14.nov Anonymous 
Technical Support 
Engineer, 
Goldwind Science 
and Technology 
Co. 
Wind Industry 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide (sample) 
The industry refers to the wind turbine manufacturing industry in China. When 
interviewing a company, the industry was replaced by this company, depending 
on the context of each question. 
1) In general 
- Can you briefly describe the industry’s development the last 5-10 years? 
- In your opinion, what was the main contributory factor for the industry’s 
success?  
2) Government institutions or industry associations 
How has state funding contributed to the industry’s development the last 5-10 
years? 
How have state policies, such as the Renewable Energy Law, affected the 
development? 
How has government funded research and development (R&D) investment 
contributed to the success of the industry? 
What measures are taken by the Chinese government to coordinate pricing, 
funding and R&D institutions with the industry? 
The policy on turbine size restrictions (of 1000KW), implemented in 2009 – 
What have the effects been for the industry? 
How important are associations, like the CREIA, for China’s innovative 
capabilities? 
3) The companies 
How has the industry acquired and developed the technology you use? 
- Why is this strategy chosen? 
- Are there any downsides with this strategy? 
What is the nature of the R&D conducted at the industry? 
In your opinion, is the industry innovative and capable of developing competitive 
technology? 
To what extent are workers responsible for innovation in your technology? 
How freely are entrepreneurs in the firm allowed to experiment? 
147 
Do you happen to know the overall R&D intensity (% spent on R&D out of the 
company’s total revenue)? 
What are major forces that inhibit the development of the industry’s (technology) 
development? 
Learning from others and sharing knowledge 
How much communication happens in the industry, between firms, research 
institutions or technical expertise regarding specific knowledge / technologies? 
- How important has this communication been? 
How important are new entrants, or company clusters in a geographical are, to the 
industry’s learning process?  
- Have the increasing amount of firms changed the political power of the 
industry? 
- Has communication with foreign companies played an important role? 
How decisive has easy access to financial capital been, for the development of 
the industry? 
4) Research institutions  
Are the connections between universities and the industry strong? 
To what extent have research institutions contributed to the industry’s 
development? 
Are enough people educated within the industry, to meet the demand created by 
the rapid growth? Has the industry difficulties finding qualified personnel?  
5) Other factors 
To what extent would you say that established interest groups with vested 
interests influence the development of renewable energy in China? And for the 
industry more specifically? 
6) Looking ahead 
What are the main challenges at the moment for further development of the 
industry? 
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Appendix 3: The Information and Consent Form 
Beijing, [month, day], 2011 
Information and Consent Form 
Research project: China’s Renewable Energy Development 
Interviewer: Marius Korsnes, Centre for Development and the Environment, Univer-
sity of Oslo 
Interviewee: … 
Purpose of the study: The general purpose of this study is to improve our understand-
ing of processes involved in the formation and growth of China’s renewable energy in-
dustry, using the wind turbine- and solar cell manufacturing industry as examples.  This 
involves analysing the acquisition and development of technology in the different firms 
in China, comparing and contrasting the experience in the wind turbine- and solar cell 
manufacturing industry. To gather information for this analysis, semi-structured inter-
views will be conducted with people from different segments of the industry in China, 
ranging from the companies themselves, to experts, researchers and government offi-
cials.  
Expected duration of research: Will be finalised in June 2012. 
Usage of information: The information gathered will be used for the analysis under-
taken to complete this specific research project. Upon completion, the study will be pub-
lished internally at the University of Oslo, possibly also externally, if the involved par-
ties agree. The final product, in shape of a M.Phil. thesis, will be publicly available. 
Participation: The interviewee is not in any way obliged to take part in this study, and 
may decline to participate. Also, the interviewee may withdraw from the study at any 
time. If the interviewee decides to withdraw, the information provided will be removed 
from the collected data, and will not be used in the analysis. If the interviewee wishes, 
he or she can remain anonymous. The interviewer will take all precautions to assure the 
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privacy and confidentiality of the interviewee. The interviewee can ask questions about 
the research at any time, and may receive information about the research results and 
conclusions if desired. If the interviewer chooses to use any quotes from the interview, 
the interviewee will be consulted in advance, and it will only be used if the interviewee 
agrees. 
By signing this document, the interviewer confirms that he will commit to the descrip-
tion above.  
By signing this document, the interviewee confirms that he or she is familiar with the 
above information, and agrees to participate in the research project.  
 
 
 
Interviewer       Interviewee 
 
 
 
 
